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 I 
 
Abstract 
 
Probabilistic risk analysis aims to assess the safety risk of a system so that actions 
can then be taken to improve safety. Uncertainty however always exists in modelling. 
For more informed decision making, uncertainty in the outputs of the model must be 
assessed through uncertainty analysis. 
 
This research focuses on parameter uncertainty of a risk model composed of fault 
trees and event trees. Research questions include: (1) how to model the subjective 
uncertainty in the basic events and the consequences; (2) how to propagate the 
uncertainty in the input parameters through fault trees and event trees to obtain 
uncertainty in the output. 
 
Structured approaches are developed to elicit the covariance matrix of the basic 
events and to model dependence among the consequences. To calculate the 
uncertainty propagation, a model is developed to mimic fault trees and event trees; 
an analytical solution and a simulation-based method are developed for assessing the 
uncertainty propagation, which are implemented independently and therefore cross-
check each other. 
 
The developments can be used for subjective uncertainty assessment of Fault-tree 
and Event-tree models. With the developed methods, a reasonable elicitation 
workload is required to model the subjective uncertainty in the input parameters; the 
assessments can be monitored during the elicitation process. The methods for 
assessing the uncertainty in the output can work efficiently for large fault trees and 
event trees. 
 
Two case studies have been conducted with the Safety Risk Model (SRM) developed 
by Rail Safety and Standard Board (RSSB), UK. In the two case studies, the 
developed methods are deployed and experts were confident in making the required 
assessments. The feasibility of the developments is validated by the case studies. 
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Notation 
 
( )E  mean of a random variable 
( ),r  correlation coefficient between two random variables 
( )var  variance of a random variable 
ip  the i
th
 input parameter 
iµ  mean of ip , i.e. ( )ii pE=µ  
iε  residual of the i
th
 parameter ip  in the linear factor model 
iw  coefficient associated with iε  
iσ  standard deviation of iε , ( )ii εσ var2 =  
kiX ,  an uncertainty factor of ip  
,i kλ  coefficient associated with kiX ,  
kC  a factor class of ,i kX  and ,j kX  when ( ), ,, 0i k j kr X X ≠  
kX  a common factor of ,i kX  and ,j kX  when , ,i k j kX X=  
,E iL  set of indices for exclusive factors of ip  
CL  set of indices for factors belonging to a factor class 
XL  set of indices for common factors 
iq  proportion of ( )var ip  explained by the associated uncertainty factors 
zf  the zth parameter family 
( )zI f  set of the invariant factors of the family zf  
( )zfV  set of the variant factors of the family zf  
m n×
R  real matrix composing of m rows and n columns 
iE  an escalation event 
( )iEW  set of outcomes of iE  
,i jω  the 
thj  outcome of iE , ( ),i j iEω ∈W  
 V 
ℓS  the 
th
ℓ  accident sequence 
( )ie ,ℓ  outcome of iE  associated with ℓS , ( ) ( )iEie W∈,ℓ  
( )mπℓ  individual injury probabilities associated with ℓS , where 4,,1⋯=m  stand 
for no injury, minor injury, major injury, and fatality respectively 
ℓN  mean of the number of people exposed to the risk scenario ℓS  
( )mcℓ  consequence at level m associated with ℓS  
jT  the jth hazard type 
( )jTE  subset of escalation events that affect jT  
jH ,ℓ  hazard of the type jT  specified by ℓS  
ℓR  rule set, ( )Dj HHHR ,,1, ,,,, ℓℓℓℓ ⋯⋯=  
( )kmA ji ,,  hazard jiH , ’s transition probability from m level to k level 
( )mA ji ,  transition probability from m-level injury to all higher levels of injuries 
( )
,
,i j m kϕ  mean of ( ), ,i jA m k  
jA  injury atom associated with jT  
jγ  mean of jA  
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Outline 
The goal of this research is to develop methods to support the assessment of 
subjective uncertainty in the output of a risk assessment model composed of fault 
trees and event trees. In this chapter, we start with an introduction to risk and 
probabilistic risk analysis. We continue to an introduction to fault trees and event 
trees as they are widely used in probabilistic risk analysis. We then continue to 
describe how decisions are made based on the probabilistic risk analysis to reduce 
risk. We can not however assess with certainty the input parameters of a probabilistic 
risk analysis model. Consequently we introduce uncertainty and its important role in 
the risk assessment context. We then identify three research aims forming the 
research goal. An overview of this thesis is then given at the end of this chapter. 
 
1.2 Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
As defined in [HSE(Health & Safety Executive) 2001], a hazard is the potential for 
harm arising from an intrinsic property or disposition of something to cause 
detriment. Some hazards are summarized in [Modarres 2006] as: 
• Chemical (e.g., toxins, corrosive agents, smoke) 
• Biological (e.g., viruses, microbial agents, bio-contaminants) 
• Thermal (e.g., explosion, fire) 
• Mechanical (e.g., impact from a moving object, explosion) 
• Electrical (e.g., electromagnetic fields, electric shock) 
• Ionizing radiation (e.g., x-rays, gamma rays) 
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• Nonionizing radiation (e.g., microwave radiation, cosmic rays) 
 
A hazard therefore is a source of danger. When people are exposed to hazards, they 
suffer the chance to be adversely affected by the hazards, which is called risk in 
[HSE(Health & Safety Executive) 2001]. Some people argue that the adverse impact 
on the unlucky people caught in an accident cannot be completely measured [Adams 
2001]. It is however the potential injuries and fatalities that primarily concern us; 
hence, we usually mean safety risk when we refer to risk. When a system is subject 
to hazards, the associated risk can be measured qualitatively or quantitatively. In a 
qualitative way, the risk is assessed on several levels from low to high. In a 
quantitative way, the risk may be measured as the number of the potential injuries 
and fatalities over a unit of time. 
 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) is a systematic procedure for assessing the 
quantitative risk of a system [Bedford and Cooke 2001; Abrahamsson 2002; 
Jonkman, Van Gelder et al. 2003; Dennis 2006; Modarres 2006]. It is also called 
quantitative risk analysis or probabilistic safety analysis (PSA). To conduct a PRA, 
we need to answer three questions as given in [Kaplan and Garrick 1981] as 
 
i. What can go wrong? 
ii. How likely is it to happen? 
iii. Given that it occurs, what are the consequences? 
 
To answer the first question we need to identify the risk scenarios of the system. The 
risk scenario is defined at the end of an accident sequence [Bedford and Cooke 2001] 
Usually the risk scenarios are modelled with event trees that we are going to 
introduce in the next section. To answer the second question, the frequency of each 
risk scenario can be estimated. To answer the third question on the above list, the 
consequences of a risk scenario are defined as the numbers of the injuries sometimes 
including minor injuries, major injuries and fatalities. We denote a risk scenario as 
iS ; we denote by if  and ic  the frequency and the consequence of iS  respectively. 
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The risk is then defined by a set of triplets iii cfS ,, , ni ,,1⋯= , [Kaplan and 
Garrick 1981]. Associated with each risk scenario, the risk may be defined as 
 
 iii cfr ×=  (1.1) 
 
and the risk of the system defined as 
 
 ∑
=
=
ni
irr
,1
 (1.2) 
 
This is the expected value of the consequences. 
 
According to Equations 1.1 and 1.2, probabilistic risk analysis consists of three 
elementary parts including: (1) identifying the risk scenarios; (2) estimate the 
frequencies of the scenarios; (3) estimate the consequences of the scenarios. Fault-
tree and Event-tree models are the most popular tools for these tasks [Bedford and 
Cooke 2001; Abrahamsson 2002]. We are going to give an introduction to Fault-tree 
and Event-tree models in the next section. 
 
1.3 Fault-tree for Event-tree Models 
Fault-tree and Event-tree models have been used extensively in PRA [Kumamoto 
and Henley 1996; Bedford and Cooke 2001; Abrahamsson 2002]. Associated with 
the system of interest, we can identify an initiating event, or several such events, 
which has the potential to cause a series of hazards. After the initiating event we can 
identify a sequence of escalation events, for which the outcomes affect the final 
consequence. Following a “forward logic”, an Event-tree model begins with the 
initiating and continues with the sequence of escalation events. Each event is 
represented by a node in the event tree; the outcomes of an event are represented by 
the branches following the associated nodes. A path from the initiating event through 
all the escalation events is called accident sequence; the risk scenario is defined at 
the end of an accident sequence [Bedford and Cooke 2001]. An example of event 
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tree is extracted from [Kumamoto and Henley 1996]. Shown in Fig. 1.1 is the 
schematic diagram of a pressure tank system. After the pressure gas in the tank is 
discharged, the pump is started to recharge the tank. The tank is protected from 
overpressure initially by a timer that cuts off the current by opening the contact. The 
system includes two more protections. One is the operator who opens the manual 
switch when he reads a high reading of the pressure gauge. The other protection is 
the relief valve that is designed to open automatically when the tank pressure reaches 
a preset height. With such a system, the failure of the timer is identified as an 
initiating event; the two extra protections are identified as the escalation events. The 
event tree of the example is demonstrated in Fig. 1.2, where three risk scenarios are 
defined. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1 Schematic diagram of pressure tank system as a risk analysis example (reproduced with 
permission from [Kumamoto and Henley 1996]) 
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Fig. 1.2 Demonstration of the Fault-tree and Event-tree models (reproduced with permission 
from [Kumamoto and Henley 1996]) 
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The frequency of the scenario is calculated in terms of the frequency of the initiating 
event and the probabilities of the outcomes of the escalation events. The frequency 
and probabilities can be estimated directly for some events. These events can also be 
broken down to the basic event with fault trees. Following a “backward logic”, a 
fault tree decomposes a particular failure, called the top event, into the basic events 
that by different combinations lead to the failure. With the probabilities of the basic 
events estimated, the frequency or the probability of the top events is calculated 
through the Fault-tree models [Kumamoto and Henley 1996; Bedford and Cooke 
2001]. The basic events are sometimes called precursors [Abrahamsson 2002; Dennis 
2006]. With a fault tree, we can investigate further the causes of the failures and the 
connections between the events. As shown in Fig. 1.2, the initiating event pump 
overrun and the failure of operator shutdown are broken down into the basic events 
through events trees. 
 
With PRA in conjunction with Fault-tree and Event-tree models, we can 
quantitatively investigate the risk of a system and the major sources. Actions can be 
taken accordingly to reduce the risk with the limited resources. We now give an 
introduction to the F-N curve and how it can be made for decision making. 
 
1.4 F-N Curve and Decision Making 
Risk cannot be eliminated and resources required to reduce risk are limited. The aim 
of studying risk is to reduce the risk efficiently with limited resources. The risk as 
defined in Equation 1.2 offers a measure of the risk level over all the risk scenarios. 
It however hides the difference between two types of incidents: one of low frequency 
but high impact consequences; the other one of high frequency but low impact 
consequences. In fact, people have different attitudes toward these two types of 
incidents [Health and Safety Executive 1992]. It is therefore of interest to include the 
frequency and the severity profile in the risk assessment. It can be represented by the 
F-N curve, where N stands for the fatalities in one incident; F stands for the yearly 
frequency of the incidents causing N or more fatalities. As the F-N curves were 
firstly made by Farmer in 1967, they are also called Farmer curves. The F-N curve 
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can be built based on the frequencies and the consequences of the risk scenarios iS , 
ni ,,1⋯= . We at first order the risk scenarios to satisfy ii cc <−1 . We can then plot 
the cumulative frequency ∑
=
=
nik
ki fF
,
 against ic  for ni ,,1⋯= . Because both F and N 
can range across several orders of magnitude, we usually draw the F-N curve on 
logarithmic scales. For examples, the F-N curves are made for road transport, rail 
yards, and airports etc as shown in Fig. 1.3. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.3 Example of F-N Curves (reproduced with permission from [Bedford and Cooke 2001]) 
 
 
We can also set up the risk tolerability criteria on the F-N Curves. As shown in Fig. 
1.4, two F-N lines partition the positive quadrant into three areas marked as 
unacceptable, ALARP and acceptable respectively. The acronym ALARP stands for 
"as low as reasonably possible". If any part of a system’s F-N curve enters the 
unacceptable area, the associated risk is regarded as intolerable. Safety actions must 
be taken to lower the F-N curve accordingly. If a system’s F-N curve is confined to 
the acceptable area, the associated risk can be regarded as tolerable. In other cases 
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when a system’s F-N curve completely or partly lies in the ALARP area, safety 
actions can be pursued based on the cost-benefit analysis. We need to analyze how 
much extra safety can be gained with extra money because the resource is always 
limited. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.4 Demonstration of the risk tolerability criteria defined by F-N curves (reproduced with 
permission from [Haugom, Rikheim et al. 1990]) 
 
 
The F-N curves have been used in risk assessment in various contexts in several 
countries for about three decades [Evans 2003]. In the literature, we can see two risk 
tolerability criteria that are defined by the F-N curves. One is recommended by HSE 
[Health and Safety Executive 1992]; the other is recommended by Netherlands 
Planning Department [Versteeg 1988]. Both criteria are defined by two parallel 
straight lines. The HSE criterion however has the slope -1; while the Dutch criterion 
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has the slope -2. Therefore Dutch criterion has stronger aversion to accidents with 
multiple fatalities. 
 
With the PRA and the criteria on the F-N curves, we can judge whether more actions 
are needed to improve the safety of a given system. However, we cannot assess with 
certainty the probabilities of the basic events and the consequence associated with 
each risk scenario. This uncertainty plays an important role in decision making 
[Morgan and Henrion 1990]. Therefore we need to study the uncertainty in the input 
parameters and then assess the uncertainty in the output. The next section will 
introduce uncertainty. 
 
1.5 Uncertainty Analysis 
1.5.1 Uncertainty Classes 
Typically uncertainty is classified into aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty. 
Aleatory uncertainty describes natural variability. Therefore aleatory uncertainty is 
also called stochastic uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty can be quantified by 
measurements and statistical estimations, or by expert judgement. Epistemic 
uncertainty represents the lack of knowledge. Therefore it is also called knowledge-
based uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty can be quantified by expert opinion 
[Bedford and Cooke 2001]. In practice, it depends on both the current knowledge and 
the measures we use to assess uncertainty. The uncertainty of a complex system 
usually is affected by many factors and therefore is difficult to classify. It can be 
decomposed into more understandable and manageable sources. The system 
uncertainty can then be classified into epistemic parts and aleatory parts. This 
classification is very helpful in practice [Winkler 1996; Bedford and Cooke 2001]. 
Firstly it makes clear that what kinds of methods can be used to model the 
uncertainty. Secondly the classification helps design suitable ways to quantify the 
uncertainty. Thirdly, the classification informs the decision maker about the effects 
of the epistemic uncertainties on the model output that could be reduced by more 
learning. 
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1.5.2 Importance of Modelling the Uncertainty and Dependence of 
the Input Parameters 
To conduct PRA, we need to evaluate the basic events and the consequences 
associated with the scenarios. In the context of risk analysis, generally there are not 
sufficient risk occurrences from which we can estimate the values of the input 
parameters. Consequently these values are mainly elicited from expert judgement 
[Cooke 1991; Iman and Helton 1991; Bedford and Cooke 2001; Abrahamsson 2002]. 
Due to the lack of the knowledge, however, we cannot assess with certainty the 
values of these input parameters. Consequently uncertainty is introduced in 
implementing the probabilistic risk analysis due to imperfect knowledge of the input 
parameters [Winkler 1996; Abrahamsson 2002; Lauridsen, Kozine et al. 2002]. This 
uncertainty belongs to epistemic uncertainty as discussed above. An example of the 
uncertainty in the PRA input parameters can be found in the project ASSURANCE 
(ASSessment of Uncertainty in Risk Analysis of Chemical Establishments) 
[Lauridsen, Kozine et al. 2002]. In this project, seven teams from different European 
countries were asked to assess the frequencies and the consequences of 11 scenarios 
related to an ammonia storage facility. As summarized in Table 1.1 and Fig. 1.5, the 
results show a wide spread for both the frequencies and the consequences. 
 
 
Table 1.1 Example of the variability in the assessed frequencies of the reference scenarios, 
reproduced with permission from [Lauridsen, Kozine et al. 2002] 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.5 Example of the variability in the consequence assessment of the 11 reference scenarios, 
reproduced with permission from [Lauridsen, Kozine et al. 2002] 
 
The uncertainty in the input parameters consequently causes the uncertainty in the 
output of a PRA model. This is demonstrated with the example regarding the project 
ASSURANCE. Based on the assessments of the input parameters as summarized in 
Table 1.1 an Fig. 1.5, one F-N curve is drawn based on each team's assessments. As 
shown in Fig. 1.6, the F-N curves show a considerable spread. For instance, the 
frequency of events leading to 100 or more fatalities ranges over two orders of 
magnitude among the different teams’ assessments. Consequently, the risk level 
could be judged to be tolerable or unacceptable depending on which assessment we 
choose for the decision making. 
 
The above example shows the uncertainty in the output F-N curve that is caused by 
the uncertainty in the input parameters due to multiple teams. The uncertainty also 
exists, however, when the input parameters are elicited from one expert. It can also 
cause the uncertainty in the expectation of risk, which is to be studied in this research. 
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To make a more informative decision, we therefore must study the uncertainty in the 
input parameters and its impact on the uncertainty in the output [Morgan and 
Henrion 1990; Kumamoto and Henley 1996; Winkler 1996; Saltelli, Chan et al. 2000; 
Bedford and Cooke 2001; Abrahamsson 2002; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. It has 
has become a major concern to decision makers, especially those in the public arena 
[Morgan and Henrion 1990; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. Consequently intensive 
studies on uncertainty analysis have been seen in literature. Nuclear industry sees the 
earliest applications of PRA and the uncertainty analysis. A series of papers have 
been published related to the reactor safety [Helton, Johnson et al. 1995; Helton, 
Johnson et al. 1995; Helton, Johnson et al. 1995; Helton, Anderson et al. 1996; 
Helton, Bean et al. 1996; Helton, Bean et al. 1997; Helton 1999; Helton, Anderson et 
al. 2000; Helton, Martell et al. 2000; Kraan and Cooke 2000]. Other applications of 
the uncertainty analysis of PRA include chemical industry [Lauridsen, Kozine et al. 
2002], offshore transport [Nilsen, Gudmestad et al. 1998], food safety [Frey and Patil 
2001], and natural disaster analysis [Iman, Johnson et al. 2002; Bazzurro and Luco 
2005; Li and Ellingwood 2006] etc. Uncertainty analysis is also used in other sectors 
such as cost analysis of engineering Project [Duffey and Van Dorp 1998] and 
production planning [Mula, Poler et al. 2006]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.6 Demonstration of the uncertainty in the estimated risk by F-N curves (reproduced with 
permission from [Abrahamsson 2002]) 
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In addition to the uncertainty in the individual input parameters, dependence often 
exists among the input parameters. When two input parameters hold a strong positive 
dependency, they take either a high value or a low value simultaneously. Ignorance 
of such dependence can result in the significant underassessment of the uncertainty 
in the output. As a result, dependence among the input parameters has a strong 
impact on the uncertainty in the output. Therefore modelling the dependence among 
the input parameters holds an important role in uncertainty analysis [Duffey and Van 
Dorp 1998; Ferson and Hajagos 2005; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006] 
 
With dependencies involved, we usually set up the uncertainty model of the input 
parameters in two steps [Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. First, the uncertainty in each 
individual input parameter is usually assumed to follow a parametric distribution; the 
governing parameters of the distribution are then elicited through expert judgement. 
These parametric distributions are called the marginal distributions of the input 
parameters. Second, the dependence is modelled with the correlations or rank 
correlations that are elicited from experts as well. When the marginal distributions 
are assumed to be normal, the uncertainty model of the input parameters, i.e. a 
multivariate normal distribution, can be defined by further eliciting the correlation 
matrix. For other types of marginal distributions, the joint distribution cannot be 
defined by further eliciting the correlations or the rank correlations. In this case, the 
joint distribution is usually defined with the one of the minimum arbitrary 
information [Bedford and Cooke 2001]. An example of modelling the input 
parameters’ uncertainty including the dependence can be found in [Helton, Johnson 
et al. 1995]. For the 34 input parameters in a reactor accident consequence model, 
each marginal distribution is assumed as either Uniform or Log-Uniform. Rank 
correlations between some pairs of input parameters are assessed for modelling the 
dependence. Another example can be found in [Helton, Anderson et al. 2000; Helton, 
Martell et al. 2000]. For the 57 input parameters in a PRA model WIPP (Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant), each individual marginal distribution is assumed as either 
Uniform, or Log-Uniform, or Triangular, or Student’s respectively. Rank correlations 
between some pairs of input parameters are assessed for modelling the dependence. 
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Modelling the dependence among the random variables is also an important issue in 
other application areas such as project risk analysis [Duffey and Van Dorp 1998; Van 
Dorp 2005], decision analysis [Clemen and Reilly 1999] and actuarial modelling 
[Frees and Valdez 1998]. 
 
1.5.3 General Procedure of Uncertainty Analysis 
Suppose a mathematical model ( )XfY = , where X is a vector of the input 
parameters. Uncertainty analysis aims to assess the uncertainty in Y that is driven by 
the uncertainties in X [Morgan and Henrion 1990; Cooke 1997]. The uncertainty in X 
is usually represented by a joint probability distribution. The uncertainty in Y is then 
calculated by propagating the uncertainty in X through the model ( )XfY = . The 
general procedure for uncertainty analysis is shown in Fig. 1.7. In the example, the 
variable G is a function of three random variables with the distribution denoted as 1f , 
2f  and 3f . Not shown in the diagram is the possible dependence among the three 
input parameters. The distribution of G is then derived through the model 
corresponding to the distributions of the input parameters. For a complex model, the 
distribution of the output is generally built by Monte Carlo simulations and therefore 
called simulated distribution. This procedure is also called probabilistic uncertainty 
analysis. With the strong foundations given by probability and statistics theories, 
probabilistic uncertainty analysis is by far the most widely used method 
[Abrahamsson 2002]. 
 
As a summary, the uncertainty analysis is composed of two steps. First, we build the 
uncertainty model in the input parameters. In the risk analysis context, it is usually 
done through the elicitation of expert judgement. Second, we calculate the 
uncertainty propagation through the model. Accordingly, we are going to identify our 
research aims for uncertainty analysis in the next section. 
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Fig. 1.7 Demonstration of uncertainty analysis of a mathematical model (reproduced with 
permission from [Abrahamsson 2002]) 
 
1.6 Research Aims 
1.6.1 Overview 
This research is founded by the Rail Safety and Standard Board (RSSB), UK. The 
goal is to develop methods for assessing the subjective uncertainty in the output of a 
PRA model. A PRA model usually is built up with three layers as demonstrated in 
Fig. 1.8. As we have discussed above, a PRA model is usually composed of fault 
trees and event trees. The fault trees and event trees are generally built up with 
computer software tools such as Isograph FT+. Therefore these fault trees and event 
trees are represented as computers codes that lie on the inner layer as shown in Fig. 
1.8.  
 
The fault trees and event trees are then parametralized usually through a combination 
of empirical data and expert judgement. Therefore the database of the parameters of 
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the fault trees and event trees form the parameter layer of the PRA model as shown 
in Fig. 1.8. 
 
The experts usually make some common assumptions to assess the parameters. The 
narratives regarding the assumptions form the outside layer as shown in Fig. 1.8. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.8 Three layers of a PRA model. 
 
 
We conduct the uncertainty analysis at the parameter layer. As discussed above, 
uncertainty analysis includes two steps: (1) build uncertainty models of the input 
parameters; and (2) compute the uncertainty propagation through the model. 
Generally there are three areas where input parameters are required in fault trees and 
event trees, including: 
(1) the basic events or precursors of the fault trees; 
(2) the consequences of the event trees; and 
(3) the escalation events. 
 
These three types of input parameters have different properties. At the first stage, we 
focus on studying the uncertainty in the basic events and the consequences; we treat 
as constants the probabilities of the escalation events. 
 
Accordingly we identify three aims for this research:  
Narrative on how the parameters are assessed 
Parameters of the fault trees and event trees 
Fault trees & Event trees 
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(1) develop new methods for modelling the subjective uncertainty in the basic 
events; 
(2) develop new methods for modelling the subjective uncertainty in the 
consequences; 
(3) calculating the uncertainty in the output of the PRA, i.e. calculating the 
propagation of uncertainty of the input through the model. 
 
We will discuss in details the above three research aims. 
 
1.6.2 Modelling Subjective Uncertainty in Basic Events 
There are many input parameters. States of knowledge uncertainties about these 
parameters are correlated. Consequently we have to model a high dimensional joint 
distribution that requires much elicitation time. It is essential to keep the elicitation 
time reasonable to the experts. We usually use parametric marginals for the 
uncertainty of the individual parameters and model the dependences among the input 
parameters separately. The most popular model is the multivariate normal 
distribution [Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. Even assuming this model, there are still 
two issues however when we have many input parameters. Suppose we have n input 
parameters. Besides the means of all the input parameters, we need to elicit n 
standard deviations to define the marginals and ( ) 21−nn  correlations to fill the 
correlation matrix. It is too much to do in practice when n is large. The second issue 
is that the outcome correlation matrix derived from elicitation must be positive semi-
definite. It is a challenge if we fill in the correlation matrix cell by cell from 
elicitation [Bedford and Cooke 2001; Van Dorp 2005; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. 
 
Our aim is to develop a procedure for building the covariance matrix through expert 
judgement elicitation. The procedure should require reasonable time from experts. 
The procedure should be able to guarantee that the outcome covariance matrix is 
positive semi-definite. 
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1.6.3 Modelling Uncertainty in Consequences 
The consequences of a risk scenario are defined here as the mean numbers of injuries, 
that is the product of the number of people exposed to the risk scenarios and the 
individual injury probability. In this research, the numbers of the people exposed to 
the risk scenarios are set as the point-estimates. These numbers are of course subject 
to uncertainty as well. For this research, however, we do not study the uncertainty in 
these numbers. Therefore we study the way that the uncertainty in the consequences 
is influenced by the uncertainty in the individual injury probabilities. 
 
A study of typical fault tree models shows that individual injury probabilities are 
often decided by the outcomes of a subset of the escalation events. A combination of 
the outcomes of the escalation events in the subset that decides the individual injury 
probabilities is defined here as a rule set. Multiple risk scenarios can be associated 
with the same rule set. Once the individual injury probabilities are assessed for a rule 
set, they can be used for all the associated risk scenarios. Therefore modelling the 
consequences on the rule sets typically leads to a reduction of elicitation workload. 
 
There are three difficulties in modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets. First, the rule 
sets are intensively interwoven to each other through the shared escalation events. It 
makes it very difficult to assess the correlation among rule sets. Second, the number 
of the rule sets increases exponentially with the number of the escalation events, 
which implies too many rule sets to assess separately for a large event tree. Third, the 
rule sets should satisfy the monotonicity property, i.e. a rule set associated with 
worse conditions should always have larger individual injury probabilities than 
another associated with better conditions. Such a monotonicity property cannot be 
modelled simply by defining the correlations among the rule sets. 
 
In order to model uncertainty in the consequences, we must therefore develop 
suitable methods for modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets. The method should 
require reasonable elicitation time from the experts and be able to keep the 
monotonicity property among the rule sets. 
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1.6.4 Calculating Uncertainty Propagation through Fault-tree and 
Event-tree Models 
Usually Fault-tree and Event-tree models are built with commercial software tools 
such as Isograph FT+. Consequently these fault trees and event trees are defined as 
the computer codes that are not very transparent to the users. For such a PRA model, 
it is difficult to manipulate the database underlying the model for calculating the 
uncertainty propagation. Furthermore, a large Fault-tree and Event-tree model can be 
composed of as many as thousands of input parameters. We need efficient methods 
for calculating the uncertainty propagation through such a large model. 
 
Our aim is to select or develop efficient methods to conduct uncertainty propagation 
through a large PRA model. The methods should be able to work on the computer 
fault trees and events models built with commercial software tools. The methods 
should also be able to work efficiently on a large Fault-tree and Event-tree model. 
 
1.7 Thesis Overview 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. 
 
In Chapter 2, literature review is made on the following topics: (1) methods for 
eliciting the marginal probability distribution of the individual variables; (2) methods 
for eliciting the dependence between two input parameters; (3) architectures for 
modelling high dimensional dependence; and (4) methods for propagating the 
uncertainty through mathematical models. The gaps in the literature are then 
highlighted at the end of the chapter. 
 
In Chapter 3, a procedure is developed for building the correlation matrix for 
multiple input parameters through elicitation on uncertainty factors. The input 
parameters are then partitioned into families by their definitions. A method is 
developed for deriving the variance of the input parameters within the associated 
families. Included at the end of the chapter are a method for eliciting the correlation 
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between two random variables and a method for eliciting the variance of an input 
parameter family. 
 
In Chapter 4, a method is developed for modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets 
through injury atoms. An injury atom is defined for a hazard source. Once defined 
the injury atoms can be used for all the rule sets. The rule sets are then defined by the 
combination of the injury atoms. 
 
In Chapter 5, a method is developed for building a mimic Excel model of the fault 
trees and event trees. With the mimic model, we can manipulate the data 
conveniently for conducting uncertainty analysis. We then select a linear 
transformation to define the correlated normal random variables on a set of 
independent standard normal random variables. The transformation is suitable when 
the covariance matrix is positive semi-definite and standard deviations are very small. 
An analytical solution of the variance is then developed. The software designs are 
then developed for calculating the analytical solution of the variance and for 
conducting the simulations based on the mimic Excel model. 
 
In Chapter 6, two case studies are made with RSSB-SRM HET10 and HET12. The 
case studies validate the practical performance of the elicitation procedure and 
methods developed in this thesis. The case studies also validate that the methods for 
calculating the uncertainty propagation through a large Fault-tree and Event-tree 
model are efficient. 
 
In Chapter 7, the aims of the research are reviewed first. The developments of this 
research are then summarized and discussed. At the end of the chapter some future 
research is proposed. 
 
In Appendix A, we propose a set of methods for building the distribution of the sum 
of products of continuous random variables. More work however is needed to 
measure and control the approximation errors. Once this is done, these methods can 
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be used to calculate the analytical approximate distribution of output of a Fault-tree 
and Event-tree model. 
 
In Appendix B, tables giving complete information relating to the cases considered in 
Chapter 6 are presented. 
 
In Appendix C, some theories on positive definite matrix and positive semi-definite 
matrix are presented. These theories are referred to in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As stated in Chapter 1, this research focuses on the subjective uncertainty analysis of 
a mathematical model, which mainly involves two tasks: (1) modelling the subjective 
uncertainty in the input parameters through expert judgement elicitation; and (2) 
propagating uncertainty through the mathematical model. 
 
In the literature, expert judgement is often used for building the distributions for 
individual variables, i.e. the marginal distributions. Due to the difficulties of 
assessment, dependence was initially ignored in building the uncertainty of multiple 
input parameters [Smith, Ryan et al. 1992]. It was found, however, that dependence 
had a strong effect on the probability distribution of the output and therefore must be 
modelled for most applications [Clemen and Winkler 1985]. By the divide-and-
conquer strategy, the elicitation of dependence can be separated from the elicitation 
of the marginal probability distributions of the individual variables [Clemen, Fischer 
et al. 2000]. Theoretically the dependence can be modelled by the elicitation of 
conditional distributions. The elicitation of the conditional distribution is however 
difficult even for two variables. It is practically impossible to elicit the conditional 
distributions for a set of variables [Ravinder, Klenmuntz et al. 1988]. A feasible way 
is to model the dependence between two variables with the correlation coefficient or 
rank correlations. For multiple variables, the dependence between each pair of 
variables can be elicited. The pairwise dependencies are then organized to define the 
dependence among the multiple variables. The structure used to organize the 
pairwise dependencies is called dependence structure  [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000; 
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Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. The correlation matrix, for example, is a common 
dependence structure. 
 
As shown in Fig. 2.1, the literature review is made to cover four parts: (1) the 
methods for eliciting the marginal probability distribution of the individual variables; 
(2) the methods for eliciting the dependence between two input parameters; (3) the 
dependence structures for modelling high dimensional dependence; and (4) the 
methods for propagating the uncertainty through mathematical models. In this 
literature review we compare the existing methods for elicitation from a practical 
perspective. The aim is to select suitable elicitation methods and/or to find where we 
can put our efforts to improve the methods for the use in our project. Rather than 
investigating the psychological and behavioural theories underlying the elicitation 
methods, we compare the elicitation methods based on the current knowledge of 
behavioural theories and the applications in elicitation practices so far. At the end of 
the chapter, we highlight the gaps that we find in the literature. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 Demonstration of the literature review scope 
 
 
1. Eliciting the probability 
of individual variables 
2. Eliciting the 
dependency 
3. Dependence 
structures 
Modelling subjective 
uncertainty in multiple 
input parameters 
4. Uncertainty 
propagation through 
mathematical models 
Subjective 
uncertainty analysis 
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2.2 Modelling Subjective Uncertainty in Multiple Input 
Parameters 
To assess the uncertainty in the output of a mathematical model, we need to build a 
uncertainty model for the input parameters [Morgan and Henrion 1990]. In the risk 
analysis context, we usually build the subjective uncertainty in the input parameters 
through expert judgement. The subjective uncertainty represents the experts’ 
knowledge and beliefs about the uncertainty in the input parameters. Elicitation is the 
process by which we formulate the experts’ knowledge and beliefs into probability 
distributions [Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005]. It is admitted that there is a limit in 
experts’ ability to perceive abstract variables. With the great effort in improving the 
elicitation, however, expert judgement is increasingly employed for input in 
quantitative uncertainty modelling [Kurowicka and Cooke 2006; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 
2006]. 
 
A sound process is essential to implement a good elicitation. The elicitation process 
proposed by SRI International for eliciting the probabilities [Merkhofer 1987] is 
composed of seven stages. In line with the SRI International process, a new process 
is developed to cope with bias caused in the elicitation [Walls and Quigley 2001]. 
The process includes five main stages. Another process with five stages is 
summarized via the transcript of a real elicitation interview [Shephard and Kirkwood 
1994]. Another elicitation process with seven steps is recommended in [Clemen and 
Reilly 2001]. Broadly these proposed processes cover the same tasks. Some tasks 
may be split into two in some processes; the order in which the tasks should be 
carried out may be slightly different. At a high level, four basic stages for 
implementing an elicitation are summarized as: Set up, Elicit, Fit, and Evaluate 
[Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005]. The Set up stage consists of the preparation for the 
elicitation. Specifically it includes: selecting the experts, training the experts, 
identifying what aspects of the problem to elicit. The Elicit stage is the 
implementation of elicitation. The experts are asked to answer the properly designed 
questions. In the Fit stage the elicited information, i.e. the experts’ answers, is 
transferred into the mathematical models such as the distributions or joint 
distributions. In the Evaluate stage, we need to judge whether the elicitation outcome 
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is adequate or not. We need to emphasize that an elicitation is well done if the 
elicited information accurately represents the expert’s belief and knowledge. It is not 
related to how good that knowledge is [Cooke 1991; Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005]. 
 
From the description of the elicitation process, one important issue about the 
elicitation is what kinds of variables can be elicited from the experts. As a guiding 
principle, experts should be asked the questions about quantities that are meaningful 
to them. This suggests that questions should generally concern observable quantities 
rather than unobservable parameters [Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; O'Hagan, Buck 
et al. 2006]. In some applications, it is also possible that the particular statistical 
model is so familiar to the experts that their parameters have acquired well-
understood scientific meaning. In this case it is also appropriate to ask experts 
directly about such parameters [Kadane 1980; Winkler 1980]. For instance, the 
probability of the basic event of a fault tree has a well understood meaning and 
therefore is not an abstract model parameter. Therefore it can be elicited from the 
experts [Bedford and Cooke 2001]. 
 
2.3 Eliciting Marginal Distributions 
2.3.1 Overview  
The uncertainty about an unknown continuous variable is generally expressed by its 
probability distribution, called marginal distribution. The marginal distribution is 
usually inferred from the elicitation of some summary statistics of the unknown 
variable [Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. The summary 
statistics widely found in the literature include probabilities, quantiles, intervals, the 
modes and the medians [Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. 
Details on these summaries will be discussed later. 
 
In practice we can only elicit a few summary statistics from the experts. The 
marginal distribution can then be built by fitting the elicited summary statistics based 
on some assumptions. For example, we can assume that that the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) is continuous and smooth. Consequently a nonparametric 
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marginal distribution can be fitted with the elicited summary statistics. A good 
summary of the methods for doing such fitting can be found in [O'Hagan, Buck et al. 
2006]. To get a reasonably good representation of the distribution, quite a few 
summary statistics are required. The marginal distribution can also be assumed to 
follow a parametric distribution family. It mainly has three advantages: (1) fewer 
assessments of the summaries are required; (2) expert judgement can be checked and 
adjusted by a few extra assessments; (3) parametric distributions are easy to analyze. 
 
2.3.2 Summary Statistics 
The cumulative probabilities of an unknown variable are valuable summaries. 
Suppose that X is an unknown variable. We can set a series of values of ixX = , 
ni ,,1⋯=  and ji xx <  for ji < . The probabilities ( )ixX ≤Pr  are then elicited from 
the experts. Alternatively, we can set a series of probabilities spreading over the 
interval [ ]1,0  that are denoted as ip , ni ,,1⋯= . The values ( )ipx  satisfying 
( )( ) ii ppxX =≤Pr , called quantiles or percentiles, are then elicited from the experts. 
The most used quantile is the median, which is obtained by setting 5.0=ip . Starting 
with the median, a method of bisection is often used to elicit a number of quantiles 
[O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. By the bisection method, the expert is firstly asked the 
question: 
 
Q1. Can you determine a value such that it is equally likely that X is less than or 
greater than this value? 
 
The elicited value from this question is the median, i.e. ( )5.0x . We will then ask the 
expert the two more questions: 
 
Q2. Suppose that X is below ( )5.0x . Can you now determine a new value such 
that it is equally likely that X is less than or greater than this value? 
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Q3. Suppose that X is above ( )5.0x . Can you now determine a new value such 
that it is equally likely that X is less than or greater than this value? 
 
The answers to the above two questions give the experts' assessments of ( )25.0x  and 
( )75.0x . This can continue with more bisections, although it becomes more difficult 
for the expert to assess. A good example of the bisection method can be found in 
[Peterson, Snapper et al. 1972]. 
 
The quantile elicitation can also be carried out on the so-called credible interval 
[Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. Associated with a 
probability [ ]1,0∈p , the central credible interval is defined by 
( ) ( )[ ]25.0,25.0 pxpx +− , where ( )25.0 px −  and ( )25.0 px +  are the two 
quantiles that satisfy 
 
 ( )( ) 25.025.0Pr ppxX −=−≤  
 
and 
 
 ( )( ) 25.025.0Pr ppxX +=+≤  
 
For example, the central credible interval associated with 5.0=p  is the interval 
defined by the lower and upper quartiles. 
 
In elicitation, the expert is advised with the definition of the central credible interval 
and then is asked to assess ( )25.0 px −  and ( )25.0 px +  corresponding to the 
probability p. Many experiments have demonstrated that the experts perform 
reasonably well in assessing credible intervals. However there is a clear tendency for 
experts to give a short central interval, which is called overconfidence [Peterson, 
Snapper et al. 1972; Schaefer and Borcherding 1973; Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 
1980]. 
 
 28 
So far there is still no conclusion on whether eliciting cumulative probability or 
eliciting quantiles leads to better performance. Eliciting the probability is reported as 
giving better performance in [Seaver, Von Winterfeldt et al. 1978], while eliciting 
the percentiles is reported as giving better performance in [Murphy and Winkler 
1974]. More recently an adaptive fixed interval method is reported as giving better 
performance in [Winman, Hansson et al. 2004], while eliciting the percentile 
including the median is recommended in [Soll and Klayman 2004]. 
 
As an alternative to eliciting the probabilities and the quantiles, the ratios of the 
probabilities can be elicited in the method termed the analytic hierarchy process 
(AHP)[Saaty 1977; Saaty 1980; Hughes 1993; Cagno, Caron et al. 2000; Monti and 
Carenini 2000]. To elicit a set of probabilities nppp ,,, 21 ⋯ , the expert is asked to 
assess the relative probabilities ii pp  for ji ≠ . The probabilities ip , ni ,,1⋯=  can 
be derived by eliciting the minimum set of ( )1−n  ratios, e.g. 1ppi , ni ,,2 ⋯= . 
When more ratios are elicited, the inconsistency among the assessments can be 
identified and used to adjust the expert judgment [Saaty 1980; Basak 1998]. Rather 
than eliciting the absolute value, the ratios are assessed using a scale from 1 to 9, 
where the points on the scale are associated with verbal descriptions. For example, 
the ratio ( ) ( ) 5PrPr =BA  is described as “A is strongly more probable than B”. 
Therefore we can see that AHP is based on relative verbal assessments that are 
believed easy to implement in practice [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000; Garthwaite, 
Kadane et al. 2005; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006; Park and Lee 2008]. The AHP 
methods are still under development with the enhancement by other techniques. A 
Bayesian paired comparison approach is developed for assessing the accident 
probability in [Szwed, Van Dorp et al. 2006]. A new method for eliciting human 
error probabilities is developed as a combination of AHP and the success likelihood 
index method (SLIM) [Park and Lee 2008]. 
 
Psychological scaling models utilize paired comparisons to implement elicitation as 
AHP does [Cooke 1991]. A set of events are pairwise compared in terms of their 
likelihood. The elicited data are then analyzed with a psychological model. Based on 
different assumptions, three psychological scaling models are developed including: 
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the Thurstone model, the Bradley-Terry model, and the NFL(negative exponential 
lifetime) model [Cooke 1991]. Compared with AHP, the Psychological scaling 
models use clear statistical assumptions. 
 
Besides the summaries related to probability, an expert’s ability to estimate the 
location measures including the mean, the median and the mode has been 
investigated in some experiments [Spencer 1961; Spencer 1963; Peterson and Miller 
1964; Beach and Swenson 1966]. The experiments show that the expert can give 
good estimation for all three location estimators for an approximately symmetric 
distribution [Spencer 1961; Beach and Swenson 1966]. However for highly skewed 
variable, the experiment shows that the expert has good performance in assessing the 
median and the mode while the mean is biased towards the median [Peterson and 
Miller 1964]. 
 
2.4 Methods for Eliciting Dependence between Two Random 
Variables 
2.4.1 Overview 
As presented before, the dependence between two variables is modelled practically 
by eliciting the correlation coefficient. In this section, we start with a brief 
description of the three correlation coefficients that are commonly used to measure 
the dependence between two variables. As for eliciting the marginal distributions of 
the individual variables, the correlation coefficients need to be derived by eliciting 
some summary statistics regarding the dependence. The correlation itself is one of 
the summaries that can be elicited. Six elicitation methods found in the literature are 
reviewed. 
 
2.4.2 Classification of Correlations 
The three types of correlations defined for two random variables are product-moment 
correlation, rank correlation and Kendall’s τ . Product-moment correlation is also 
called Pearson’s correlation. For two random variables X and Y, with finite 
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expectations ( )XE , ( )YE  and finite variance 2Xσ , 2Yσ , the product-moment 
correlation is defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
YX
YEXEXYEYXr
σσ
−
=,  
 
Product-moment correlation defined above is a measure of the linear relationship 
between the random variables and ( ) 1, ±=YXr  if and only if baXY +=  for some 
0≠a . 
 
Rank correlation is also called Spearman rank correlation. Suppose that X and Y are 
two random variables. Suppose further that XF  and YF  are the cumulative 
distribution functions of X and Y respectively. Define the quantile variables 
 
( )XFU X=  
 
( )YFV Y=  
 
By the above definition, U and V are two random variables with the support defined 
on [ ]1,0 . The rank correlation of X and Y is then defined as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
VU
r
VEUEUVEVUrYX
σσ
ρ −== ,,  
 
Therefore rank correlation is defined on the quantile variables. As a result, rank 
correlation is invariant with respect to strictly increasing transformations of the 
random variables, as all such transformations have the same quantile variables. 
 
Suppose that X and Y are two random variables of the cumulative distribution 
function XF  and YF  respectively. Let ( )11,YX  and ( )22 ,YX  be two independent pairs 
of samples of ( )YX , . Kendall’s τ  of X and Y is defined as 
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( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]0Pr0Pr 12121212 <−−−>−−= YYXXYYXXτ  
 
For two random variables X and Y, the above three correlations can be derived 
through the elicitation methods discussed below. When X and Y are assumed to 
follow normal distributions, the joint normal distribution can then be defined with the 
product-moment correlation. For the general marginal distributions, the joint 
distribution of X and Y can be derived with a suitable copula that is to be discussed 
later on. 
 
2.4.3 Main Methods for Eliciting Correlations 
Six main methods for eliciting the correlations have been well investigated in the 
literature. As summarized in [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000] the six methods include: 
• the correlation strength, called the S method; 
• direct elicitation of the correlation coefficient, called the R method; 
• conditional fractile elicitation, called the CF method; 
• concordance probability elicitation; called the CNC method; 
• joint probability elicitation, called the JP method; 
• conditional probability elicitation, called the CP method 
 
With the S method, a continuous line scale is presented; and the left and right ends 
represent being independent and perfect correlation respectively. The expert is asked 
to mark on the line with the location representing his belief of the dependence 
between the two variables. The location of the mark is then linearly transformed to a 
correlation between 0 and 1. In addition, the expert is asked whether the two 
variables are positively or negatively correlated.  
 
With the R method, the expert is asked to assess directly the correlation coefficient 
between the two random variables. 
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Suppose the random variables X and Y have marginal distributions ( )xF  and ( )yG  
respectively and the joint density ( )yxf YX ,, . With the CF method, the expert is 
informed that a pair of sample ( )yx,  is drawn randomly from ( )yxf YX ,, . The expert 
is then informed about the probability ( )yY ≤Pr , i.e. ( )yG . In the case studies in 
[Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000], it is set as ( ) 9.0=yG . The expert is then asked to 
assess probability ( )yYxX ≤≤Pr . The correlation between X and Y can then be 
derived through non-parametric regression: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ), 0.5 0.5X Y yE F r X Y G y≤ = − +  
 
In the above formula, ( )yG  is preset; ( )X Y yE F ≤  is obtained from the elicitation; and 
the Spearman’s rank correlation ( )YXr ,  can then be solved in terms of ( )yG  and 
( )X Y yE F ≤ . We can see that ( )yG  has to be taken not equal to 0.5. 
 
With the CNC method, the expert is informed that two pairs of samples ( )11, yx  and 
( )22 , yx  are drawn randomly from ( )yxf YX ,, . The expert is then informed that 
12 xx >  and is asked to assess the probability of 12 yy > . It is the concordance 
probability that is actually elicited by the CNC method. Naturally Kendall's τ  is 
employed to model the elicited probability as defined as 
 
12 −= CPτ  
 
where the CP  stands for the elicited probability; τ  is the estimate of Kendall's τ . 
 
The derived Kendall's τ  can be used directly to define the joint distribution 
( )yxf YX ,,  by selecting a suitable copula [Bedford and Cooke 2001; Kurowicka and 
Cooke 2006]. When the bivariate normal distribution is assumed for X and Y, the 
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Pearson product-moment correlation and the Spearman's rank correlation can also be 
derived from the Kendall's τ  as defined in [Kruskal 1958] as 
 
( ) ( )2sin, piτ=YXr  
 
( ) 





= 6sin2,
rYXr piρ  
 
where ( )YXr ,  and rρ  stand for the Pearson's correlation and Spearman's rank 
correlation respectively. 
 
With the JP method, the expert is asked to assess the probability of a random sample 
falling in a specific area, i.e. the probability ( )LL yYandxX ≤≤Pr , where Lx  and 
Ly  are preset values such as the 30 percentile [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000]. 
 
With the CP method, the expert is told that sample ( )yx,  is drawn randomly from 
( )yxf YX ,, . The expert is then informed x falls into the lower [ ]1,0∈P  part of X, i.e. 
Pxx ≤ , where Px  is the P×100  percentile of X. The P is set as 60% in the case 
studies in [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000]. The expert is then asked to assess the 
probability ( )PP xXyY ≤≤Pr , where Py  is the P×100  percentile of Y. With the 
elicited joint probability from the JP method or the conditional probability from the 
CP method, the Pearson correlation between X and Y can then be calculated by 
assuming bivariate normal distribution for X and Y. 
 
The above six methods are compared with two case studies in [Clemen, Fischer et al. 
2000]. The research demonstrates that the R method and the S method give the best 
performance in terms of accuracy. They are also considered the easiest to implement. 
This conclusion seems controversial since the R method was reported as a poor one 
in the earlier research [Gokhale and Press 1982; Morgan and Henrion 1990; Kadane 
and Wolfson 1998]. For the S method, it seems a strong assumption to linearly 
transform the mark location to the correlation. The good performance of the R 
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method and the S method in [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000], however, can be attributed 
to the two aspects: (1) the respondents in the experiments are very familiar with the 
statistical correlations; (2) the training method is very efficient. The training was 
done in the same way as the software Crystal Ball does [ORACLE 2008]. For a pair 
of bivariate normal random variables, the samples are drawn on a preset correlation 
and then the scatter plot is presented on the screen. Based on the scatter plot, the 
expert is asked to assess the correlation by the S method and R method. The expert is 
then informed with the true correlation to adjust their judgment. The investigation in 
[Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000] demonstrates that the good assessment of the 
correlations can be obtained by the S and R method when the expert knows well 
about the statistical correlations and has an efficient training process. 
 
2.5 High Dimensional Dependence Modelling 
2.5.1 Overview 
Considering the difficulties and the cost in elicitation, the uncertainty model for 
multiple input parameters in practice is usually built by parametric marginal 
distributions of the individual variables plus the correlations among the parameters. 
Consequently, the uncertainty model can be built in two stages: (1) building the 
marginal distribution of the individual parameters; (2) modelling the dependences 
among the parameters [Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. After the review of the methods 
for eliciting the marginal probability distributions and the correlations between a pair 
of random variables, the methods for defining the correlations for high dimensional 
input parameters are to be reviewed in this section. 
 
2.5.2 Multivariate Normal Distributions 
When the individual input parameters can be assumed to follow normal distributions, 
the uncertainty in the input parameters can be completely defined by the means, the 
variances, and the correlation matrix. The multivariate normal distribution is one of 
the best choices for modelling the uncertainty in the input parameters. It requires less 
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elicitation than other parametric joint distributions do. It is also easy to conduct 
analysis [Ghosh and Henderson 2003; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. 
 
For n random variables, there are ( ) 21−nn  correlation coefficients needed to elicit 
to build the correlation matrix. For very high dimensional input parameters, however, 
elicitation work for building the correlation matrix is still too time intensive. The 
situation becomes worse since we have to keep the outcome matrix positive definite 
or positive semi-definite. Different methods have been developed to obtain a positive 
semi-definite correlation matrix by adjusting the outcome matrix from elicitation. 
Usually some assumptions have to be made for this purpose [Ghosh and Henderson 
2002; Ghosh and Henderson 2003; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. 
 
2.5.3 Copula Trees and the Copula Vines 
For two random variables with general marginal distributions rather than normal 
distributions, the joint distribution cannot be defined completely by defining the 
correlation matrix. This difficulty can be dealt with by introducing copulas that are 
defined on the quantile variables. 
 
Suppose that the random variables X and Y have cumulative distribution functions 
( )xFX  and ( )yFY  respectively. Define ( )XFU X=  and ( )YFV Y= . Therefore U and 
V are random variables of uniform marginal distributions. The copula of X and Y is 
defined as the joint distribution of ( )VU ,  and denoted as ( )vuC YX ,, . Every 
continuous bivariate distribution can be completely determined by the copula and the 
marginal distributions as ( ) ( ) ( )( )yFxFCyxF YXYXYX ,, ,, =  [Clemen and Reilly 1999]. 
For a given copula ( )vuC YX ,, , Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient and Kendall’s 
τ  can be calculated as in [Nelsen 2006]. We know that the transformation by the 
cumulative distribution function does not change Spearman’s rank correlation or 
Kendall’s τ . Therefore we can design the copula ( )vuC YX ,,  to satisfy the rank 
correlations that are elicited for X and Y. As a result, the outcome joint distribution 
that is defined by the ( )xFX , ( )yFY  and ( )vuC YX ,,  has the rank correlation as 
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elicited from the expert [Jouini and Clemen 1996; Clemen and Reilly 1999; Bedford 
and Cooke 2001; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. Case 
studies using copulas to define dependence can be found in [Clemen and Reilly 
1999]. 
 
Based on the specific characteristics, different copulas can be defined. A good 
general review of the copulas can be found in [Bedford and Cooke 2001; Kurowicka 
and Cooke 2006; Nelsen 2006]. 
 
For high-dimensional input parameters, Markov trees and copula vines can be used 
to define the joint distributions on the rank correlations or conditional rank 
correlations [Bedford and Cooke 2001; Bedford and Cooke 2002]. The outcome joint 
distribution can satisfy exactly the rank correlations elicited from the experts. Many 
case studies using Markov trees and copula vines have been found in the literature 
such as [Yi and Bier 1998; Clemen and Reilly 1999; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. 
 
Markov trees cannot be used to represent any joint dependence structure. Copula 
vines however can be constructed to model any given rank correlation matrix exactly. 
 
2.5.4 Modelling Dependence through Common Factors 
The method for modelling the dependence through common factors was initially 
developed on a single common factor in a risk analysis model in [Duffey and Van 
Dorp 1998]. It was further extended to multiple factors in [Van Dorp 2005]. As 
demonstrated in Fig 2.2, the iU 's in the left side circles represent common factors to 
the input parameters jX 's in the right side circles; the variable jY  in the middle box 
is a surrogate variable aggregating the effects of the iU 's on the jX 's. 
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Fig. 2.2 A model for defining the dependence among multiple random variables on the common 
factors, extracted from [Van Dorp 2005] 
 
 
The common factors iU  are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [ ]1,0 . 
The lowest and highest risk level of iU  are set to 0 and 1 respectively. To one input 
parameter jX , the factors iU , mi ,,1⋯=  can have different importance. To measure 
the relative importance of the factors to jX , the weights ijw , , mi ,,1⋯= , are 
defined. To derive the weights, the m factors can be compared pairwise in terms of 
their importance to the input parameter jX . For each pair of factors ( )1iU  and ( )2iU , 
( ) ( ) mii ,,11,1 ⋯= , the elicited information is how many times ( )1iU  is more important 
to jX  than ( )1iU . With the elicited information, the weights can be derived and 
normalized to keep 
 
 1
1
,
=∑
=
m
i
ijw , 10 , ≤≤ ijw  
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Therefore the weights measure the relative importance of a factor to one input 
parameter. We can say that ( )1iU  is 
( )
( )2,
1,
ij
ij
w
w
 times more important to jX  than ( )2iU . 
 
Based on the elicited weights, the aggregated factor is defined as a weighted linear 
combination 
 
∑
=
=
m
i
iijj UwY
1
,
 
 
At the next step, the bivariate dependence between jY  and jX  needs to modelled. It 
can be implemented with a copula ( ) ( )( )jj XFYFC , . 
 
As a summary, the dependence between jX , nj ,,1⋯=  is modelled by the common 
factors iU , mi ,,1⋯= , the weights, the aggregated factor jY 's and the copulas 
( ) ( )( )jj XFYFC , . Modelling through common factors offers a flexible framework 
that does not require a special structure among the parameters. Exploring and ranking 
the common factors iU 's offer the insight into the dependence mechanism in a 
structured way. To populate the model, mn ×  weights ijw , 's and n copulas 
( ) ( )( )jj XFYFC ,  need to be elicited. For high-dimension models, it requires much 
less elicitation workload than directly eliciting the ( ) 21−nn  correlations among the 
n parameters. Since no correlation matrix of the parameters is required, there is no 
difficult in keeping it positive definite. 
 
In this method, if the factors iU  were independent normal random variables, the 
aggregated factors jY  would be correlated normal random variables. From this 
perspective, the method is close to the idea of a normal copula. 
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2.6 Uncertainty Analysis Methods 
2.6.1 Overview 
There are two types of uncertainties: model uncertainty and parameter uncertainty 
[Morgan and Henrion 1990]. Model uncertainty arises from the fact that any model is 
a simplification of the reality. It is not covered in this research. We focus on 
parameter uncertainty. 
 
Suppose there is a mathematical model ( )XfY = , where Y is a scalar output; 
[ ]nXX ,,1 ⋯=X  is a vector of the input parameters of the dimension n . Parameter 
uncertainty analysis aims to assess the uncertainty in y that is caused by the 
uncertainties in X [Rabitz 1989; Cooke 1997; Saltelli, Chan et al. 2000]. It is also 
called uncertainty propagation in [Morgan and Henrion 1990; Iman, Johnson et al. 
2002]. The uncertainty in X is represented by a joint probability distribution. The 
uncertainty in Y is then calculated as the propagation of the input uncertainty through 
the model, and called probabilistic uncertainty analysis [Abrahamsson 2002; Helton, 
Johnson et al. 2006]. There are also some other types of uncertainty representations 
such as interval analysis and fuzzy theory [Helton, Johnson et al. 2004]. We focus on 
probabilistic uncertainty analysis in this research. 
 
In this section, a literature review is made on the methods for probabilistic 
uncertainty analysis, including analytical methods, and simulation-based methods. 
 
2.6.2 Analytical methods 
With the joint distribution of the input parameters, the distribution of the output 
should ideally be derived as the distribution of the function of the random variables 
[Ross 2003]. This is called the analytical method. The exact analytical distribution of 
the output however can be derived only for simple models such as linear models of 
normal variables. Generally the original model needs to be approximated with its 
Taylor series. The mean, the variance and the higher order moments can then be 
calculated based on the approximate model. Since only the moments of the output 
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can be derived, the method is also referred to as the “method of moments” [Morgan 
and Henrion 1990; Robinson 1998; Abrahamsson 2002]. 
 
We can see that the “method of moments” only represents an approximation of the 
original model. When the variance in the input is large, higher order terms in the 
Taylor expansion must be included. This introduces much more complexity of the 
algebra especially for the complex original models, as is the case in risk analysis. 
 
2.6.3 Simulations-based Methods 
2.6.3.1 Overview 
Given the limitation of the analytical methods, simulation-based methods are the 
most popular ways to carry out probabilistic uncertainty analysis. This trend has been 
enhanced further by the rapid development of the computer and software 
technologies. 
 
Suppose that the joint distribution of [ ]nXX ,,1 ⋯=X  is known. A sample of X  is 
denoted as [ ]nkkk xx ,1, ,,⋯=x , where ikx ,  is a sample of iX . By the joint distribution 
of X , we can generate a set of independent and identically distributed samples of X , 
denoted as kx , snk ,,1⋯= , where sn  stands for the size of the samples. The sample 
kx , can then be fed into the model )(Xf  and a sample of Y can be calculated as 
( )kk fy x= . Such a process is called Monte Carlo simulation. Based on the simulated 
ky , snk ,,1⋯= , the mean, the variance and the empirical distribution of Y can then 
be estimated. This is called a simulation-based method. [Helton and Davis 2002] 
 
From the above description, the core of the simulation-based method is to generate 
samples of the input parameters that satisfy the pre-specified joint distribution. The 
two most important sampling methods are random sampling and Latin hyper-cube 
sampling [Helton and Davis 2000; Helton, Johnson et al. 2006].  
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2.6.3.2 Random Sampling 
Random sampling is associated with Monte-Carlo simulation [Sobol 1974]. Suppose 
a random variable X  has the CDF ( )xFX . By the random sampling method, the 
samples of X is generated using ( )xFX . Define the random variable U  as uniformly 
distributed in [0, 1]. At the first step, a set of independent and identically distributed 
samples of U , denoted as 
Sn
uu ,,1 ⋯ , are generated through a algorithm, called 
random number generator. The most common algorithm is the multiplicative 
congruential method. Starting with a seed 0s , a sequence of numbers are generated 
by the multiplicative congruential method as 
 
( ) ( )mass kk mod1−= , ⋯,2,1=k  
 
where a  and m  are preset integers; ( )mod  is the function returning the remainder 
after 1−kas  is divided by m . 
 
Therefore ks  takes a value in { }1,,0 −m⋯ . The samples of U  are then calculated by 
 
m
s
u ki = , snk ,,1⋯=  
 
With large a  and m , 
Sn
uu ,,1 ⋯  are approximately independent and identically 
distributed samples of U . The IBM System/360 Uniform Random Generator is built 
on the multiplicative congruential method taking 1231 −=m  and 57=a . It has been 
used in many mathematical software packages and gives good results. 
 
We can see that the 
Sn
uu ,,1 ⋯  are not really random; they are decided by the preset 
seed 0s  and the preset integers a  and m . Therefore Snuu ,,1 ⋯  are called pseudo-
random numbers. More discuss on generating the pseudo-random numbers can be 
found in [L'Ecuyer 1998].  
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At the second step, the samples of X  can be generated based on 
Sn
uu ,,1 ⋯  as 
 
 ( )kXk uFx 1−= , snk ,,1⋯=  
 
where 
 
 ( ) ( ){ }uxFxuF XX ≥=− :inf1  
 
is the inverse function of ( )xFX . 
 
When the multiple input parameters [ ]nXX ,,1 ⋯=X  follow a joint normal 
distribution, the sampling can be done through the Cholesky decomposition [Scheuer 
and Stoller 1962; Law and McComas 1999]. Suppose 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )TnTnXXEE µµ ,,,, 11 ⋯⋯ ==X  
 
 ( ) ( ) xX Σ== nXX ,,covcov 1 ⋯  
 
When xΣ  is positive semi-definite, it can be factored by the Cholesky decomposition 
as 
 
 
TLL=Σx  
 
where nnRL ×∈  is a lower triangular matrix. 
 
The input variables [ ]nXX ,,1 ⋯=X  can then be rewritten as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )TnTnTn ZZLXX ,,,,,, 111 ⋯⋯⋯ ⋅+= µµ  
 
where ( )1,0~ NZ j , nj ,,1⋯=  are independent standard normal variables. 
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The samples of jZ , nj ,,1⋯=  can be generated independently by the process 
discussed above. The samples of X  can then be calculated based on the samples of 
jZ , nj ,,1⋯= .  
 
When [ ]nXX ,,1 ⋯=X  follows a general joint distribution other than joint normal, in 
principle the samples can be generated based on conditional distributions. It is 
however difficult to implement in practice for high dimensional input parameters. 
The joint normal transform method, called NORTA(NORmal To Anything), is a 
more realistic alternative when the uncertainty in X  is modelled by the marginal 
distributions and the rank correlations [Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. 
 
Suppose that the marginal distribution of iX  is iF , ni ,,1⋯= , and the dependence 
among the iX ’s is modelled by the rank correlation matrix XΣ . We need to generate 
the samples of the iX ’s that satisfy both the marginals iF  and the XΣ . We start with 
defining a set of standard normal random variables [ ]nYY ,,1 ⋯=Y , i.e. ( )1,0~ NYi , 
ni ,,1⋯= . Suppose the correlation matrix of Y is YΣ . Consequently we have defined 
( )YN Σ0,Y ~ . Then the samples of X can be generated by: 
• Generate the kth sample of ( )YN Σ0,Y ~ , denoted as nkk yy ,1, ,,⋯ ; 
• Calculate the sample of iX  by ( )( )ikiik yFx ,1, Φ= − , ni ,,1⋯=  
 
The function ( )Φ  stands for the cumulative probability function of the standard 
normal distribution. The samples of X  generated by this procedure will have the 
preset marginal distributions. To show this, note that each iY  has a standard normal 
distribution, so that ( )iYΦ  is uniformly distributed on (0, 1). Therefore 
( )( )iii YFX Φ= −1  has the preset marginal distribution. The preset rank correlation 
matrix XΣ  can be obtained by setting the correlation matrix YΣ  accordingly. 
However, there is no general closed-form expression that gives YΣ  in terms of XΣ . 
Indeed, determining the right YΣ  is perhaps the most difficult step in implementing 
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the NORTA method. More properties of the NORTA methods are investigated in 
[Ghosh and Henderson 2002; Ghosh and Henderson 2003] 
 
Random sampling is easy to implement and provides unbiased estimates of the 
means, variance and the distribution of the model output. It suffers however large 
variance. In practice we need to generate a large number of samples to reduce the 
variance [Ghosh and Henderson 2003; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. It is therefore 
preferred when sufficient samples are possible and the computation of the model is 
not costly. As a complement, Latin hyper-cube sampling is developed for the 
situation when a large number of samples are impossible for computationally costly 
models. 
 
2.6.3.3 Latin Hyper-cube Sampling 
Latin hyper-cube sampling (LHS) is designed to ensure the full coverage of the input 
space [McKay and Beckman 1979] and therefore reduce the variability associated 
with the random sampling. Suppose that X  has the CDF ( )xFX . To get sn  samples 
of X , the support of X  is partitioned into sn  contiguous intervals iχ , Sni ,,1⋯=  
of equal probability. Within iχ , a sample ix  is generated by the random sampling 
method following the conditional distribution ( )xF
iXX χ∈ . Following this process for 
iχ , Sni ,,1⋯= , we have Sn  samples X . 
 
For independent multiple input parameters [ ]nXX ,,1 ⋯=X , the LHS samples can be 
generated for jX , nj ,,1⋯=  separately at the first step. Denote the samples for jX  
as jix , , Sni ,,1⋯= . The LHS samples of X can then be generated by combining jix ,1  
and kix ,2 , Snii ,,1, 21 ⋯= , nkj ,,1, ⋯=  randomly and without replacement [Helton 
and Davis 2000]. 
 
The LHS samples for dependent [ ]nXX ,,1 ⋯=X  can be generated by the restricted 
pairing technique proposed in [Iman and Conover 1982]. The LHS samples are 
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generated for the input parameters separately at the first stage as for the independent 
input parameters. At the second step, the samples are combined together with 
specified selection procedure to obtain the preset rank correlations. A drawback to 
restricted pairing technique is that adding new samples to the existing samples will 
destroy the rank correlations in the samples. It means that the sample size cannot be 
increased by simply adding more samples as for the random sampling method. To 
solve this problem, an extension of the restricted pairing technique has been 
developed in [Sallaberry, Helton et al. 2006]. 
 
The LHS method can reduce the variance of the uncertainty analysis and so requires 
much less samples than the random sampling method [Stein 1987]. It however has 
poor coverage in the both ends of the input parameters. It is therefore preferable 
when a large number of samples are infeasible for computationally expensive models. 
Detailed comparisons between random sampling and LHS can be found in [McKay 
and Beckman 1979; Helton and Davis 2002; Helton and Davis 2003; Helton, Davis 
et al. 2005; Helton, Johnson et al. 2006]. 
 
2.6.4 Uncertainty Analysis of Fault-tree and Event-tree Models 
For a Fault-tree model of independent basic events, the analytical solution of the 
variance of the top event is developed in [Rushdi 1985]. The analytical solution of 
the variance of the top event is also derived when the basic events follow a joint 
normal distribution [Der Kiureghian 1987]. 
 
For general applications, however, the uncertainty analysis with Fault-tree and 
Event-tree models is mainly conducted through simulations. Many examples of this 
type of uncertainty analysis can be found in the reactor safety field [Helton, Johnson 
et al. 1995; Helton, Johnson et al. 1995; Helton, Johnson et al. 1995; Helton, 
Anderson et al. 1996; Helton, Bean et al. 1996; Helton, Bean et al. 1997; Helton 
1999; Helton, Anderson et al. 2000; Helton, Martell et al. 2000; Kraan and Cooke 
2000]. More examples can also be found in chemical industry [Lauridsen, Kozine et 
al. 2002], offshore transport [Nilsen, Gudmestad et al. 1998], food safety [Frey and 
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Patil 2001], and natural disaster analysis [Iman, Johnson et al. 2002; Bazzurro and 
Luco 2005; Li and Ellingwood 2006] etc. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
A good elicitation method should have strong foundations that are defensible in 
terms of probability and statistics theory. It should be as general as possible to apply 
in a wide variety of situations. It should also be able to be linked directly to the 
modelling procedure. The elicitation quantity should have a clear interpretation so 
that the assessors can view it as easy and credible [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000]. 
Furthermore, for high dimensional input parameters, the method should require 
reasonable elicitation time from the experts. By these criteria, methods for eliciting 
the marginal probabilities are applicable in practice. The methods for eliciting the 
correlations between two random variables can also satisfy most of the applications. 
There is still a gap however in building high dimensional dependence by elicitation. 
 
It has been agreed that uncertainty for high dimensional input parameters should be 
modelled on parametric marginal distributions plus a framework for modelling the 
correlations [Kurowicka and Cooke 2006; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. The 
correlation matrix or the rank correlation matrix offers the straightforward 
framework that is easy to understand and can be dealt with by the well developed 
algorithms for matrices. It however requires assessing ( ) 21−nn  pairwise 
correlations for the n input parameters, which means too much elicitation workload 
when n is large. Furthermore, by eliciting pairwise correlations it is very difficult to 
keep the outcome matrix positive definite or positive semi-definite as required for a 
correlation matrix. Copula trees offer an efficient and consistent framework when the 
input parameters hold suitable structure patterns [Bedford and Cooke 2001; Bedford 
and Cooke 2002]. Copula vines can be used for all kinds of input parameters. The 
elicitation for populating the model is quite difficult to implement in practice. The 
method for building the dependence on the factors is an efficient and flexible way 
that also offers a structured exploration of the underlying dependence causes [Van 
Dorp 2005]. No correlation or covariance matrix however has been developed with 
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the method. Therefore it cannot be applied when we do need a covariance matrix for 
modelling the uncertainty in the input parameters. 
 
The uncertainty analysis of Fault-tree and Event tree models can be efficiently 
conducted by simulations-based methods in conjunction with analytical analysis of 
the moments. In the literature, however, there are still no methods found for 
calculating the mean and the variance when both the basic events of the Fault-tree 
models and the consequences of the Event tree models are treated as correlated 
random variables. As we have discussed in Chapter 1, fault trees and event trees are 
usually built with commercial software packages such as Isograph FT+ and stored as 
computer codes in the internal database. For uncertainty analysis, we need to access 
these computer models. In Isograph FT+, an interface is developed for users to set 
the input parameters, to run the fault trees and event trees, and to obtain the results. 
By this interface, we can conduct simulations of the fault trees and event trees for 
uncertainty analysis. However, the interface is developed as dynamic link libraries 
(DLLs). It requires high level of programming skills to utilize this interface. 
Furthermore, we cannot do any analytical analysis of the uncertainty of fault trees 
and event trees though that interface. There is still no discussion on how to 
implement the analysis on a large model built with a commercial software package. 
 
In this research, we aim at first to develop a method for building the correlation 
matrix through elicitation on uncertainty factors. The method is expected to have two 
features: (1) significant reduction of the elicitation workload compared with direct 
elicitation of the correlation matrix; (2) guaranteed positive definite or positive semi-
definite correlation matrix. Secondly, we aim to develop a method to reduce the 
elicitation for deriving the variance of the input parameters. Thirdly we aim to 
develop a method to model the dependence among the rule sets associated with the 
consequences of the Event-tree models. Fourthly, we aim to select or develop a set of 
methods for conducting the uncertainty analysis of the Fault-tree and Event-tree 
models built on the software package Isograph FT+. 
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Chapter 3  
 
A New Procedure for Building the Covariance Matrix 
of Input Parameters through Elicitation 
 
 
3.1 Overview 
For a large group of input parameters, it is difficult to build the uncertainty model 
through elicitation of expert judgment. In practice, it is split into two tasks: (1) 
building the marginal distributions for all the individual parameters; and (2) building 
the dependence among all the parameters [Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. When the 
normal distribution is assumed as the marginal for each single parameter, the 
uncertainty in a group of input parameters can be completely defined by the means 
and the covariance matrix. In this chapter, a procedure is developed for building the 
covariance matrix through the elicitation of expert judgement. 
 
Uncertainty factors have been employed as an efficient way in modelling the 
uncertainty in the input parameters. The elicitation workload can be reduced 
significantly by modelling the uncertainty factors [Van Dorp 2005]. In this chapter, 
the uncertainty factors are used to structure the input parameters’ uncertainty through 
a linear model [Cheng, Bedford et al. 2007]. The correlation matrix of the input 
parameters is then developed based on the elicitation of the correlations regarding the 
uncertainty factors. The outcome correlation matrix can be guaranteed to be positive 
semi-definite as required. 
 
We continue then to develop the method for deriving the variance of the input 
parameters through expert judgement elicitation. The input parameters that are 
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defined physically in a similar way are defined to be a family. When input 
parameters are occurrence rates of a Poisson process, the sum of the family members 
is the occurrence rate of the family. The variance of the family occurrence rate, 
called the variance of the family, is then meaningful and can be derived by eliciting 
the percentile of the waiting time [Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005]. A method is then 
developed to derive the family covariance matrix based on the family variance and 
the family correlation matrix. This method at first features a significant reduction of 
the elicitation workload. Furthermore some experts may be more confident in giving 
their assessment on higher level events, as was the case with the experts in RSSB in 
the case studies for this research. 
 
To implement the above method for building the correlation matrix, the correlation 
between two random variables must be elicited. The qualitative assessment plus 
benchmark method is adopted because it is easy for experts to make the judgement 
[Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000] and has been widely used in the Excel Add-in Crystal 
Ball [ORACLE 2008]. The method is presented and discussed later in this chapter. 
 
A method is then developed for deriving the family variance based on the elicitation 
of the percentile of the waiting time for the next occurrence. 
 
At the end of this chapter, we include an example for demonstrating the procedure 
for building the covariance matrix of an input parameter family. 
 
3.2 Research philosophy and Methodology 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This research focuses on uncertainty analysis of a risk assessment model. The 
uncertainty can arise from two perspectives. First, a model is always an approximate 
representation of reality [Pidd 2003]. Consequently when assessment is made based 
on a model, uncertainty is caused by the unknown approximation. This uncertainty is 
called model uncertainty. Second, with a given model, we usually cannot know for 
sure the values of the input parameters. The uncertainty in the input parameters 
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propagates through the model and causes the uncertainty in the output. This is called 
parameter uncertainty. 
 
This research focuses on the parameter uncertainty analysis. We need to model the 
uncertainty in the parameters at first and then assess the resulting in uncertainty in 
the output. To quantitatively assess the uncertainty, we must define a mathematical 
representation of it. Probability theory offers a rigorous framework for this and has 
been well accepted in the literature [Lindley 2000]. Kolmogorov’s axioms states that 
probability is a positive normalized measure over a field of “possible worlds” or 
“possible states of nature”. This axioms has been widely accepted as the most 
appropriate framework for uncertainty assessment. Within the field of uncertainty of 
PRA, however, strong debate exists over the actual meaning of probability 
[Apolostolakis 1988; Winkler 1996; Nilsen and Aven 2003]. There are two main 
interpretations of probability: the frequentist and subjectivist views. The choice of 
the interpretation depends on the way the researcher observes the world, and acts 
within it. Consequently it defines the methodology: i.e. the ways for date collection 
and the data analysis. We are going to discuss the philosophy standpoint and justify 
the adopted methodology regarding this research. Specifically we will discuss three 
questions: the ontology, the epistemology and the methodology. 
3.2.2 Ontology 
Ontology concerns the form and nature of reality. Positivists believe that there is 
only one true reality; interpretivists accept that the reality depends on one’s 
experience and perceptions and therefore is subjective [Ponterotto 2005]. 
Frequentists and subjectivests of probability hold completely different ontological 
positions. On one hand, frequentists believe that a true reality exists independent to 
observers. To a frequentist, probability is a natural characteristic of the world. For a 
specific event, there is a true probability. On the other hand, subjectivists believe that 
probability is a degree of belief in the occurrence of an event that is decided by the 
observer’s knowledge [De Finetti 1974]. Correspondingly, subjective probability is a 
mode of judgment made by an observer based on his/her knowledge and background 
information. As a result, uncertainty is not an objective characteristic of an event 
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existing in the real world independently of the analyst as frequentists believe [Parry 
1996]. 
 
As stated before, this research aims to assess the uncertainty in the output driven by 
the uncertainty in the input parameters. We study the epistemic uncertainty that 
represents the lack of the experts’ knowledge. Different experts may have different 
knowledge about the input parameters that result in different definitions of the 
probabilities. Therefore we adopt the subjectivist view of probability; 
correspondingly we take the interpretivists’ view of ontology. 
3.2.3 Epistemology 
Epistemology concerns the process of knowledge acquisition and defines the 
relationship between the knower and what can be known. 
 
For a frequentist, probability learning is integrally related to the concept of relative 
frequencies. Because probability is believed as a characteristic of the objective world, 
in order to assess this probability, one needs to perform a series of repeatable 
experiments in which this event occurs. The probability of the event is then set as the 
relative frequency of the outcomes of this event. When the number of the 
experiments is large, the relative frequency converges to the true probability of the 
event. Mathematically, we can define a sequence of independent random variables 
{ }1, , ,nX X⋯ ⋯  and iX  is the outcome of the ith experiment defined as 
 
1,  the event happens
0,  otherwisei
X

= 

 
 
The probability of the event can then be inferred by 
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Associated with point estimation of the probability, a confidence interval can also be 
estimated representing a level of acceptability for the estimation. As a summary 
frequentists’ epistemology is to use the historical data to estimate probability that is 
believed to be an objective true value. 
 
For an interpretivist, the probability represents one’s degree of belief of an event of 
interest. In order to assess the probability we need to explore one’s knowledge and 
beliefs and formulate them into probability. This process is commonly called expert 
judgement elicitation [Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. 
Expert judgement elicitation has been used in many fields including risk and 
uncertainty assessment for decades [Cooke 1991]. With continuous effort in 
improving the elicitation, it is increasingly employed for uncertainty assessment 
[Kurowicka and Cooke 2006; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. 
 
A sound process is essential to implement a good elicitation. Broadly an elicitation 
process covers four basic stages: Set up, Elicit, Fit, and Evaluate [Garthwaite, 
Kadane et al. 2005]. In the set up stage, we select the experts, training the experts, 
identifying what aspects of the problem to elicit. The Elicit stage is the 
implementation of elicitation. In the Fit stage the experts’ answers are transferred 
into the mathematical models to derive probabilities. In the Evaluate stage, we 
evaluate whether the elicitation outcome is adequate or not. We need to emphasize 
that an elicitation is well done if the elicited information accurately represents the 
expert’s belief and knowledge. It is not related to how good that knowledge is 
[Cooke 1991; Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005]. 
3.2.4 Methodology 
Methodology concerns how the data are obtained in a research. It depends on the 
ontology and epistemology adopted for the research. From the frequentist’s view of 
probability, we need occurrence data of an event to estimate its probability as 
discussed above. To obtain data, one way is to observe the event and record the 
historical occurrences. Another way is to conduct controlled experiments in a 
sufficiently identical way. It is sometimes a faster and cheaper way to obtain data. 
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From the subjectivist’s view of probability, as stated before, we elicit information 
from experts and then formulate the information into probabilities. Therefore 
elicitation is the main way for subjectivist’s to obtain data. It can be implemented 
through questionnaires, interviews, workshop etc [Creswell 2009]. One important 
task for conducting elicitation is to design a sound mathematical framework for 
formulating the elicited results. It is intrinsically related to the questions that we used 
to elicit experts’ knowledge and beliefs [Cooke 1991; Bedford and Cooke 2001; 
O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. 
 
As stated before, in this research we take the subjectivist’s interpretation of 
probability in line with the interpretivists’ view of ontology. Correspondingly we 
adopt expert judgement elicitation to evaluate probabilities for uncertainty 
assessment. We first chose and develop proper mathematical frameworks for 
information fusion. Accordingly we design questions for experts to answer. 
 
Experts are chosen from RSSB for three reasons. First, it is the RSSB that builds the 
safety risk model. The RSSB now is concerned with their uncertainty in the model. 
The experts are likely to have a positive attitude towards this exercise. Second, the 
experts know how the RSSB-SRM is built and how it is used in practice. As such, 
they are knowledgeable about the uncertainty sources. Third, the experts have at least 
basic understanding of statistics. Therefore they can understand well elicitation 
questions. Before starting elicitation, training was given for experts to understand the 
mathematical framework. Documents regarding the mathematical framework were 
first offered to experts. After experts finished reading, a two-day’s workshop was 
organized and a mock elicitation was conducted to make sure that experts gained 
understanding of the relevant issues. 
 
In this research, we conducted two case studies. For Case I, elicitation was 
implemented through questionnaires. Four forms were designed for benchmark, 
family identification, family definitions respectively. Eight families were identified 
by experts for Case I. For each family, three forms were designed to elicit 
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information regarding the uncertainty factors. The whole elicitation lasted for 2 
months as experts worked part-timely for the elicitation. During the elicitation 
process, the researcher and the experts communicated through both email and phone 
talk. Case study II was conducted through a five-day’s workshop. The researcher and 
the experts worked together to elicit the information. It turns out that face-to-face 
workshop is a more productive way to eliciting. 
 
Following the subjectivist’s view of probability, there is not a real probability that 
can be used to validate the elicited information. A good elicitation is done when it 
catches properly the knowledge and beliefs of experts [Cooke 1991; Garthwaite, 
Kadane et al. 2005]. Accordingly, the validation was conducted at two stages in this 
research. First, we derive an indicator to monitor the elicited information during the 
elicitation process. The information given by experts can be guaranteed to be 
consistent once the indicator is satisfied. The case studies demonstrate that the 
indicator works very efficiently. Second, we need to make sure that the elicited 
information represents the knowledge of all experts in the institute, rather than the 
individual experts participating in the elicitation. For this end, the experts 
participating in the elicitation were asked to communicate with the experts in the 
institute during the elicitation process. At the last step of the elicitation, a review 
meeting was arranged for the relevant experts to check the elicited information and 
the derived results. The case studies demonstrate that the review meeting is an 
efficient way. 
 
3.3 Linear Model on Uncertainty Factors 
Assume that the uncertainty in a parameter is affected by a set of independent factors. 
Assume further that the uncertainty is defined with a linear model of the factors as 
 
 iiKiKiiiiiii wXXXp ii ελλλµ ++++=− ,,2,2,1,1, ⋯  (3.1) 
 
where ip  stands for an input parameter; iµ  is the mean of ip ; kiX ,  is the kth factor 
that is normalized such as ( ) 1var
,
=kiX  and ( ) 0, =kiXE ; ki,λ  is the loading of kiX , ; 
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iK  is the number of the factors of ip ; iε  stand for the residual uncertainty of ip , 
which is normalized such as ( ) 1var =iε , ( ) 0=iE ε ; iε  is assumed to be independent 
to all the factors, i.e. ( ) 0,cov
,
=ikiX ε , iKk ,,1⋯= ; iw  is the loading of iε . 
 
We assume that ip  and kiX ,  in Equation 3.1 follow a normal distribution. Rather 
than for prediction of ip , the linear model of Equation 3.1 aims to structure the 
uncertainty of the input parameter into the factors. Correlations between two 
parameters can then be derived through the shared uncertainty factors. 
 
Based on Equation 3.1, the variance of ip  can be derived as 
 
 ( ) 22
,
var i
k
kii wp += ∑λ  (3.2) 
 
Similarly if we can define another parameter jp  in the same form as in Equation 3.1, 
then the covariance between ip  and jp  is 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )jijiK
K
k
kjikjiji wwXXrpp
i j
εελλ ,cov,,cov
1 1
,,,,
+⋅= ∑∑
= =ℓ
ℓℓ  (3.3) 
 
where ( ),r  stands for the correlation between the two variables. 
 
The correlation ( )kji XXr ,, ,ℓ  is included in Equations 3.3 because the factors from 
two different parameters could be identical or correlated while the factors associated 
with one parameter are assumed to be independent. By rearranging the sequence of 
the factors and adding zero coefficients ki ,λ  when needed, the relations among the 
factors are demonstrated in Fig. 3.1. In a horizontal oval, the factors kiX , , 
Kk ,,1⋯= , { }max iiK K= , are associated with ip  and are assumed to be 
independent. In a vertical oval, the factors kiX ,  and kjX ,  can be correlated or even 
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identical. Consequently, two factor ( )1,kiX  and ( )2,kjX , where ( ) ( ) Kkk ,,12,1 ⋯= , 
( ) ( )21 kk ≠ , are independent. We will discuss the classifications of the factors so that 
suitable definitions can be made accordingly. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Relations among the factors associated with multiple parameters 
 
3.4 Factor Categories 
For deriving the correlation between the input parameters, the factors associated with 
ip  and jp  are partitioned into three categories: common factors, correlated factors 
and exclusive factors, as demonstrated in Fig. 3.2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.2 Classifications of the uncertainty factors 
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As shown in Fig. 3.1, suppose that kiX ,  and kjX ,  are two factors from ip  and jp  
respectively. When 0
,
≠kiλ , 0, ≠kjλ , kiX ,  and kjX ,  define a common factor when 
they are identical. It is denoted by kjkik XXX ,, == . 
 
When 0
,
≠kiλ , 0, ≠kjλ , kiX ,  and kjX ,  define a factor class when they are correlated. 
It is denoted by kjkik XXC ,, ,= . 
 
When 0
,
=kjλ , kiX ,  is associated with ip  and has nothing to do with jp . 
Consequently kiX ,  is called exclusive factor of ip . Accordingly, when 0, =kiλ , kjX ,  
is an exclusive factor of jp . 
 
To exemplify the above classifications, we take a group of RSSB-SRM precursors 
that are defined as road vehicle (RV) driver error causing RV struck by train on level 
crossing L, where L denotes one of the eight types of level crossings (LCs) [RSSB 
2004]. These precursors are defined as a collective event for all the level crossings of 
the same type. The eight types of LCs are homogenously deployed across the Britain 
railway mainline [Dennis 2006]. The eight precursors are then exposed 
homogenously to the weather over Britain. We think bad weather condition can 
cause more road vehicle drivers’ errors causing RV struck by train on level crossings. 
When the weather over Britain deviates consistently from the historical average, the 
eight precursors are expected to have a deviation of the occurrence rates consistently. 
Because weather affects the eight precursors in the same way, it is a common factor 
for all the eight precursors. 
 
One of the eight level crossings is the User-Worked Crossing with Telephone 
(UWC-T). The user is required to use the phone to call the signaller in order to obtain 
permission to use the crossing. When the crossing is clear for railway use, the user is 
required to use the phone to inform the signaller. If the reliability of the phone-
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communication system is considered as a factor, it is exclusive to UWC-T because 
no other level crossings are equipped with it. 
 
The eight types of LCs can be put into two groups defined as: User Worked 
Crossings (UWCs) and non-UWCs. The level crossings in each group have the same 
user populations and the two populations are different to some extent [RSSB 2004]. 
Therefore, two factors can be defined according to the two groups of usage 
population respectively. The two factors are correlated because there is still an 
overlap of the two user populations. Based on the above definition, these two factors 
form a factor class. As we can see, the factor class actually composes of the two 
correlated factors, each of which is a common factor to a subset of the eight 
precursors. To populate the model, we need to assess only one correlation for this 
correlated factor class. Such a class is called thin class. A thin class makes it feasible 
to model the correlated factors by elicitation. In practice, we can always keep a factor 
class thin by agglomerating some correlated factors in the class. 
 
According to the above classifications, the input parameter’s linear model defined in 
Equation 3.1 can be rewritten as 
 
 
jj
Lk
kjkj
Lk
kjkj
Lk
kkjjj
ii
Lk
kiki
Lk
kiki
Lk
kkiii
wXXXp
wXXXp
jECX
iECX
ελλλµ
ελλλµ
+++=−
+++=−
∑∑∑
∑∑∑
∈∈∈
∈∈∈
,
,
,,,,,
,,,,,
 (3.4) 
 
where XL , CL  stand for the sets of indices for the common factors and the correlated 
factors respectively; iEL ,  and jEL ,  stand for the sets of indices for the exclusive 
factors associated with ip  and jp  respectively. 
 
Any two input parameters are connected through their common factors and the factor 
classes. In the next section, the correlation between two parameters is to be derived 
based on the model defined in Equation 3.4. 
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3.5 Correlation between Two Input Parameters 
We assume that the residual uncertainty of different parameters are independent i.e., 
( ) 0,cov =ji εε . According to the classifications of the factors, and recalling that all 
the factors associated with one input parameter are independent, the covariance 
between ip  and jp  can be derived from Equations 3.3 and 3.4 as 
 
 
( ) ( )∑∑
∈∈
⋅+=
CX Lk
kjkikjki
Lk
kjkiji XXrpp ,,,,,, ,,cov λλλλ  (3.5) 
 
For subjective uncertainty analysis, we rely on the elicitation of the expert judgement 
to assess the loadings ki,λ . It is however difficult for experts to assess ki,λ  because it 
involves both the correlation and the variance [Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; 
O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. Consequently the covariance in Equation 3.5 cannot be 
derived directly from the loadings. As an alternative, the correlation between ip  and 
jp  is to be derived based on elicitation of the correlations between the factors. The 
variance of the parameter is to be derived through elicitation separately. 
 
For a factor kiX ,  of ip , we have 
 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )ki
i
kii
ki
i
iki
kii
ki
kii
ki X
p
Xpr
X
p
pX
Xp
X
Xp
,
,
,,
,
,
,
,
var
var
,
var
var
varvar
,cov
var
,cov
===λ  
 
Recalling that ( ) 1var
,
=kiX , from the above formula we have 
 
 
( ) ( )ikiiki pXpr var, ,, =λ  (3.6) 
 
Applying Equation 3.6 with Equation 3.5 we obtain 
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( ) ( ) ( )ji
Lk
k
ji
Lk
k
jiji ppohpp
CX
varvar,cov
,,
⋅







+= ∑∑
∈∈
 (3.7) 
 
where  
 
 
( ) ( )kjkik ji XprXprh ,,, ⋅=  (3.8) 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )kjkikjjkiik ji XXrXprXpro ,,,,, ,,, ⋅⋅=  (3.9) 
 
By the definition of correlation, we have 
 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ∑∑ ∈∈ +== CX Lk
k
ji
Lk
k
ji
ji
ji
ji ohpp
pp
ppr
,,
varvar
,cov
,  (3.10) 
 
In Equation 3.10, the term k jih ,  and 
k
jio ,  are the contributions from the common 
factors and factor classes respectively. The calculation of k jih ,  and 
k
jio ,  is based on the 
correlations regarding the factors, which can be reasonably elicited as well discussed 
in the literature [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000; Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; 
O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. The correlation coefficients that need to elicit are 
summarized as: 
• ( ),i kr p X : the correlation between a common factor and each input 
parameter 
• ( ),,i i kr p X : the correlation between a classed factor and its associated input 
parameter 
• ( ), ,,i k j kr X X : the correlation between two factors of the same class 
 
We have assumed that all the factors associated with the same input parameter are 
independent, therefore are uncorrelated; correspondingly no correlations among them 
need to elicit. Based on the assumption, two classed factors 
,i kX  and ,j kX  are 
 61 
uncorrelated with all the other factors 
,n mX , m k≠ . It does not however mean 
necessarily that 
,i kX  and ,j kX  are uncorrelated. Their correlation needs to be elicited. 
 
Through the above method, a positive semi-definite correlation matrix can be 
guaranteed for multiple parameters as will be shown in the next section. 
 
3.6 Correlation Matrix for Multiple Parameters 
3.6.1 Overview 
Suppose that there are N parameters arranged in a vertical vector as defined as 
 
 [ ]TNn ppp ,,,,1 ⋯⋯=p  (3.11) 
 
The correlation matrix of p is denoted by 
 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 














=
1,,
,1,
,,1
1
1
11
⋯⋯
⋮⋱⋮⋮⋮
⋯⋯
⋮⋮⋮⋱⋮
⋯⋯
nNN
Nnn
Nn
pprppr
pprppr
pprppr
r p  (3.12) 
 
The matrix ( )pr  can be built with each cell ( )ji ppr ,  calculated separately from 
Equation 3.10. We are however going to define ( )pr  in a compact form as the sum of 
a series of matrices associated with the common factors, correlated factors, the 
exclusive factors and the residual terms. We will prove that those summand matrices 
can be kept positive semi-definite and as a result ( )pr  is positive semi-definite. For 
this end, related definitions and theories on positive definite or positive semi-definite 
matrices are included in Appendix C. 
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3.6.2 Decomposition of the Correlation Matrix of Multiple Input 
Parameters 
For developing the correlation matrix of p  as denoted in Equation 3.11, we are going 
to redefine the linear uncertainty model in Equation 3.4 in a compact format with 
matrices. For this purpose, we need to define the column vectors of the factors 
associated with the common factors, the factor classes, and the exclusive factors as 
defined before. We denote a column vector of the factors as kX , 
1×∈ Nk RX , where 
N is the number of the input parameters included in p . Associated with each kX , we 
need to define the matrices of the loadings, which is denoted by kλ , 
NN
k
×∈Rλ . 
 
Associated with a common factor, kX , XLk ∈ , we define the column vector of 
factors as 
 
 
( )Tkkk XX ,,⋯=X  (3.13) 
 
Accordingly we define the matrix of loadings as 
 
 
















=
kN
ki
k
k
,
,
,1
00
00
00
λ
λ
λ
⋯⋯
⋮⋱⋮⋮⋮
⋯⋯
⋮⋮⋮⋱⋮
⋯⋯
λ  (3.14) 
 
Therefore kλ  is a diagonal matrix with all the off-diagonal cells filled with zeros. 
 
Associated with a factor class kC , CLk ∈ , we define the column vector of factors as 
 
 
( )TkNkikk XXX ,,,1 ,,,, ⋯⋯=X  (3.15) 
 
Accordingly we define the matrix of loadings as 
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




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

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
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

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ki
k
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,1
00
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λ
λ
λ
⋯⋯
⋮⋱⋮⋮⋮
⋯⋯
⋮⋯⋮⋱⋮
⋯⋯
λ  (3.16) 
 
Hence kλ  is a diagonal matrix with all the off-diagonal cells filled with zeros. 
 
Associated with an exclusive factor kiX , , iELk ,∈ , we define the column vector of 
factors as 
 
 
( )Tkikik XX ,, ,,⋯=X  (3.17) 
 
Accordingly we define the matrix of loadings as 
 
 
















=
000
00
000
,
⋯⋯
⋮⋱⋮⋮⋮
⋯⋯
⋮⋯⋮⋱⋮
⋯⋯
kik λλ  (3.18) 
 
The matrix kλ  in Equation 3.18 contains only one non-zero value on the i
th
 diagonal 
cell. 
 
We define the column vector associated with the residual iε , Ni ,,1⋯= , as 
 
 
( )Tiii εε ,,⋯=ε , 1×∈ Ni Rε  (3.19) 
 
Accordingly we define the matrix of loadings associated with iε  as 
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



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










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⋯⋯
⋮⋱⋮⋮⋮
⋯⋯
⋮⋯⋮⋱⋮
⋯⋯
ii ww , 
1×∈ Ni Rw  (3.20) 
 
The matrix iw  contains only one non-zero value on the i
th
 diagonal cell. 
 
Based on the definitions in Equations 3.13-3.20 and the linear model in Equation 3.4, 
we can define the linear model of the N input parameters in terms of the matrices as 
 
 
,
1 1X C E i
N N
k k k k k k i i
k L k L i k L i∈ ∈ = ∈ =
− = + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑p u λ X λ X λ X w ε  (3.21) 
 
Recall that we assume that the factors, except of the factors of the same class, and the 
residuals are mutually independent. As given in [Van Kampen 1992], we have 
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 (3.22) 
 
Suppose that ( )TNVV ,,1 ⋯=V , 1×∈ NRV , NM ×∈RU , as given in [Dillon and 
Goldstein 1984] we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) TUVVUUVUV ,cov,cov =  (3.23) 
 
Therefore from Equation 3.10 we have 
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 (3.24) 
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We can derive the covariance matrix ( )kk XX ,cov  following the definitions of kX . 
When kX  is associated with a common factor, i.e. XLk ∈ , from Equation 3.13 we 
have 
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Recalling ( ) ( ) 1var,cov == kkk XXX , we have 
 
 ( ) [ ] NNkk ×=
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where [ ] NN×1  is called ones-matrix of dimensions NN × . 
 
When kX  is associated with a factor class kC , CLk ∈ , from Equation 3.15, we have 
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  (3.26) 
 
We define 
 
 
( )kjkiji XX ,,2, ,cov=σ  (3.27) 
 
Recalling ( ) 1var
,
=kiX , we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )kjkikjkikjkiji XXrXXXXr ,,,,,,2, ,varvar, =⋅=σ  (3.28) 
 
and  
 
 
( ) 1,cov
,,
2
,
== kikiii XXσ  (3.29) 
 
Applying Equations 3.27 - 3.29 with Equation 3.26, we have 
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  (3.30) 
 
When kX  is associated with an exclusive factor, i.e. iELk ,∈ , from Equation 3.17 we 
have 
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Recall ( ) ( ) 1var,cov
,,,
== kikiki XXX . As defined in Equation 3.25 we have 
 
 ( ) [ ] NNkk ×= 1,cov XX , iELk ,∈  (3.31) 
 
Corresponding to the vector of the residuals, following Equation 3.19 we have 
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Recall ( ) ( ) 1var,cov == iii εεε . As defined in Equation 3.25 we have 
 
 ( ) [ ] NNii ×= 1,cov εε  (3.32) 
 
Applying Equations 3.25, 3.30, 3.30 and 3.32 and with Equation 3.24, we have 
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We define the diagonal matrix containing the variance of the input parameters as 
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Accordingly we define 
 
 
( )
( )
( )















=
N
i
p
p
p
var00
0var0
00var 1
⋯⋯
⋮⋱⋮⋮⋮
⋯⋯
⋮⋮⋮⋱⋮
⋯⋯
pσ  (3.35) 
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From Equations 3.34 - 3.36, we have 
 
 
2
ppp σσσ =⋅  (3.37) 
 
 NIσσ pp =⋅
−1
 (3.38) 
 
where NI  stands for the NN ×  dimensional identity matrix. 
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By Equations 3.12, 3.67 and 3.36, we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) 11 ,cov −− ⋅⋅= pp σppσpr  (3.39) 
 
By applying Equation 3.33 with Equation 3.39, we have 
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  (3.40) 
 
By Equation 3.36, we have 
 
 
( )T11 −− = pp σσ  (3.41) 
 
By Equations 3.14, 3.16 and 3.18, the matrix of the loadings associated all the types 
of the vectors of factors are diagonal. Consequently we have 
 
 
T
kk λλ =  (3.42) 
 
From Equations 3.41 and 3.42, we have 
 
 
( ) ( )TkTTkTk λσσλσλ ppp 111 −−− ==  (3.43) 
 
By Equation 3.20, we have also 
 
 
T
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From Equations 3.41 and 3.44, we have 
 
 
( ) ( )TiTTiTi wσσwσw ppp 111 −−− ==  (3.45) 
 
Applying Equations 3.43 and 3.45 with Equation 3.40, we have 
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  (3.46) 
 
From Equation 3.46, we can decompose ( )pr  into the correlation matrices associated 
with the common factors, the factor classes, the exclusive factors and the residuals. 
When kX  is associated with a common factor kX , i.e. XLk ∈ , we define 
 
 ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )TkNNkX kr λσλσp pp 11 1 −×− ⋅⋅=  (3.47) 
 
When kX  is associated with a factor class kC , i.e. CLk ∈ , we define 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )TkkkC Crr k λσλσp pp 11 −− ⋅⋅=  (3.48) 
 
When kX  is associated with an exclusive factor kiX , , i.e. iELk ,∈ , we define 
 
 ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )TkNNkX kir λσλσp pp 11 1, −×− ⋅⋅=  (3.49) 
 
According the vector of the residual iε , we define 
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 ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )TiNNiir wσwσp pp 11 1 −×− ⋅⋅=ε  (3.50) 
 
Using the notations established in Equations 3.47-3.50, we express Equation 3.40 as 
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We call ( )
kX
r p , ( )
kC
r p , ( )
kiX
r
,
p  and ( )
i
r εp  the correlation matrix of p associated 
with the common factor, the factor class, the exclusive factor and the residual 
respectively. We are going to show how these correlation matrices can be defined by 
the elicitation of expert judgement. We will also prove that these correlation matrices 
are positive semi-definite. 
 
3.6.3 Correlation Matrix Associated with a Common Factor 
The correlation matrix of p associated with a common factor kX  is defined in 
Equation 3.47. From Equations 3.14 and 3.36, we have 
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From Equation 3.6, we have 
 
 ( ) ( )kii
ki Xpr
p
,
var
,
=
λ
 (3.53) 
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where ( )ki Xpr ,  represents the correlation between ip  and kX . 
 
Applying Equation 3.53 with Equation 3.52, we have 
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The diagonal matrix ( )kXr ,p  is called the correlation matrix between the input 
parameter vector p and the common factor kX . 
 
Applying Equations 3.54 with Equation 3.47, we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )( )TkNNkX XrXrr k ,1, ppp ⋅⋅= ×  (3.55) 
 
By analogy with k jih ,  defined in Equation 3.8, ( ) kXr p  represents the correlation 
matrix of p driven by the common factor kX . We are going to prove that ( ) kXr p  is 
positive semi-define. For this purpose, we define the square-root of [ ] NN×1  as 
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Therefore we have 
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and 
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Applying Equations 3.58 and 3.57 with Equation 3.55, we have 
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As defined in Equation 3.54, ( )kXr ,p  is a diagonal matrix and therefore we have 
 
 
( ) ( )( )Tkk XrXr ,, pp =  (3.60) 
 
Based on Equations 3.59 and 3.60, we have 
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By Theorem C.2 in Appendix C, the matrix ( )
kX
r p  in Equation 3.61 is positive 
semi-definite. This property of ( )
kX
r p  is to be used later to prove that ( )pr  is 
positive semi-definite. 
 
3.6.4 Correlation Matrix Associated with a Factor Class 
The correlation matrix of p associated with a factor class kC  is defined in Equation 
3.48. From Equations 3.16 and 3.36, we  
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Applying Equation 3.53 with Equation 3.62, we have 
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The diagonal matrix ( )kCr ,p  is called the correlation matrix between the input 
parameter vector p and the factor class kC . This matrix needs to be built through 
elicitation of expert judgement. 
 
Applying Equation 3.62 with Equation 3.48, we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )TkkkC CrCrCrr k ,, ppp ⋅⋅=  (3.64) 
 
By Theorem C.3 in Appendix C, ( )
kC
r p  defined in Equation 3.64 is semi-definite 
when ( )kCr  in Equation 3.20 is kept positive semi-definite. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4, a factor class in practice is kept “thin” by agglomerating 
the included factors into a few factors each of which is common to a subset of the 
input parameters. For a thin factor class, it is feasible to build a positive semi-definite 
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( )kCr  through elicitation of expert judgement [Ghosh and Henderson 2003]. The LC 
users in the example in Section 3.4, for example, are agglomerated into the users of 
UWC, denoted by ( )UkC , and the users of non-UWC, denoted by 
( )N
kC . Five of the 
eight input parameters are associated with ( )UkC  and the other three are associated 
with ( )NkC . The associated ( )kCr  can then be defined as 
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Therefore ( ) ( )( )NkUk CCr ,  is the only one that needs to be elicited. The outcome ( )kCr  
is automatically positive definite. 
 
3.6.5 Correlation Matrix Associated with an Exclusive Factor 
The correlation matrix of p associated with an exclusive factor is defined in Equation 
3.49. From Equations 3.18 and 3.36, we  
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Applying Equation 3.53 with Equation 3.65, we have 
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Corresponding to the matrix of loadings kλ , iELk ,∈  as defined in Equation 4.N6, 
the matrix ( )kiXr ,,p  contains only one non-zero ( )kii Xpr ,,  that needs to be elicited 
from the experts. 
 
Applying Equation 3.66 with Equation 3.49, we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )( )TkiNNkiX XrXrr ki ,, ,1,, ppp ⋅⋅= ×  
 
By the calculations of the matrices we have 
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The ( )
kiX
r
,
p  has 0 for all the cells except the ith diagonal one. Apparently ( )
kiX
r
,
p  is 
associated only with ( )ii ppr ,  in ( )pr . It is consistent with the definition that the 
exclusive factor impacts only the associated input parameter and therefore does not 
contribute to the correlation among the parameters. Because of ( ) 0,
,
2 ≥kii Xpr , 
( )
kiX
r
,
p  is positive semi-definite by Theorem C.1 in Appendix C. 
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3.6.6 Correlation Matrix Associated with the Residual 
The correlation matrix of p associated with a residual is defined in Equation 3.50. 
From Equations 3.20 and 3.36, we  
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Therefore the matrix iwσp
1−
 contains only one non-zero cell on the diagonal 
corresponding to the associated residual iε . Different from all the factors, the matrix 
iwσp
1−
 is not to be derived based on the elicitation regarding the associated residual 
iε . Rather, we will derive ( )i
i
p
w
var
 from the elicitation regarding the factors. 
 
Recalling Equation 3.2, ( ) 22
,
var i
k
kii wp += ∑λ , and Equation 3.6 
( ) ( )ikiiki pXpr var, ,, =λ . Applying Equation 3.6 with Equation 3.2, we have 
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We then have 
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The four terms on the right side of Equation 3.70 represent the four parts of ( )ii ppr ,  
corresponding in the sequence to: (a) kX  the common factors kX , XLk ∈ ; (b) the 
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correlated factors kiX , , CLk ∈ ; (c) the exclusive factors kiX , , iELk ,∈ ; and (d) the 
residual uncertainty iε . Parts (a), (b) and (c) can be defined by the elicitation of the 
correlations between the input parameter and the associated factors. From Equation 
3.70, we define 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑∑
∈∈∈
++=
iECX Lk
kii
Lk
kii
Lk
kii XprXprXprq
,
,
2
,
22
,,,  (3.71) 
 
Because ( ) 0var
2
≥
i
i
p
w
, by Equations 3.70 and 3.71, we must have 
 
 10 ≤≤ iq  (3.72) 
 
Applying Equation 3.71 with Equation 3.70, we have 
 
 ( ) ii
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 (3.73) 
 
We can see that iq  stands for the proportion of ( )ipvar  that is explained by all the 
factors associated with ip . Inequality 3.72 offers a constraint to monitor the experts' 
assessments during the elicitation. With iq  derived by Equation 3.71 through 
elicitation, applying Equation 3.73 with Equation 3.68 we have 
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Applying Equation 3.74 with Equation 3.50, we have 
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  (3.75) 
 
By Theorem C.1 in Appendix C, ( )
i
r εp  is positive semi-definite when 10 ≤≤ iq  is 
satisfied. For all the residuals iε , Ni ,,1⋯= , a correlation matrix can be defined in a 
compact form as 
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Applying Equation 3.75 with 3.76, we have 
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By Theorem C.4 in Appendix C, the ( ) εpr  is positive semi-definite when all ( ) ir εp , 
Ni ,,1⋯=  are positive semi-definite. 
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3.6.7 Correlation Matrix as Sum of Correlation Matrices 
Associated with the Various Types of Factors 
With the definitions given in Equations 3.55, 3.64, 3.67, 3.75, 3.77 and 3.76, the 
overall correlation matrix of N input parameters can be derived from Equation 3.51 
as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) εppppp rrrrr
Ni Lk
X
Lk
C
Lk
X
iE
ki
C
k
X
k
+++= ∑ ∑∑∑
= ∈∈∈ ,1
,
,
 (3.78) 
 
In Equation 3.78, the matrices ( )
kX
r p  and ( )
kC
r p  are the correlation contribution of 
the common factors and factor classes respectively; ( )
kiX
r
,
p  and ( ) εpr  are matrix 
associated with the exclusive factors and the residual terms respectively. As 
developed above, these matrices can be built based on the elicitation of the 
correlations between the input parameters and the associated factors and the 
correlations among the factors in a class. Following the above procedure, these 
correlation matrices can be kept positive semi-definite. As a result the correlation 
matrix ( )pr  can be kept positive semi-definite by Theorem C.4 in Appendix C. 
When 1<iq  for some Ni ,,1⋯= , then ( ) εpr  is positive definite and as a result ( )pr  
is positive definite by Theorem C.4 in Appendix C. 
 
From Equation 3.78, all exclusive factors associated with one input parameter can be 
represented by a single one. From operational perspective, however, we don not do 
that way. Elicitation starts with identifying all the major factors for each input 
parameter. At the second step, factors are then classified. Therefore, we don’t know 
if a factor belongs to the exclusive category or not until we identify all the major 
factors. Furthermore, with all the major factors identified, experts are more confident 
with assessing the associated correlations. 
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3.7 Definition of an Input Parameter Family 
3.7.1 Motivation 
The primary motivation for establishing the parameter family concept is to reduce 
the elicitation workload regarding the variance. With the correlation matrix of a set 
of input parameters built, we need the variance of input parameter to build the 
covariance matrix. It can be done through elicitation of the expert judgement [Cooke 
1991; Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006; O'Hagan, Buck 
et al. 2006]. For a large set of input parameters, it requires much elicitation workload 
however. We therefore need to develop a way to reduce the workload. A group of 
input parameters can be defined as physically similar events. For example, a group of 
RSSB-SRM precursors are defined as road vehicle (RV) driver error causing RV 
struck by train on level crossing L, where L denotes one of the eight types of level 
crossings (LCs) [RSSB 2004]. We can see that this group of the precursors are 
defined as the same event associated with different types of level crossings. We are 
going to define such a group of input parameters to be a family. When input 
parameters are occurrence rate of a Poisson process, their sum is the occurrence rate 
of the family. The idea is to elicit the variance in the occurrence rate of the family 
and derive the variance of the precursors in the family. By eliciting on the family 
instead of individual parameters, the elicitation workload is reduced significantly. 
 
The second motivation is to facilitate the assessment. Experts are more confident in 
giving their assessment on higher level events, as shown in the case of RSSB-SRM. 
By eliciting on the family level rather than individual parameters, we can make the 
elicitation easier to experts. 
 
3.7.2 Definition 
We define a group of input parameters to be a family, when: (1) the input parameters 
have physically similar interpretation for which a basic event can be defined; (2) a 
set of differences can be identified among the input parameters; (3) affected by some 
differences, each individual parameter derives from the basic event. Therefore, after 
the effect of the differences is accounted, the input parameters can be treated as the 
 82 
basic event. The family members therefore share a common part of uncertainty due 
to the basic event. The factors associated with the basic event are invariant factors; 
the factors associated with variations are variant factors. 
 
We are going to develop the mathematical definition of the family based on the 
uncertainty model as defined in Equation 3.4. We denote a family by f . Suppose 
two input parameters ip  and jp  belong to the family f , denoted by fpp ji ∈, . 
Recall that the uncertainty in ip  and jp  can be defined on their factors of three 
categories as in Equation 3.4 as 
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We define the common factors that are associated with the basic event as the 
invariant factors of the family, i.e.  
 
( ) { } is associated with the basic eventk kI f X X=  
 
We define the other factors that are associated with the differences among the family 
as the variant factors, i.e.  
 
( ) { }
{ } { }, , ,
 is not associated with the basic eventk k
i k E i i k C
V f X X
X k L X k L
=
∈ ∈∪ ∪
 
 
We can see that the common factors are split into ( )fI  and ( )fV  depending on if 
they are associated with the basic. The uncertainty model of the family can then be 
defined based on Equation 3.4 as 
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 (3.79) 
 
For some families, the members can also share the same residual term that is not 
affected by any difference across the family. In this situation, we call the residual 
term family residual that is an invariant factor. The uncertainty model of the family 
correspondingly becomes 
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where fε  stands for the family residual. 
 
Therefore the uncertainty model of the family can be defined in two situations 
depending on the property of the residual uncertainty terms in the family. 
 
Based on Equations 3.79 and 3.80, the variance of the family members can be split 
into the common part due to the invariant factors and the part due to the variant 
factors as defined as 
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where  
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By Equation 3.2 we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )fVifIii ppp varvarvar +=  (3.83) 
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var  are associated with the basic event that is the same 
for the family. Therefore we have 
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From Equations 3.84, we have 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 2
2
var
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j
i
fIj
fIi
p
p
µ
µ
=  (3.85) 
 
When the input parameters are occurrence rate, the sum of the family members is the 
occurrence rate of the family. The variance of the family occurrence rate, called the 
variance of the family, is then meaningful and can be derived by eliciting the 
percentile of the waiting time [Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005]. The variance of the 
family members can then be derived from the family variance. 
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Once a whole set of input parameters are partitioned into families, the covariance 
matrix can be partitioned into blocks correspondingly as to be discussed next. 
 
3.7.3 Covariance Matrix Partitioned by Families 
Suppose that there is a group of parameters denoted by [ ]TNn ppp ⋯⋯ ,,,1=p . The 
parameters are partitioned into Z families denoted by zf , Zz ,,1⋯= . Accordingly, 
the overall correlation matrix ( )pr  is partitioned into blocks as 
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where ( )zfr  stands for the correlation matrix of zf ; ( )yz ffr ,  stands for the 
correlation block between families zf  and yf . 
 
The diagonal blocks represent correlations within families; the off-diagonal blocks 
represent the correlations between families. The methods developed previously can 
be used to build the correlation matrix. 
 
The variance of the parameters ( )ipvar  will be derived within the associated family 
zf . The method is going to be developed next. Given ( )ipvar , Ni ,,1⋯= , recall the 
definition in Equation 3.35, 
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Consequently the covariance matrix is 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pΛppΛp 2
1
2
1
cov ⋅⋅= r  
 
Because ( )pr  can be guaranteed to be positive semi-definite, ( )pcov  is positive 
semi-definite by Theorem C.3 in Appendix C. 
 
In the next section, the correlation matrix of an input parameter family is to be 
developed based on Equations 3.79 and 3.80 respectively. After that, we continue to 
develop the method for eliciting the variance of input parameters within the family. 
 
3.8 Correlation Matrix of a Parameter Family 
3.8.1 Family with Independent Residuals 
When the family members have independent residuals iε , the linear model is defined 
as in Equation 3.79. This model is the same as defined in Equation 3.4 except that the 
common factors are split into two parts for invariant factors and variant factors 
respectively. Correspondingly the correlation matrix of the family f  therefore can 
be adapted from Equation 3.78 as 
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  (3.86) 
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where ( )fr  stands for the correlation matrix of f ; ( )
kX
fr , ( )
kC
fr , ( )
kiX
fr
,
 and 
( ) εfr  are the contributions from the common factors, factor classes, exclusive 
factors and the residuals as defined in Equations 3.55, 3.64, 3.67 and 3.76 
respectively. 
 
3.8.2 Family Residual as an Invariant Factor 
When the family has the family residual as an invariant factor, the linear model is 
defined as in Equation 3.80. The family’s correlation matrix can be derived from 
Equation 3.86 as  
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  (3.87) 
 
where ( )
f
fr ε  stands for the correlation matrix associated with the family residual 
fε . 
 
We can see that the only difference between Equations 3.86 and 3.87 is the 
replacement of ( ) εfr  with ( ) ffr ε . Because fε  is a common factor, we are going 
to derive the matrix ( )
f
fr ε  based on Equation 3.55. 
 
Based on Equation 3.73, we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) ii
i
fi qp
w
pr −== 1
var
,
2
ε  
 
where iq , as defined in Equation 3.71, is the proportion of ( )ipvar  that is explained 
by the factors. 
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Based on Equation 3.54, we define the correlation matrix between p  and fε  as 
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  (3.88) 
 
where m stands for the size of f , i.e. the number of the input parameters in f . 
 
By Equation 3.55, the correlation matrix of the family associated with fε  can then 
derived as 
 
 ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )fmmf rrfr f εεε ,1, pp ⋅⋅= ×  (3.89) 
 
The correlation matrix of f  with the family residual fε  can then be defined by 
Equation 3.87 with ( ) εfr  replaced with ( ) ffr ε . As a summary, the process for 
building the family correlation matrix is demonstrated in Fig. 3.3. 
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Fig. 3.3 Flow chart for building the family’s correlation matrix and the variance of parameters 
in the family through elicitation 
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3.9 Deriving Variance of Parameters in a Family 
In this section, we will develop the method for deriving variance of family members 
based on elicitation of the family variance. 
 
By applying Equation 3.6 with Equations 3.81 and 3.82 we have 
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where iq  is defined as in Equation 3.71. 
 
Based on Equations 3.90 and 3.91, we define 
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Analogous to iq , iIq ,  and iVq ,  stand for the proportion of ( )ipvar  explained by the 
invariant factors and the variant factors respectively. Based on Equation 3.83 we 
have 
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 1
,,
=+ iViI qq  (3.94) 
 
For fpp ji ∈, , from Equations 3.90 and 3.92 we have 
 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) iI
jI
fIj
fIi
j
i
q
q
p
p
p
p
,
,
var
var
var
var
=   . (3.95) 
 
By applying Equation 3.85 with Equation 3.95, we have 
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In Equation 3.96, iIq ,  and jIq ,  can be calculated from the elicitation on the factors by 
Equations 3.92 and 3.71. The means iµ  and jµ  can be elicited from expert 
judgement [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000; Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; O'Hagan, 
Buck et al. 2006]. Therefore the ratio of the variance between two family members 
can be derived by Equation 3.96 through elicitation. If we select a family member as 
the reference denoted by rp , we can define ( )ipvar , fpi ∈  in terms of ( )rpvar  
based on Equation 3.96 as 
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When the input parameters are occurrence rates, their sum is meaningful as the 
occurrence rate of the family as defined as  
 
 ∑
∈
=
fp
if
i
pp  (3.98) 
 
From Equation 3.98, we have 
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In Equation 3.99, the family variance ( )fpvar  is to be elicited. We can then derive  
( )ipvar  for fpi ∈  from ( )fpvar . 
 
By applying Equation 3.97 with Equation 3.99, we have 
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From Equation 3.100, ( )rpvar  can be solved in terms of ( )fpvar . The ( )ipvar  for 
fpi ∈  can then calculated by Equation 3.97. 
 
As a summary, the process for building the family correlation matrix and calculating 
the variance of the family members is shown in Fig. 3.3. We can see a significant 
reduction of the elicitation workload when we elicit the variance within the family 
rather for the input parameters separately. Furthermore, the discussion with the 
experts in RSSB shows that the experts are more confident in giving their assessment 
on higher level events. 
 
3.10 Qualitative Assessment and Benchmark of Correlations 
Elicitation of the correlations between two random variables is the basic input for 
building the correlation matrix of a group of input parameters based on the methods 
developed in the previous sections. Six types of methods for eliciting dependence 
between two random variables have been summarized and discussed in [Clemen, 
Fischer et al. 2000]. Three desirable characteristics of a good elicitation method are 
summarized in the paper. Firstly, a good elicitation method should have rigorous 
foundations that are defensible in terms of probability theory. Secondly a good 
method should be a general one that can be used in a wide variety of situations. 
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Thirdly a good method should be easy to implement and be able to be linked directly 
to the modelling procedure.  
 
Two of the six types of elicitation methods summarized in [Clemen, Fischer et al. 
2000] present the correlation with a continuous line. Two numbers are marked on the 
both ends of the line. The smaller one on the left side represents the weakest 
correlation, i.e. 0; while the larger one on the right side represents strongest 
correlation, i.e. 1. The experts are asked to mark on the line a point of which the 
distance from the both ends represents the belief of the correlation strength between 
two random variables. A numerical measure of the correlation is then mapped 
linearly from the mark position. Because the experts actually are asked to compare 
the correlations between different pairs of random variables rather than making 
quantitative assessment directly, these two methods can be categorized as qualitative 
assessment. They are ranked as the easiest way to implement. However, the linear 
numerical mapping implies a strong assumption and makes the two methods less 
rigorous. The mapping however can be done in another way as employed in the 
Excel Add-in Crystal Ball [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000]. For a given pair of random 
variables of preset correlation, the scatter plot is made on the samples and presented 
on the screen. The experts are then asked to draw a position on the continuous line to 
shown their belief of the correlation strength. By repeating this process many times, a 
map can be made between the positions and the underlying correlations. By 
assuming that the experts can perceive the correlations in a way consistent with their 
subjective correlation perception, we think this map can be used as benchmark in the 
qualitative assessment of the correlations. 
 
A combination of the qualitative assessment and the benchmark as defined above is 
both easy to implement and rigorous in term of probability theory. It is therefore 
believed to be a good method by the standards summarized in [Clemen, Fischer et al. 
2000]. We continue to define the procedure in details. Rather that using the 
continuous line to represent the correlation, we use finite qualitative correlation 
levels as agreed with the experts for our case studies. 
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At the first step, the correlations are elicited from the expert in qualitative levels 
defined as: Very weak (VW), Weak (W), Moderate (M), Strong (S), Very strong 
(VS). The number of the levels can be made based on the expert’s distinguishing 
ability with reference to the literature [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000]. 
 
At the second step, benchmark is conducted to map the qualitative assessments into 
numerical intervals. Take a pair of normal random variables defined as 
 
( ) ( )Σ,~, µNYX  
 
where 
 
( )T0,0=µ  
 






=Σ
1
1
XY
XY
ρ
ρ
 
 
So X and Y are standard normal with correlation coefficient XYρ . By setting XYρ  
randomly between 0 and 1, samples of X and Y can be generated. As demonstrated in 
Fig. 3.4, the scatter plot is then made on the samples and presented on the screen. 
The expert is then asked to assess the correlation in terms of the same qualitative 
levels as used in the elicitation at the first step. The underlying correlation coefficient 
and the expert’s qualitative assessment are recoded for benchmark. 
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Fig. 3.4 Demonstration of benchmark of the quantitative correlation assessments 
 
 
By repeating the second step many times with different XYρ , a table can be built 
containing the preset correlation coefficient and the expert’s qualitative assessment 
as demonstrated in Table 3.1. The benchmark data are expected to be grouped by the 
associated qualitative levels as displayed in Fig. 3.5. Statistics such as the mean, the 
median and the boundaries can then be calculated and used for benchmark of the 
qualitative assessment of the correlations that are used to build the correlation matrix 
of a group of input parameters. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Benchmark table containing the preset correlations and the correlation level assessed 
by the expert. The qualitative levels are defined as Very weak (VW), Weak (W), Moderate (M), 
Strong (S), Very strong (VS). 
No. Correlation of the samples on 
the scatter plot 
Qualitative level given by the 
Expert 
1.  0.2 VW 
2.  0.8 VS 
……   
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Fig. 3.5 Demonstration of benchmark data grouped by the associated qualitative levels. The two 
extreme levels Extremely Weak (EW), Extremely Strong (ES) are defined as 0 and 1 for the 
boundary. 
 
 
3.11 Define Variance of Occurrence Rate by Eliciting on 
Waiting Time 
Based on the methods developed in the previous sections, assessment of the variance 
of the input parameter family is required to build the family’s covariance matrix. In 
this section, the method for deriving the variance based on the elicitation is to be 
developed. 
 
We denote by λ  the occurrence rate. We assume that λ  follows a truncated normal 
distribution for 0>λ , which is defined as 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0,,
1
1
>
−
= λσµλpi λNormA  (3.101) 
 
 
( ) 





−Φ==≤≡ ∫
∞−
λ
λ σ
µλσµλ 0 ),()0Pr dNormA  (3.102) 
 
where µ  and λσ are the mean and standard deviation of λ  respectively; ( )⋅Φ  stands 
for the standard normal cumulative probability function. 
 
Apparently the term 1-A in Equation 3.101 works as a normaliser of the probability 
density function. It is believed that A is a small number. 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Correlation Scale 
EW VW W M S VS ES 
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At the stage of uncertainty analysis, the best estimate of the parameters generally has 
already been done and generally used as the means [Morgan and Henrion 1990]. This 
is the case with the risk RSSB-SRM with which our case studies will be made. We 
therefore assume the means are known and focus on the elicitation of the variance. 
 
People’s ability to assess the statistical percentiles has been proven in psychological 
research [Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005]. The variance of λ  can be derived through 
eliciting the percentiles of λ . The occurrence rate λ  is not observable however. A 
general principle for elicitation is that we should always elicit an observable variable 
[Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. Based on this principle, 
the percentile of the waiting time between two successive occurrences is to be 
elicited to derive the variance of λ . 
 
Given the occurrence rate λ , the events are assumed to follow a homogeneous 
Poisson process. Denote the travel miles between the two successive occurrences as 
T. Based on the assumption of homogeneous Poisson process, T is exponentially 
distributed as 
 
 ( ) tetf λλλ −=;  (3.103) 
 
From Equation 3.103 the cumulative probability of T given λ  can be derived as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )tdssftF t λλλ −−== ∫ exp1;; 0  (3.104) 
 
From Equation 3.101 and 3.104, the predictive cumulative probability of T can be 
derived as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )∫+∞=< 0 ;Pr λλpiλ dtFtT  (3.105) 
 
Substituting Equation 3.105 with Equation 3.101 and 3.104 we obtain 
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 (3.107) 
 
where 
 
 
2
λσµλ tE −= . 
 
Define the percentile of the waiting time cpt  by 
 
 
( ) ( )1,0,Pr ∈≤= cptTcp cp   
 
Based on Equation 3.106 and 3.107, λσ  is a monotonic function of cpt  for a given 
( )1,0∈cp . The function curve can be solved numerically and used to define λσ  
through eliciting cpt . As generally recommended in the literature, 95 percentile 95.0t  
is to be elicited from the experts [Pearson and Tukey 1965; Keefer and Bodily 1983]. 
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As an example, the precursor family of road vehicle (RV) incorrectly on LCs and 
struck by train due to environmental factors is taken to demonstrate the above 
method. The family occurrence rate is evaluated as 09-1.18e=µ  per train travel 
mile [Dennis 2006]. The occurrence rate per year can be derived through the yearly 
travel miles, i.e. yearmilesM /275242062= . The curve of 95.0t  against the 
candidate λσ  is plotted in Fig. 3.6. It demonstrates that when λσ  varies from 0 to 
8.3µ , 95.0t  varies from 111 months to 126 months. The experts are asked to give 
their belief of 95.0t  within this interval. 
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Fig. 3.6 Percentile 95.0t  versus the candidate standard deviation λσ . 
 
 
3.12 An Example of Building Family Covariance Matrix 
In this section we make an example to show the procedure developed above for 
building the covariance matrix of an input parameter family. In RSSB-SRM version 
5, the hazardous event HET-12 is defined as the derailment of passenger trains 
[Dennis 2006]. As summarized in Table 3.2, four precursors related to HET-12, 
denoted by ip , 4,,1⋯=i , are the yearly occurrence rates related to different types 
of train drivers’ errors. Following the procedure defined above, we are going to build 
the covariance matrix of the four precursors. 
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Table 3.2 Precursors related to train derailment caused by the train drivers’ errors 
Precursors 
Code 
Denoted 
by Description 
POSL----PH 1p  Overspeeding leading to PT derailment 
PSNT----PF 2p  Severe braking/snatch leading to PT derailment 
PSPD----PH 3p  SPAD at S&C leading to PT derailment 
UTRN----UE 4p  Running into train derailed while in depots/sidings 
leading to train derailment 
 
Step 1:Define  the precursor family and the factors 
As summarized in Table 3.2, the four precursors are related to train drivers’ errors of 
different causes. They are also related to the group of the train drivers. By the 
definition given above, the experts believe that these four precursors form one family 
and their variance can be derived through the elicitation regarding the four precursors 
as a group. 
 
One major factor affecting the occurrences of the train drivers’ errors is elicited as 
the drivers monitoring and training program (DMTP). Because all the four precursors 
are related to the same group of drivers who are given the same monitoring and 
training program, DMTP is identified as a common factor denoted by 1X . Because 
there is no difference regarding the DMTP among the four precursors, DMTP is 
further defined as an invariant factor of the family. The residual uncertainty terms 
associated with the four precursors are believed to be independent. Therefore, the 
uncertainty of this family can be defined by the linear model defined in Equation 
3.79. We are going to build the family correlation matrix and the covariance matrix 
according to the procedure developed above. 
 
Step 2:Elicit correlations regarding the factors 
 101 
We start with eliciting the qualitative correlation assessment between DMTP and the 
family members, denoted by ( )1, Xpr i , 4,,1⋯=i . All these correlations are positive. 
The qualitative assessment are then be transformed to the numerical correlations by 
the benchmark technique described in Section 3.11. The elicited qualitative 
correlation assessments and the associated numerical correlations are summarized in 
Table 3.3. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Correlations between the family members and the invariant factor driver monitoring 
and training program 
Precursor 
Codes 
Qualitative Correlation 
Assessment 
Correlation 
number 
Denoted by 
POSL----PH VS 0.939 ( )11, Xpr  
PSNT----PF S 0.776 ( )12 , Xpr  
PSPD----PH S 0.776 ( )13 , Xpr  
UTRN----UE S 0.776 ( )14 , Xpr  
 
 
Step 3:Build the correlation matrix 
By the procedure developed above, we will build the family correlation matrices 
associated with the common factor DMTP and the residual terms respectively. The 
family correlation matrix can then be assembled by Equation 3.86. 
 
By Equation 3.11, we denote the vector of the precursors in the family by 
[ ]Tpppp 4321 ,,,=p . Based on the correlations given in Table 3.3, the correlation 
matrix of between the family members and DMT can be defined by Equation 3.54 as 
 
( )












=
776.0000
0776.000
00776.00
000939.0
, 1Xr p  
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where 1X  stands for the invariant factor DMTP. 
 
We can then build the correlation matrix associated with DMTP by Equation 3.55 as 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )












=⋅⋅= ×
602.0602.0602.0729.0
602.0602.0602.0729.0
602.0602.0602.0729.0
729.0729.0729.0882.0
,1, 14411 XrXrr X ppp  
 
where [ ] 441 ×  is a ones-matrix as defined in Equation 3.25 as 
 
[ ]












=×
1111
1111
1111
1111
1 44  
 
We continue to build the family correlation matrix associated with the residual terms. 
For this purpose, we need to calculate iq , 4,,1⋯=i , where iq  is the proportions of 
the ith member’s variance that is explained by the uncertainty factors. By Equation 
3.71, we have 
 
( ) ( ) 882.0,, 11111 =⋅= XprXprq  
 
( ) ( ) 602.0,, 12122 =⋅= XprXprq  
 
( ) ( ) 602.0,, 13132 =⋅= XprXprq  
 
( ) ( ) 602.0,, 14142 =⋅= XprXprq  
 
By Equation 3.75, we have 
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( )












=











 −
=
0000
0000
0000
000118.0
0000
0000
0000
0001 1
1
q
r εp  
 
( )












=












−
=
0000
0000
00398.00
0000
0000
0000
0010
0000
2
2
q
r εp  
 
( )












=












−
=
0000
0398.000
0000
0000
0000
0100
0000
0000
3
3 q
r εp  
 
( )












=












−
=
398.0000
0000
0000
0000
1000
0000
0000
0000
4
4
q
r εp  
 
By Equation 3.76, we then have 
 
( ) ( )












==∑
=
398.0000
0398.000
00398.00
000118.0
4
1i
i
rr εε pp  
 
The family correlation matrix can then be assembled by Equation 3.78 as 
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( ) ( ) ( )












=+=
1602.0602.0729.0
602.01602.0729.0
602.0602.01729.0
729.0729.0729.01
1 ε
ppp rrr X  
 
Step 4: Derive the standard deviation of the members within the family 
We can continue to derive the family covariance matrix through elicitation of the 95 
percentile of the waiting time of the family, which is denoted by 95.0t . The means of 
the occurrence rates of the precursors in the family are summarized in Table 3.4. The 
mean of the family occurrence rate is calculated as 
 
934.2 −= eµ  
 
As developed in Section 3.12, we denoted the standard deviation of the family 
occurrence rate as λσ . We calculate 95.0t  corresponding to two values of λσ  for the 
experts’ reference when making their assessment. When 0=λσ , the family 
occurrence rate is fixed at the mean and 95.0t  is calculated by the pure exponential 
distribution as 55.8 months. When 8.3µσ λ = , 95.0t  is calculated as 65.3 months. 
The experts assess 95.0t  as 59.5 months. The standard deviation of the family 
occurrence rate can then be derived as 4.69e-10. Consequently the standard 
deviations of the four precursors can be derived by the procedure developed in 
Section 3.9, which are summarized in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4 Means and the standard deviations of the precursors in the example 
Precursors Mean iµ  STD iσ  
1p  3.060E-10 5.480E-11 
2p  1.801E-10 3.906E-11 
3p  1.836E-09 3.982E-10 
4p  1.836E-11 3.982E-12 
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Step 5: Build the family covariance matrix 
With the standard deviations of the precursors derived, by Equation 3.35 we have 
 












−
−
−
−
=
12982.3000
010982.300
0011906.30
00011480.5
e
e
e
e
pσ  
 
Using Equation 3.100, the family covariance matrix can be calculated as 
 
( ) ( )cov
3 21 1.56 21 1.59 20 1.59 22
1.56 21 1.53 21 9.36 21 9.36 23
1.59 20 9.36 21 1.59 19 9.54 22
1.59 22 9.36 23 9.54 22 1.59 23
r
ee e e e
e e e e
e e e e
e e e e
= ⋅ ⋅
− − − − 
 
− − − − =
 − − − −
 
− − − − 
p pp σ p σ
 
 
With the means and the covariance matrix built through elicitation of expert 
judgement, the joint normal distribution of the precursors is then completely defined. 
 
3.13 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a procedure is developed for building the covariance matrix of a 
group of parameters through elicitation of expert judgement. In a factor analysis, a 
set of factors are identified as the underlying dependence structure in a correlation 
matrix. The proposed procedure works as an inverse procedure of the factor analysis. 
We start with the factors that construct the dependence structure; we then elicit on 
the factors and derive the correlation matrix. 
 
Through a linear model, the uncertainty in a parameter is structured into the 
contributions of its uncertainty factors. The correlation between a pair of input 
parameters is brought by the common factors and the factors in the same class that 
therefore are correlated. A method has been developed in this chapter to build the 
correlation by eliciting the correlations regarding the common factors and the 
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correlated factors. An indicative value is derived as the proportion of the parameter's 
variance that is explained by the factors. This indicative value cannot exceed 1, 
which can be used to monitor the assessment during the elicitation. The experts have 
to compare between the factors and give the consistent assessment that satisfies this 
constraint. As a result, a positive semi-definite correlation matrix can be guaranteed 
for multiple input parameters, which is a big feature of this method. Suppose there 
are n parameters having m common factors. The number of elicitation parameters is 
mn × . Compared with directly filling in the correlation matrix of ( ) 21−nn  cells, 
this method also features much less elicitation workload. 
 
When a group of parameters have physically similar interpretation, the concept of a 
parameter family is defined. In risk and reliability analysis most of the input 
parameters are defined as the occurrence rate of the basic events [Kumamoto and 
Henley 1996; Modarres 2006]. The sum of the input parameters can therefore be 
defined as occurrence rate of the family which is meaning to assess the variance. A 
method is then developed to derive the variance of the input parameters through 
eliciting the variance of the family occurrence rate. The first benefit of the method is 
the reduction of the elicitation workload regarding the variance. Secondly the 
assessment of higher level events is more reliable as is the case with RSSB-SRM. 
 
As the support technique, we select the combination of the qualitative assessment 
and the benchmark for eliciting the correlation between two random variables. This 
combination makes the method both easy to implement and rigorous in terms of the 
probability theory. 
 
At the end of this chapter a method is developed to derive the variance of the 
occurrence rate by eliciting the percentile of the waiting time between two successive 
occurrences. The waiting time is an observable variable and people’s ability in 
assessing the statistical percentile has been proved in psychological research and 
many elicitation practices. Therefore this method is feasible to implement. 
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From this chapter, we have some work left for future as well. First, we assume a 
truncated normal distribution for the occurrence rate λ . The assumption is made 
together with RSSB. We need to investigate if other distributions such as a Gamma 
distribution are suitable. Furthermore, we need to investigate the possible 
consequences of adopting a different distribution. 
 
Second, the proposed benchmark method depends on the assumption that experts are 
able to percept the correlations by observing the scatter plots. For other distributions 
than normal, the scatter plots may show more complex patterns and mislead experts. 
Therefore it will be difficult to apply the proposed benchmark method for other types 
of distributions. This difficult however can be overcome or mitigated by a proper 
training process. Experts can understand well the patterns associated with a new 
distribution through the training. With an efficient training procedure, the proposed 
benchmark method can be used for other distribution. Similarly, the proposed 
benchmark method can be used for rank correlations as long as an efficient training 
procedure can be made. We can continue to find some efficient training methods. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Modelling Uncertainty in Rule Sets of a Safety Event 
Tree  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Event-trees are widely used for modelling the risk scenarios in safety risk analysis. 
An event tree starts with an initiating event that has the potential to cause safety risk. 
A set of events follows the initiating event. These events can take different outcomes 
and affect the final safety risk. Therefore they are called escalation events. A path 
from the initiating event through all the escalation events is called an accident 
sequence. The distinct combinations of the outcomes of the escalation events define a 
finite number of accident sequences of an event tree. A risk scenario is specified at 
the end of each accident sequence. Associated with each risk scenario, a number of 
people are supposed to be exposed to the risk of getting injured. The numbers of the 
people exposed to the risk scenarios are subject to uncertainty. In this research, 
however, we don’t study the uncertainty in these numbers. We focus on studying the 
uncertainty in the individual injury probabilities associated with the rule sets of the 
event tree, which is to be discussed next. 
 
The injuries are usually classified into four levels including: no injuries, minor 
injuries, major injuries and fatalities [Dennis 2006]. Each individual exposed to the 
risk suffers a probability of getting injured at one of the four levels. We assume that 
all the individuals exposed to one risk scenario get injured independently. The 
consequences associated with one risk scenario are defined as the means of injuries 
at the four levels. Consequently the consequences are calculated as the product of the 
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number of people on scene and the individual injury probabilities. The escalation 
events that affect the individual injury probabilities form a subset of the escalation 
events. A rule set is defined when each escalation event in the subset takes a specific 
outcome. Multiple risk scenarios can be associated with the same rule set. Once the 
individual injury probabilities of the rule set are defined, they can be used for all the 
associated risk scenarios. Therefore the workload for populating the risk model can 
be reduced by modelling on the rule sets. 
 
There are still difficulties in modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets of an event tree 
composing many escalation events. First, the rule sets are intensively interwoven to 
each other through the escalation events. It makes it very difficult to directly assess 
the correlations among rule sets. Second, the number of the rule sets increases 
exponentially with the number of the hazards, which implies too many pairwise 
correlations to assess for a large Event-tree model. Third, the individual injury 
probabilities should have a monotonicity property: a rule set associated with worse 
outcomes of all the escalation events should have individual injury probabilities not 
less than another rule set associated with better outcomes. For instance, two rule sets 
in [Dennis 2006] are defined for the collision of a passenger train and a road vehicle 
with high and low approach speeds respectively. By considering the physical forces 
involved, when all the other situations are the same, the individual injury 
probabilities due to the collision associated with high approach speed should not be 
less than those associated with low approach speed. Such an order relationship 
cannot be modelled purely by the pairwise correlations among the rule sets. 
 
Aimed at the above difficulties, we identify along the sequence of the escalation 
events the hazard types that are the materials or activities with potential to cause 
injuries. Depending on the outcomes of the escalation events associated with a risk 
scenario, one hazard type is defined at a specific level, which is called a hazard. As a 
result, a rule set is defined by a sequence of hazards decided by the outcomes of the 
escalation events associated with each risk scenario. These concepts are 
demonstrated with an example regarding the risk of the possible rupture of a tank 
containing compressed natural gas (CNG). As summarized in Table 4.1, five distinct 
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rule sets are defined by the combinations of the hazards that are defined on the 
outcomes of the escalation events. This example is to be discussed in details later on 
in this chapter. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Example of the rule sets decided by the outcomes of the escalation events 
 Outcomes of the escalation events Hazards 
No. Release Mode 
Ignition 
Mode 
Dispersion 
Type 
Explosion Fire 
1. Instantaneous Immediate N/A Explosion I Fireball 
2. Instantaneous Delayed Dense cloud Explosion II Flash fire I 
3. Instantaneous Delayed Buoyant  Explosion III Flash fire II 
4. Instantaneous No N/A No No 
5. Gradual Immediate N/A No Jet flame 
6. Gradual Delayed Dense cloud Explosion II Flash fire I 
7. Gradual Delayed Buoyant  Explosion III Flash fire II 
8. Gradual No N/A No No 
 
 
We continue to define the injury probabilities of a rule set through the definitions of 
the hazards. We assume that, given the sequence, the hazards are independent in 
terms of causing the injuries to the people exposed to the risk scenario. When an 
individual person caught in the risk scenario is not lucky enough to escape all the 
hazards, the person becomes part of the consequence. After each hazard in the 
sequence, an individual exposed to the risk scenario either keeps the same level of 
injury or suffers a higher level injury. We assume that the transition probabilities 
associated with a hazard depend only on the person’s injury level before the hazard. 
Consequently, the individual injury probabilities of a rule set can be defined on the 
associated hazards by a Markov Chain model [Ross 2003]. To build up the Markov 
Chain model, we need to elicit the transition probabilities associated with each 
hazard. Once the transition probabilities are elicited for one hazard, they can be used 
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for all the rule sets containing the same hazard. Therefore, modelling on the hazards 
can significantly reduce the elicitation work. 
 
For modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets, we can then model the uncertainty in 
the transition probabilities. We assume that the transition probabilities associated 
with different hazard types to be independent. It means that a given transition 
probability of one hazard does not tell any information on the transition probability 
of the hazards of another type. We assume that the transition probabilities associated 
with the same hazard type are proportional. By the assumption, an injury atom is 
defined for each hazard type associated with the worst hazard level. All the transition 
probabilities associated with the same hazard type are then defined on the injury 
atom. The individual injury probabilities of the rule sets can then modelled on the 
injury atoms. The dependences among the rule sets are modelled automatically 
through the injury atoms. The order relationship can also be kept between two rule 
sets associated with general worse and better hazards respectively. 
 
In most of the cases, we are more concerned with the major injuries and the fatalities 
than with the minor injuries. We need also to keep the elicitation work and time 
reasonable to the experts. For these two purposes, we develop a model of two levels 
of injuries as a simplified case of the model of four levels of injuries. A 
demonstration example of the model of two levels of injuries is then made on three 
rule sets of RSSB-SRM [Dennis 2006]. 
 
4.2 Risk Scenarios and Consequences 
An Event-tree starts with an initiating event that has the potential to cause the safety 
risk. Shown in Fig. 4.1 is an event-tree example that is extracted from [Modarres 
2006]. The initiating event in the example is the rupture of the tank containing 
compressed natural gas (CNG). After the initiating event, there can be many other 
events that can have different outcomes and affect the final consequence. These 
following events are accordingly called escalation events [Marsh and Bearfield 2008]. 
In the event tree shown in Fig. 4.1, five escalation events are included as (1) gas 
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release mode; (2) expansion and ignition; (3) dispersion type: (4) fire type; and (5) 
fire location. Each escalation event is represented by a node; the outcomes of an 
escalation event are represented by the branches following the node. Given the 
outcomes of the previous events, the outcomes of one event may not affect the final 
consequence. In this case, the event is set as not applicable (N/A) that is a special 
outcome; and there is one branch following the node. Such cases can be found in the 
example shown in Fig. 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 An Event-tree example extracted from [Modarres 2006]. 
 
 
We denote the escalation events in the same sequence as in the event tree by 
Li EEE ,,,,1 ⋯⋯ , where L  represents the number of the escalation events. We 
denote the outcomes of the event iE , typically yes or no, as 
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( ) { }jiiE ,ω=W , iKj ,,1⋯=  
 
where iK  stands for the number of the outcomes of iE . 
 
Following [Papazoglou 1998], the set ( )iEW  is called the outcome space of the 
event iE . All the possible combinations of the outcomes ji ,ω , Li ,,1⋯= , define the 
outcome space of the escalation events Li EEE ,,,,1 ⋯⋯ , which is denoted by 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LiLi EEEEEE WWWW ⊗⊗⊗⊗= ⋯⋯⋯⋯ 11 ,,,,  (4.1) 
 
where ⊗  stands for the Cartesian multiplication. 
 
With each escalation event having a specific outcome, a path from the initiating 
event through all the escalation events resulting in the final consequence is called an 
accident sequence. A finite number of accident sequences of an event tree are 
defined by the distinct combinations of the outcomes of the escalation events. For 
instance, there are 18 scenarios defined in the example shown in Fig. 4.1. A specific 
risk scenario is defined at the end of each accident sequence. We denote the risk 
scenario associated with the thℓ  accident sequence as ℓS . We denote the outcome of 
iE  associated with ℓS  as ( )ie ,ℓ  
 
 ( ) ( )iEie W∈,ℓ  (4.2) 
 
Consequently the risk scenario ℓS  can then be defined as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )LeieeS ,,,,,,1, ℓ⋯ℓ⋯ℓℓ =  (4.3) 
 
By Equation 4.1, we have  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )Li EEELeiee ,,,,,,,,,,1, 1 ⋯⋯ℓ⋯ℓ⋯ℓ W∈  
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Therefore each risk scenario corresponds to an element of the outcome space of the 
escalation events. 
 
With the outcomes of all the escalation events defined, the consequence due to a risk 
scenario can then be defined. Usually the injuries are classified into four levels 
including: no injury, minor injury, major injury, and fatality. When an individual is 
exposed to a risk scenario, the probabilities of the individual getting injured at the 
four levels are called the individual injury probabilities. We denote the individual 
injury probabilities associated with ℓS  as ( )mπℓ , where 4,,1⋯=m  stand for no 
injury, minor injury, major injury, and fatality respectively. Therefore we have 
 
 ( ) 14
1
=∑
=m
mπℓ , ( ) 0≥mπℓ  (4.4) 
 
In addition to the individual injury probabilities, a number of people are supposed to 
be exposed to a risk scenario. The number of people exposed to the risk scenario is 
affected by the outcomes of associated escalation events. For instance, the event Fire 
Location as shown in Fig. 4.1 has five outcomes including: Urban (0.2), Rural (0.2), 
Tunnel (0.02), Station (0.08), and Garage (0.5). The numbers in the parenthesis are 
the probabilities of the associated outcomes. The mean of the number of the people 
exposed to the scenario is set for each location. Another example can be found in 
RSSB-SRM [Dennis 2006]. According to the time intervals during a day, the loading 
type of the passenger trains in the RSSB-SRM has four outcomes including Night 
loading (0.1), Off-peak loading (0.72), Peak loading (0.135), and Crush loading 
(0.045). The mean of the number of the passengers onboard is set for each loading 
type. In summary, the mean of the number of people exposed to the risk scenario is 
decided by the outcomes of the associated escalation events. We denote the mean of 
the number of people exposed to the risk scenario ℓS  as ℓN . 
 
The consequences associated with the risk scenario are defined as the numbers of the 
injuries at the four levels. We assume that all the individuals exposed to one risk 
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scenario get injured independently. We denote the consequences associated with ℓS  
as ( )mcℓ , where 4,,1⋯=m  stand for no injury, minor injury, major injury, and 
fatality respectively. The consequences of a risk scenario are defined as the means of 
injuries at the four levels as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )mPNmc ℓℓℓ pi×= , 4,,1⋯=m  (4.5) 
 
By applying Equation 4.4 with application 4.5, we have 
 
 ( ) ℓℓ Nmc
m
=∑
=
4
1
 (4.6) 
 
By Equation 4.5, the uncertainty in ( )mcℓ  is driven by: (1) the uncertainty in ℓN , i.e. 
the number of the people exposed to ℓS ; and (2) the uncertainty in ( )mℓpi , i.e. the 
individual injury probability. In this research, we concentrate on developing the 
methods for modelling the uncertainty in ( )mℓpi  and treat ℓN  as a constant. 
 
4.3 Rule Sets 
A hazard type is either a material or activity that has the potential to cause injuries to 
the people exposed to the risk scenario. Some common hazard types in industry 
sectors include explosion, fire, and toxic releases etc as summarized in [Andrews and 
Moss 2002]. On the railway system three common hazard types are identified as the 
mechanical impact, the fire, and the toxic release [Dennis 2006]. Along the 
escalation event sequence ( )Li EEE ,,,,1 ⋯⋯ , we can identify a sequence of hazard 
types, which is defined as 
 
 
( )Dj TTT ,,,,1 ⋯⋯=T  (4.7) 
 
where jT  represents the jth hazard type; D stands for the number of the hazard types. 
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Each hazard type is affected by a subset of escalation events. We define the subset of 
escalation events affecting jT  as 
 
 
( ) { }jiij TEET  of level hazard  theaffects=E  (4.8) 
 
For example, the first hazard type included in RSSB-SRM [Dennis 2006] is the 
mechanical impact in the collision of a passenger train with a road vehicle. By 
considering the physical forces involved, the approach speed of the train affects the 
individual casualty probability due to the mechanical impact. One escalation event 
included in RSSB-SRM [Dennis 2006] is the type of the level crossing. Different 
limits of the approach speed are imposed on the train on different types of level 
crossings [RSSB 2004]. Therefore the level crossing type is one escalation event that 
affects the mechanical impact hazard type. Another hazard type included in RSSB-
SRM [Dennis 2006] is fire. It is affected by the escalation event defining whether 
there are extra flammable materials involved in the accident. The third hazard type in 
RSSB-SRM is the toxic goods, which is affected by the escalation events defining 
the amount of the toxic released in the accident. 
 
As defined in Equation 4.3, a risk scenario ℓS  is defined as a sequence of outcomes 
of the escalation events along the event tree. The hazard types defined in Equation 
4.7 are accordingly defined at the specific levels. We define a specific level of a 
hazard type as a hazard. We denote by jH ,ℓ  the hazard of the type jT  specified by 
the risk scenario ℓS . Corresponding to ( )jTE  defined in Equation 4.8, we define the 
set of the outcomes associated with jH ,ℓ  as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }jij HEieH EO ∈= ,, ℓℓ  (4.9) 
 
where ( ) ( )iEie W∈,ℓ  stands for the outcome of iE  associated with ℓS . 
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Associated with ℓS , a sequence of D hazards corresponding to the D hazard types in 
T  is defined as 
 
 
( )Dj HHHR ,,1, ,,,, ℓℓℓℓ ⋯⋯=  (4.10) 
 
We assume that the sequence of the hazards define the individual injury probabilities 
of an individual exposed to the risk. Consequently ℓR  is called a rule set [Dennis 
2006]. 
 
Based on the definition in Equation 4.10, when ( ) ( ) jj HH ,2,1 ℓℓ = , Dj ,,1⋯= , the rule 
sets ( )1ℓR  and ( )2ℓR  are identical, which is denoted by 
 
 ( ) ( )21 ℓℓ RR =  (4.11) 
 
Therefore multiple risk scenarios can be associated with the same rule sets. 
 
We have assumed that the sequence of the hazards define the individual injury 
probabilities of a rule set. Therefore, the identical rule sets ( ) ( )21 ℓℓ RR =  have the same 
individual injury probabilities, which are denoted as 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( )mm 21 ℓℓ pipi = , 4,,1⋯=m  (4.12) 
 
Once the individual injury probabilities of the rule set are assessed, they can be used 
for all the other risk scenarios associated with the same rule set. It represents an 
important benefit of defining the consequences through the rule sets by Equation 4.5. 
 
We continue to demonstrate the above definitions regarding the rule sets with an 
example. We use the system on the rupture of the tank containing compressed natural 
gas as shown in Fig. 4.1. In this system, two hazard types are identified as: 1H : 
explosion; and 2H : fire [Modarres 2006]. The levels of 1H  and 2H  are decided by 
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the outcomes of three escalation events including: (1) 1E : gas release mode; (2) 2E : 
ignition model; (3) 3E : dispersion type. The escalation event 1E  has two outcomes 
defined as: (1) 1,1ω : instantaneous release; (2) 2,1ω : gradual release. The escalation 
event 2E  has three outcomes defined as: (1) 1,2ω : immediate ignition; (2) 2,2ω : 
delayed ignition; (2) 3,2ω : no ignition. The escalation event 3E  has two outcomes 
defined as: (1) 1,3ω : dense cloud; (2) 2,3ω : buoyant. Associated with one risk 
scenario, the three escalation events take the specific outcomes and consequently 1H  
and 2H  take the specific hazard. The corresponding hazards and the associated 
outcomes of the escalation events are summarized in Table 4.1. Associated with 1H  
there are three hazards defined as: (1) Explosion at Level I; (2) Explosion at Level II; 
and (3) Explosion at Level III. Associated with 2H , there are four hazards defined as: 
(1) Fireball; (2) Flash fire at Level I; (3) Flash fire at Level II; and (4) Jet blame. 
 
As summarized in Table 4.1, we can see that there are five distinct rule sets defined 
by the combinations of the hazards as 
1R : explosion at Level I, fireball 
2R : explosion at Level II, flash fire at Level I 
3R : explosion at Level III, flash fire at Level II 
4R : no explosion, Jet flame 
5R : no explosion, no fire 
 
This example shows that all the risk scenarios can be associated with the five rule 
sets, and hence that the rule set concept offers potential for a significant reduction of 
the elicitation work. 
 
In this section, we have defined the rule sets for the risk scenarios. We have shown 
that multiple risk scenarios can be associated with the same rule set. Once the 
individual injury probabilities of a rule set are assessed, they can be used for all the 
associated risk scenarios. Therefore defining the consequences through the rule sets 
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by Equation 4.5 requires less elicitation work than assessing the risk scenarios 
directly. However for a large event tree of many hazard types, there are still too 
many rule sets to assess through elicitation. As discussed above, the rule sets are 
defined on a sequence of hazards decided by the outcomes of the escalation events. 
Consequently there are three difficulties in modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets 
as described above as: (1) the difficulty in directly assessing the correlations among 
intensively interwoven rule sets; (2) too many pairwise correlations to assess for a 
large Event-tree model; (3) the difficulty in keeping the monotonicity property in the 
individual injury probabilities. Due to the construction process of the event trees, the 
above difficulties are generic when we need to model the uncertainty in the rule sets. 
To solve the difficulties, we are going to define the individual injury probabilities of 
a rule set on the associated hazards by a Markov Chain model [Ross 2003]. 
Therefore once a hazard is assessed, it can be used in all the other rule set containing 
the hazard. 
 
4.4 Definition of Rule Sets on Hazards 
As described before, a rule set is defined by a sequence of hazards decided by the 
outcomes of the escalation events. We assume that, given the sequence, the hazards 
are independent in terms of causing the injuries to the people exposed to the risk 
scenario. When an individual caught in the risk scenario is not lucky enough to 
escape all the hazards, the person becomes part of the consequence. After each 
hazard in the sequence, an individual exposed to the risk scenario is either kept at the 
existing level of injury or moved to a higher level injury, as shown in Fig. 4.2. We 
assume that the probabilities of a hazard moving a person to higher levels of injuries 
depend only on the person’s existing injury level before the hazard. Consequently, 
the individual injury probabilities of a rule set can be defined on the associated 
hazards by a Markov Chain model [Ross 2003]. 
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Fig. 4.2 Diagram of the Markov Chain model of the individual injuries 
 
 
As shown in Fig. 4.2, we denote by ( )kmA ji ,,  the hazard jiH , ’s transition probability 
from m level to k level, where 41 ≤≤≤ km  stand for the four levels of injuries as 
defined before. Clearly we have 
 
 
( ) 1,0
,
≤≤ kmA ji , 41 ≤≤≤ km  (4.13) 
 
We denote the individual injury probabilities of the rule set iR  before and after jiH ,  
as ( )mji 1, −pi  and ( )mji ,pi  respectively, where 4,,1⋯=m  stand for the four levels of 
No injury 
(1) 
Minor injury 
(2) 
Major injury 
(3) 
Fatality 
(4) 
( )1,1
, jiA  
( )3,1
, jiA  
( )4,1
, jiA  
( )2,1
, jiA  
( )2,2
, jiA  
( )3,2
, jiA  
( )4,2
, jiA  
( )4,3
, jiA  
( )3,3
, jiA  
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injuries respectively. The individual injury probabilities ( )mji 1, −pi  and ( )mji ,pi  are 
connected by the transition probabilities ( )kmA ji ,,  as shown in Fig. 4.3. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3 Individual injury probabilities connected by the transition probabilities 
 
 
As shown in Fig. 4.3, to have no injury after the hazard jiH , , the individual must 
have no injury before jiH ,  and follow the transition ( )1,1, jiA . Therefore we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1,111
,1,, jijiji A⋅= −pipi  (4.14) 
 
In the same way, we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2,222,112
,1,,1,, jijijijiji AA ⋅+⋅= −− pipipi  (4.15) 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3,333,223,113
,1,,1,,1,, jijijijijijiji AAA ⋅+⋅+⋅= −−− pipipipi  (4.16) 
 
( )mji 1, −pi  Transition 
probability 
( )mji,pi
 
( )1,1
, jiA  
( )2,1
, jiA  
( )3,1
, jiA  
( )11, −jipi  
( )4,1
, jiA  
( )1
, jipi  
( )2,2
, jiA  
( )3,2
, jiA  
( )21, −jipi  
( )4,2
, jiA  
( )2
, jipi  
( )3,3
, jiA  ( )31, −jipi  
( )4,3
, jiA  
( )3
, jipi  
( )41, −jipi  ( )4,4, jiA  
 
( )4
, jipi  
 
∑ 
∑ 
∑ 
∑ 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )44,334,224,114 1,,1,,1,,1,, −−−− +⋅+⋅+⋅= jijijijijijijiji AAA pipipipipi  
 
  (4.17) 
 
The above four equations can be summarized in one as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∑
=
−
⋅=
m
k
jijiji mkAkm
1
,1,, ,pipi , 4,,1⋯=m  (4.18) 
 
We call ( )mmA ji ,,  the dummy transition probability at the m level of injury. We will 
elicit the transition probabilities ( )kmA ji ,, , km < , and determine the dummy 
probabilities using 
 
 ( ) ( )∑
+=
−=
4
1
,,
,1,
mk
jiji kmAmmA , 4,,1⋯=m  (4.19) 
 
Applying Equation 4.19 with Equation 4.18, we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 4
, , 1 , , 1 ,
1 1
, 1 ,
m
i j i j i j i j i j
k j m
m k A k m m A m jpi pi pi
−
− −
= = +
 
= ⋅ + ⋅ − 
 
∑ ∑  (4.20) 
 
We assume that the people exposed to the risk scenario are initially uninjured. 
Therefore we have 
 
 
( ) 110, =ipi ,   ( ) ( ) ( ) 0432 0,0,0, === iii pipipi  (4.21) 
 
By Equations 4.20 and 4.21, the individual injury probabilities of a rule set can be 
defined when the transition probabilities are assessed for all the hazards associated 
with the rule set. Suppose that the rule set has D hazards in sequence, the individual 
injury probabilities of the rule set iR  are then defined by 
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( ) ( )mm Dii ,pipi = , 4,,1⋯=m  (4.22) 
 
We have so far defined the individual injury probabilities of the rule set through a 
Markov Chain model. Once the transition probabilities associated with the hazard 
( ) jiH ,1  are assessed, they can be used for any other rule set ( )2iR  when ( ) ( ) jiji HH ,2,1 = . 
It means a significant reduction of the elicitation work in populating the model. We 
will continue to model the uncertainty in the individual injury probabilities of the 
rule sets. 
 
4.5 Uncertainty in Individual Injury Probabilities of Rule Sets 
4.5.1 Uncertainty in Transition Probabilities 
We have so far define the individual injury probabilities of the rule set on the 
transition probabilities of the associated hazards. The transition probabilities 
however cannot be assessed with certainty. Therefore the transition probability 
( )kmA ji ,,  is defined as a random variable. We denote the mean of ( )kmA ji ,,  by 
 
 
( ) ( )[ ]kmAEkm jiji ,, ,, =ϕ ,  41 ≤<≤ km  (4.23) 
 
Clearly, we have 
 
 
( ) 1,0
,
≤≤ kmjiϕ  (4.24) 
 
The uncertainty in ( )kmA ji ,,  belongs to epistemic uncertainty category. It needs to 
be elicited from experts. After that, the uncertainty in individual injury probabilities 
of the rule set can be derived. 
 
To model the uncertainty in the transition probabilities, we need to discuss the 
relations among them. A given transition probability associated with one hazard type 
does not tell the expert any information about the transition probabilities associated 
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with other hazard types. Therefore we assume that the transition probabilities 
associated with different hazard types are independent. 
 
Toward the same hazard type, however, experts are either too optimistic or too 
pessimistic. If an expert gives an assessment larger than the mean of one transition 
probability, he will do the same to another transition probability of the same hazard 
type. This has been agreed with the experts in RSSB. The Dirichlet distribution is not 
able to keep such a property; consequently it is not suitable for modelling the 
uncertainty in the transition probabilities associated with the same hazard type. 
 
For simplification, we assume that the expert's assessments of the transition 
probabilities of the same hazard type deviate from the associated means 
proportionally. Based on the assumption, the transition probabilities associated with 
the hazard type jT  have the form: 
 
 
( )
( ) j
j
ji
ji A
km
kmA
γϕ
=
,
,
,
,
, for all ni ,,1⋯= , 41 ≤<≤ km  (4.25) 
 
where n stands for the number of the rule sets; jA  is a random variable; ( )jj AE=γ  
is the mean of jA . 
 
In Equation 4.25, we set 41 ≤<≤ km  to exclude dummy transition probabilities 
from the assumption of proportional transition probabilities. After the uncertainty in 
the real transition probabilities ( )kmA ji ,, , 41 ≤<≤ km , are elicited, the uncertainty 
in the dummy transition probabilities is automatically defined by Equation 4.19. 
 
Based on Equation 4.25, the uncertainties of two transition probabilities associated 
with the same hazard type can be modelled with copulas [Bedford and Cooke 2001]. 
As a more convenient way for multiple transition probabilities associated with the 
same hazard type, however, we are going to define the injury atom for each hazard 
type. 
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Equation 4.25 shows that all the transition probabilities associated with jT  can be 
defined when jA , jγ  and ( )kmji ,,ϕ 's are elicited. Therefore jA  works as a reference 
and is called the injury atom associated with jT . The injury atom jA  however does 
not have a meaning definition so that it can be elicited. It needs to be associated with 
some meaningful parameter for elicitation. By Equation 4.25, any transition 
probability ( )kmA ji ,,  seems a choice for the injury atom jA . Unfortunately it is not 
because the injury atom jA  must be defined to satisfy two constraints. First, by the 
inequality 4.13, we have 
 
 
( ) 1,0
,
≤≤ kmA ji , 41 ≤<≤ km  
 
Second, we define 
 
 ( ) ( )∑
+=
=
4
1
,,
,
mh
jiji hmAmA , 41 <≤ m  (4.26) 
 
We can see that ( )mA ji ,  measures the transition probability from the m-level injury 
to all the higher levels of injuries. We call ( )mA ji ,  the general transition probabilities 
from the m-level injury. Clearly we have 
 
 
( ) 10
,
≤≤ mA ji , ni ,,1⋯= , 41 <≤ m  (4.27) 
 
The injury atom jA  must be defined to satisfy these two constraints. 
 
4.5.2 Injury Atom 
Based on Equation 4.25, the injury atom jA  needs to be defined so that the 
uncertainty in the transition probabilities of the same hazard type jT  can be defined. 
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We need to associated jA  with some meaningful parameters so that it can be elicited. 
Furthermore, the definition of jA  must satisfy two constraints as imposed by the 
inequalities 4.13 and 4.27. 
 
We start with discussing the transition probabilities associated with one rule set iR . 
From Equation 4.25, the transition probabilities from the m-level injury satisfy 
 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) j
j
ji
ji
ji
ji
ji
ji A
m
mA
km
kmA
mm
mmA
γϕϕϕ
=====
+
+
4,
4,
,
,
1,
1,
,
,
,
,
,
,
⋯⋯  (4.28) 
 
From Equation 4.28, we have 
 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) j
j
mh
ji
mh
ji
ji
ji A
hm
hmA
km
kmA
γϕϕ
==
∑
∑
+=
+=
4
1
,
4
1
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
, 4,,1⋯+= mk  (4.29) 
 
Corresponding to the definition in Equation 4.26, we define 
 
 ( ) ( )∑
+=
=
4
1
,,
,
mh
jiji hmm ϕγ  (4.30) 
 
By Equations 4.26, 4.23 and 4.30, we have 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )mhmAEmAE ji
mh
jiji ,
4
1
,,
, γ== ∑
+=
 (4.31) 
 
Therefore ( )mji,γ  is the mean of ( )mA ji , . 
 
By applying Equations 4.26 and 4.30 with Equation 4.29, we have 
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( )
( )
( )
( ) j
j
ji
ji
ji
ji A
m
mA
km
kmA
γγϕ
==
,
,
,
,
,
,
,  (4.32) 
 
By Equation 4.32, the injury atom jA  can be associated with the general transition 
probability ( )mA ji ,  that can be elicited and can keep the inequalities 4.13 and 4.27. 
The injury atom jA , however, needs to be defined to for all the rule sets. We will 
discuss the situation of multiple rule sets next. 
 
Suppose that ( )1iR  and ( )2iR  are two rule sets, where ( ) ( ) nii ,,12,1 ⋯= . Associated 
with the hazard type jT , the two hazards defined for ( )1iR  and ( )2iR  are denoted as 
( ) jiH ,1  and ( ) jiH ,2  respectively. Suppose ( ) ( )11,1 ,kmA ji  and ( ) ( )22,2 ,kmA ji  are two 
transition probabilities associated with ( ) jiH ,1  and ( ) jiH ,2  respectively, where 
41 11 ≤<≤ km , 41 22 ≤<≤ km . Using Equations 4.32, we have 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) j
j
ji
ji
ji
ji A
m
mA
km
kmA
γγϕ
==
1,1
1,1
11,1
11,1
,
,
 (4.33) 
 
and 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) j
j
ji
ji
ji
ji A
m
mA
km
kmA
γγϕ
==
2,2
2,2
22,2
22,2
,
,
 (4.34) 
 
Therefore, we have 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) j
j
ji
ji
ji
ji
ji
ji
ji
ji A
km
kmA
m
mA
m
mA
km
kmA
γϕγγϕ
====
22,2
22,2
2,2
2,2
1,1
1,1
11,1
11,1
,
,
,
,
 (4.35) 
 
It shows that the general transition probabilities are proportional as well when all the 
transition probabilities associated with the same hazard type are assumed to be 
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proportional. From Equation 4.35, we continue to develop the definition of the injury 
atom jA  for the hazard type jT . 
 
From Equation 4.35, we then have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2,22,2
1,1
1,1 mA
m
m
mA ji
ji
ji
ji γ
γ
=  (4.36) 
 
Suppose 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 10 2,21,1 ≤≤≤ mm jiji γγ  (4.37) 
 
Consequently we have 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 12,2
1,1 ≤
m
m
ji
ji
γ
γ
 (4.38) 
 
Applying the inequality 4.38 with Equation 4.36, we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2,21,1 mAmA jiji ≤  (4.39) 
 
Recalling that ( ) 1,0
,
≤≤ kmA ji . By Equation 4.26, we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1,111,1 , mAkmA jiji ≤  (4.40) 
 
Applying the inequality 4.40 with the inequality 4.39, we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2,21,111,1 , mAmAkmA jijiji ≤≤  (4.41) 
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Because ( ) ( )11,1 ,kmA ji  and ( ) ( )22,2 ,kmA ji  can be any two transition probabilities 
associated with the hazard type jT , we can safely generalize the above equations and 
inequalities to all the transition probabilities associated with jT . According to the 
inequality 4.37, we define 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )mm ji
m
niMjMi ,
3,,1
,,1,
max γγ
⋯
⋯
=
=
=  (4.42) 
 
where n stands for the number of the rule sets of the event tree; ( )Mi  and Mm  are 
the indices of the rule set and the injury level associated with the maximum general 
transition probability respectively. 
 
According to the inequality 4.41, we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )MjMijiji mAmAkmA ,,, , ≤≤ , for all ni ,,1⋯= , 41 ≤<≤ km  (4.43) 
 
Based on the inequality 4.43, the inequalities 4.13 and 4.27 can be satisfied when jA  
is associated with ( ) ( )MjMi mA , . Therefore, we define 
 
 ( ) ( )MjMij mAA ,=  (4.44) 
 
and  
 
 ( ) ( )MjMij m,γγ =  (4.45) 
 
By Equations 4.44 and 4.45, we have 
 
 
( ) jjAE γ=  (4.46) 
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By Equations 4.42 and 4.44, the injury atom jA  can be associated with ( ) ( )MjMi mA , , 
which is called the worst general transition probability. Therefore, the uncertainty in 
the transition probabilities associated with jT  can be built in three steps. First, we 
elicit the means of all the transition probabilities, i.e. ( )kmji ,,ϕ , ni ,,1⋯= , 
41 ≤<≤ km . Second, we search for the worst general transition probability, i.e. the 
one of the maximum mean ( ) ( )MjMij m,γγ = . Third, we elicit the distribution of 
( ) ( )MjMij mAA ,= , for which the method will be discussed later on. All the transition 
probabilities associated with jT  can then be defined by Equation 4.32. In this way, 
the inequality 4.13 and 4.27 can be satisfied. 
 
4.5.3 Uncertainty in Individual Injury Probabilities through Injury 
Atoms 
With jA  and jγ  elicited, using Equation 4.32, we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) j
j
ji
ji A
km
kmA
γ
ϕ ,
,
,
,
= , ni ,,1⋯= , 41 ≤<≤ km  (4.47) 
 
According to Equation 4.47, we define 
 
 
( ) ( )
j
ji
ji
km
kmz
γ
ϕ ,
,
,
,
=  (4.48) 
 
From Equations 4.47 and 4.48, we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) jjiji AkmzkmA ⋅= ,, ,,  (4.49) 
 
We call ( )kmz ji ,,  the weight of the transition probability ( )kmA ji ,,  relative to the 
injury atom jA . By Equation 4.49, we can define the individual injury probabilities 
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of the rule set in terms of the injury atoms. Applying Equations 4.48, 4.49 and 4.30 
with Equation 4.19, we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) j
j
ji
ji A
m
mmA
γ
γ
,
,
1, −= , 4,,1⋯=m  (4.50) 
 
Applying Equations 4.49 and 4.50 with Equation 4.20, we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )








−⋅+⋅⋅=
−
−
=
−∑ j
j
ji
ji
m
k
jjijiji A
m
mAmkzkm
γ
γ
pipipi ,1,
1
1
,1,, 1,  (4.51) 
 
By Equation 4.51, the individual injury probabilities of the rule set are defined on the 
injury atoms. The dependence among the rule sets can be modelled automatically 
through the injury atoms. We continue to discuss the order relationships among the 
rule sets. 
 
4.6 Order Relationships among Rule Sets 
Suppose that there are two rule sets ( )1iR  and ( )2iR . We call that the hazards 
associated with ( )1iR  are generally worse than those associated with ( )2iR  when 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 ,2,1 jiji γγ ≥ , Dj ,,1⋯= . (4.52) 
 
As defined in Equations 4.26 and 4.30, ( ) ( )1,1 jiγ  and ( ) ( )1,2 jiγ  are the means of 
( ) ( )1,1 jiA  and ( ) ( )1,2 jiA  that are the general transition probabilities. By Equation 4.51, 
we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )








−⋅=
− j
j
ji
jiji Aγ
γ
pipi
1
111 ,1,,   
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Recalling ( ) 110, =ipi , we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∏
=








−==
D
j
j
j
ji
Dii A
1
,
,
1
111
γ
γ
pipi  (4.53) 
 
Based on the inequality 4.52 and recalling 10 ≤≤ jγ , 10 ≤≤ jA , we have 
 
 
( ) ( )
0
11
1 ,, 21 ≥≥≥ j
j
ji
j
j
ji AA
γ
γ
γ
γ
 
 
We then have 
 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) 11
1
1
1
1
10 ,, 21 ≤−≤−≤ j
j
ji
j
j
ji AA
γ
γ
γ
γ
, Dj ,,1⋯=  
 
It follows 
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( )
( )
( )∏∏
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







−≤




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
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j
j
jiD
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j
j
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1
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1
,
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1
1
1
1
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γ
 
 
By Equation 4.53, we then have 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( )11 21 ii pipi <  (4.54) 
 
By Equation 4.1, we have 
 
 ( ) ( )114
2
i
m
i m pipi −=∑
=
 (4.55) 
 
Applying Equation 4.55 with the inequality 4.54, we have 
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 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∑∑
==
=−≥−=
4
2
221
4
2
1 1111
m
iii
m
i mm pipipipi  (4.56) 
 
We call ( )( )∑
=
4
2
1
m
i mpi  and ( )( )∑
=
4
2
2
m
i mpi  the general injury probabilities of the rule set 
( )1iR  and ( )2iR  respectively. The inequality 4.56 shows that, when ( )1iR  has generally 
worse hazards than ( )2iR  does as defined in the inequality 4.52, the general individual 
injury probability of ( )1iR  is not less than that of ( )2iR . It is called the order 
relationship between ( )1iR  and ( )2iR . 
 
4.7 A Simplified Model of Two Injury Levels 
For uncertainty analysis, we always need to keep the elicitation workload reasonable 
for the experts. Usually we are more concerned with the major injuries and the 
fatalities than with the minor injuries. Therefore the minor injuries can be excluded 
in the uncertainty analysis. To reduce the elicitation work further, the major injuries 
and the fatalities can also be put into one category called casualties. 
 
Accordingly, the model of the individual injury probabilities defined in Equation 
4.51 can be simplified to accommodate only two levels of injuries: no injuries and 
casualties. We can exclude the minor injuries and the major injuries from the model 
defined in Equation 4.51 by setting  
 
 
( ) ( ) 03,12,1
,,
== jiji zz , Dj ,,1⋯=  (4.57) 
 
By Equations 4.21 and 4.51, we then have 
 
 
( ) ( ) 032
,,
== jiji pipi , Dj ,,1⋯=  (4.58) 
 
Therefore by Equation 4.22, we have 
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 ( ) ( ) 032 == ii pipi  (4.59) 
 
Consequently the minor injuries and the major injuries are excluded from the model. 
We then denote by ( )4
, jipi  the individual casualty probability. Applying Equation 
4.57 with Equation 4.53, we have 
 
 ( ) ( )∏
=








−=
D
j
j
j
ji
i A
z
1
,
4,1
11
γ
pi  (4.60) 
 
By Equation 4.4, we have 
 
 ( ) ( )114 ii pipi −=  (4.61) 
 
Applying Equation 4.60 with Equation 4.61, we have 
 
 ( ) ( )∏
=








−−=
D
j
j
j
ji
i A
z
1
,
4,1
114
γ
pi  (4.62) 
 
The Equation 4.62 defines a simplified model including only two levels of injuries: 
no injury and casualty. Such a model requires much less elicitation workload than the 
model of four injury levels. It is especially suitable when our concern is on the 
uncertainty of the major injuries and the fatalities. It has been used in some 
applications such as RSSB-SRM [Dennis 2006]. 
 
4.8 Distribution of an Injury Atom 
As developed before, the injury atom measure the transition probability 
corresponding to the worst safety condition. Usually we assume that a random 
variable measuring the probability follows a Beta distribution on the interval [0,1]. 
Accordingly we assume 
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( )jjj BetaA βα ,~ , [ ]1,0∈jA  (4.63) 
 
where jα  and jβ  are the definition parameters of the Beta distribution. 
 
The distribution of the injury atom can be built through expert judgement elicitation 
[O'Hagan 1998; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. We assume further that the injury atom 
has a unimodal probability distribution. Accordingly we impose the constraint that 
the definition parameters α  and β  are greater than 1 [Evans, Nicholas et al. 2000]. 
Consequently, the density probability and the cumulative probability of the injury 
atom jA  can be defined as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1,
1
,; −− −⋅⋅= jj jj
jj
jjj aaB
af βαβαβα  (4.64) 
 
and 
 
 
( ) ( )( )jj
jja
jjj B
B
aF j βα
βαβα
,
,
,; =  (4.65) 
 
where [ ]1,0∈ja ; 1>jα ; 1>jβ ; ( )jjB βα ,  is a Beta function; ( )jja jB βα ,  is the 
incomplete Beta function. 
 
We continue to develop a method for deriving jα  and jβ  through the expert 
judgement elicitation. Based on Equations 4.64 and 4.65, the parameters jα  and jβ  
can be derived through the elicitation regarding jA  [O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. By 
Equation 4.64, we have 
 
 
( )
jj
j
jAE βα
α
+
=  (4.66) 
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Recall that 
 
 
( ) jjAE γ=  
 
We consequently have 
 
 j
j
j
j αγ
γβ −= 1  (4.67) 
 
For ( )1,0∈P , we denote the P×100  percentile of jA  as Pja , . Suppose the percentile 
Pja ,  has been elicited. By Equation 4.65, we have 
 
 
( ) PjjjPjj aaAF ,, ,; == βα  (4.68) 
 
By applying Equations 4.65 and 4.67 with Equation 4.68, an equation of jα  can be 
derived. Numerical algorithm can then be employed to solve jα  through the 
software package such as MATLAB or MS Excel. The parameter jβ  can then be 
solved straightforwardly by Equation 4.67. 
 
4.9 A Demonstration Example 
4.9.1 Rule Sets and Injury Atoms 
To demonstrate the methods for modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets through the 
injury atoms, an example is made on the risk assessment model RSSB-SRM [Dennis 
2006]. In this model, the major injuries and the fatalities are put into one category 
called casualty. At the first stage of the uncertainty assessment, the minor injuries are 
concerned as much as the major injuries and the fatalities. Therefore, the model of 
two levels of injuries is employed for the uncertainty assessment. 
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In the demonstration example, we use three rule sets in RSSB-SRM including: T10-
LCPRO-3, T10-LCPRO-4 and T10-LCPRO-7. The three rule sets are defined as: 
 
T10-LCPRO-3: Train strikes large road vehicle above buffer height (low loader, 
JCB, etc. ) on AHB, FP, MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), no 
fire 
 
T10-LCPRO-4: Train strikes large road vehicle above buffer height (low loader, 
JCB, etc. ) on AHB, FP, MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), with 
fire 
 
T10-LCPRO-7: Train strikes HGV carrying flammable hazardous goods on AHB, FP, 
MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC) crossing, with fire 
 
In the definitions of the three rule sets, the acronyms AHB, FP, MB/MCB/CCTV, 
and UWC stand for the different types of level crossings that are the outcomes of one 
escalation event [RSSB 2004; Dennis 2006]. From these three rule sets, we can 
identify two hazard types including: the mechanical impact and the fire. As discussed 
previously, the hazard type of mechanical impact is affected by the train’s approach 
speeds that are associated with the types of the level crossings. A similar approach 
speed however is set for the level crossings included in the above three rule sets. 
Therefore the three rule sets have the same hazard associated with the mechanical 
impact. Depending on whether there are extra flammable goods carried in the 
involved road vehicle, two hazards associated with the fire are defined. The three 
hazards are summarised in Table 4.2. For each hazard, the mean of the casualty 
probability is elicited from experts and included in Table 4.2 as well. 
 
Table 4.2 Hazards at different levels associated with the demonstration example 
Code Hazards Mean of the casualty 
probability 
MIPRO Mechanical impact with the train approach speed 
on the other non-automotive level crossings 
7.543% 
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Fire Fire without extra flammable goods 2.857% 
FireFGs Fire with extra flammable goods carried in the 
involved road vehicle 
14.2857% 
 
4.9.2 Definition of Injury Atoms 
As summarized in Table 4.2, one hazard associated with mechanical impact is 
defined, which is defined as the associated injury atom accordingly. Two hazards 
associated with fire are defined corresponding to whether there are extra flammable 
goods or not respectively. Between the two hazards associated with fire, the one with 
extra flammable goods represents the worse case and therefore is defined as the 
associated injury atom. 
 
Within the RSSB-SRM, the upper bounds of the two injury atoms have already been 
elicited in addition to the means. As agreed with the experts of the RSSB-SRM, the 
upper bound is interpreted as the 99 percentile. The means and the 99 percentiles of 
the two injury atoms are summarized in Table 4.3. We assume the injury atoms 
follow Beta distributions. The definition parameters α  and β  of the two injury 
atoms can then be calculated by the above procedure and are summarized in Table 
4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Definitions of the injury atoms for the demonstration example 
Code The Mean 99 percentile α  β  Std 
MIPRO 7.543% 15.09% 7.09 86.93 0.027 
FireFGs 14.28% 28.57% 6.27 37.62 0.052 
 
4.9.3 Definition of Rule Sets on Injury Atoms 
The three rule sets in the example can then be defined on the two injury atoms by 
Equation 4.49. The weights associated with the injury atoms are calculated by 
Equation 4.48 and are summarized in Table 4.4. The means of the rule sets are 
calculated by Equation 4.68 and are included in Table 4.4 as well. 
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Table 4.4 Definitions of the rule sets on the injury atoms for the demonstration example 
Rule Sets MIPRO FireFGs The mean 
T10-LCPRO-3 1 0 0.07543 
T10-LCPRO-4 1 0.2 0.10185 
T10-LCPRO-7 0 1 0.14286 
 
 
With the injury atoms defined, we can continue to investigate the dependence and the 
order relations among the rule sets. For this purpose, we employ the Monte-Carlo 
simulations. At first, we generate independently the samples of the two injury atoms 
by the definitions as summarised in Table 4.3. The individual casualty probability of 
the three rule sets are then calculated by Equation 4.62 based on the weights 
summarized in Table 4.4. Based on 6000 samples of the three rule sets, the scatter 
plots are made pairwise to demonstrate the dependence and order relationship among 
the three rule sets. Demonstrated in Fig. 4.4 is the scatter plot between the rule sets 
T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-LCPPRO-7. By Table 4.4, the two rule sets share the injury 
atom FireFGs. For T10-LCPPRO-4, however, the injury atom MIPRO is more than 
twice stronger than the injury atom FireFGs in terms of the mean of the individual 
casualty probability. Consequently a moderate dependence is introduced for the two 
rule sets as shown in Fig. 4.4. There is no order relation demonstrated between the 
rule sets T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-LCPPRO-7. 
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Scatter plot showing dependency
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Fig. 4.4 Scatter plot between T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-LCPPRO-7 
 
 
Demonstrated in Fig. 4.5 is the scatter plot between T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-
LCPPRO-3. As summarized in Table 4.4 the two rule sets share the injury atom 
MIPRO. The rule set T10-LCPPRO-4 has an extra injury atom FireFGs. Because the 
injury atom MIPRO is more than twice stronger than the injury atom FireFGs in 
terms of the mean of the individual casualty probability, the rule sets T10-LCPPRO-
4 and T10-LCPPRO-3 have a stronger common injury atom than T10-LCPPRO-4 
and T10-LCPPRO-7 do. As a result, a stronger dependence is induced between T10-
LCPPRO-4 and T10-LCPPRO-3 than that between T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-
LCPPRO-7 as shown in Fig. 4.5. Due to the extra injury atom FireFGs, T10-
LCPPRO-4 should have an individual casualty probability always larger than T10-
LCPPRO-3 does. This order relationship is also demonstrated in Fig. 4.5 where the 
all sample points fall under the 45-degree line. 
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Scatter plot showing dependency
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Fig. 4.5 Scatter plot between T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-LCPPRO-3 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have developed a method for modelling the uncertainty in the rule 
sets of an event tree. Usually the experts make their assessments of consequences of 
risk scenarios by thinking of the included hazards separately and then aggregating 
them together, as is the case with RSSB-SRM. We try to construct a model of the 
correlations between the parameters and reconstruct the reasoning implicit behind the 
calculation. 
 
Along the sequence of the escalation events of an event tree, we identify the hazard 
types that are the materials or activities with potential to cause injuries. Depending 
on the outcomes of the escalation events associated with a risk scenario, each hazard 
type is defined at a specific level, which is called a hazard. The individual injury 
probabilities of the rule set are then defined in terms of the hazards. 
 
We assume that, given the sequence, the hazards are independent in terms of causing 
the injuries to the people exposed to the risk scenario. When an individual person 
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caught in a risk scenario is not lucky enough to escape all the hazards, the person 
becomes part of the consequence. After each hazard in the sequence, an individual 
exposed to the risk scenario either keeps the same level of injury or suffers a higher 
level injury. We assume that the transition probabilities associated with a hazard 
depend only on the person’s injury level before the hazard. Consequently, the 
individual injury probabilities of a rule set can be defined on the associated hazards 
by a Markov Chain model [Ross 2003]. To build up the Markov Chain model, we 
need to elicit the transition probabilities associated with each hazard. Once the 
transition probabilities are elicited for one hazard, they can be used for all the rule 
sets containing the same hazard. Therefore, modelling on the hazards can 
significantly reduce the elicitation work. 
 
For modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets, we need to model the uncertainty in 
the transition probabilities that belongs to epistemic uncertainty category as well. We 
assume that the transition probabilities associated with different hazard types to be 
independent. It means that a given transition probability of one hazard does not tell 
any information on the transition probability of the hazards of another type. We 
assume that the transition probabilities associated with the same hazard type are 
proportional. By the assumption, an injury atom is defined for each hazard type. All 
the transition probabilities associated with the same hazard type are then defined on 
the injury atom. Consequently the individual injury probabilities of the rule sets are 
modelled on the injury atoms. 
 
In most of the cases, we are more concerned with the major injuries and the fatalities 
than with the minor injuries. We need also to keep the elicitation work and time 
reasonable to the experts. For these two purposes, we develop a model of two levels 
of injuries as a simplified case of the model of four levels of injuries. 
 
By the above methods, we elicit the uncertainties regarding the hazards; the 
uncertainty in the rule sets are then defined in terms of the hazards. The number of 
the hazards is much smaller than that of the rule sets. Therefore, the above methods 
require reasonable elicitation time from experts. By the above method, the 
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dependences among the rule sets are modelled automatically through the injury 
atoms. The monotonicity property of the rule sets can also be kept between two rule 
sets associated with general worse and better hazards respectively. 
 
For future research work, we can investigate the possible application of the ordered 
Dirichlet distribution on modelling transition probabilities. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Uncertainty Assessment of Fault-tree and Event-tree 
Models  
 
 
5.1 Overview 
Fault trees and event trees are widely used in probabilistic risk analysis. The 
uncertainty in the output of the Fault-tree and Event-tree model is driven by: (1) the 
uncertainty in the basic events of the fault tree; (2) the uncertainty in the probabilities 
of the outcomes of the escalation events; and (3) the uncertainty in the consequences 
of the risk scenarios. In this research, we confine the Fault-tree and Event-tree model 
as follows. The subjective uncertainty of the basic events is assumed to follow a joint 
normal distribution. The probabilities of the escalation events’ outcomes are set as 
the best-estimated values; the uncertainty in these probabilities is not studied in this 
research. The consequence of a risk scenario is defined as the means of equivalent 
fatalities counting both the fatalities and the scaled-down major injuries, which is the 
product of the number of the people exposed to the risk scenario and the individual 
casualty probability of the associated rule set. The uncertainty in the rule set is 
modelled on the injury atoms by the simplified model of two injury levels as 
developed in Chapter 4. The numbers of people exposed to the risk scenarios are set 
with the best-estimated values; the uncertainty in these numbers is not studied in this 
research. Focusing on the fault trees and event trees as described above, we are going 
to develop the methods for conducting the subjective uncertainty analysis. 
 
At the first step, we develop a mimic model of the fault tree and event tree model. 
Fault trees and event trees are usually built with commercial software packages such 
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as Isograph FT+. The software packages usually offer a graphic interface for the 
users to build up the models. The software then transfers the graphic model into 
computer codes and data that are stored in the internal database. After a run of the 
model, the generated results are also stored in the internal database. The internal 
databases, however, are usually not transparent to the users. To access the internal 
database, users must utilize the dedicated interface software tools that are developed 
associated with the commercial software packages. Associated with Isograph FT+, 
for example, we need to program with the dynamical link library (DLL) to access the 
internal database and to run the models [Isograph 2004; Isograph 2005]. These limits 
on accessing and manipulating the internal database cause difficulties in conducting 
uncertainty assessment in two aspects. Firstly, for conducting simulations, we need 
to set the input parameters, run the model and obtain the results. It is very difficult if 
possible given the limits on accessing the database of the fault tree and event tree 
computer model. Secondly, the computer model consisting of the codes and data 
stored in the internal database is completely a “black-box” to the analysts. It is 
impossible to do any analytical analysis with such a computer model. Therefore we 
need a mimic model of the original computer model. 
 
The top event of a fault tree is broken down into the basic events, also called 
precursors. A cut set is a collection of the basic events that together certainly cause 
the top event. A minimum cut set is one that is no longer a cut set when any of its 
basic events is removed. The basic events are called rare events when they have very 
small occurrence probabilities. For two minimum cut sets composed of rare events, 
the simultaneous occurrence probability is an order of magnitude smaller than the 
occurrence probability of either minimum cut sets. Based on this idea, the occurrence 
probability of the top event can be approximated as the sum of the occurrence 
probabilities of all the minimum cut sets, which is called rare event approximation 
[Bedford and Cooke 2001]. Once the fault trees and event trees are built with a 
commercial software tool such as Isograph and the input parameters are set, the 
minimum cut sets can be generated and associated with a risk scenario. The codes of 
the events composing the risk scenarios can then be output into a plain text file such 
as MS Excel. We can then program with MS Excel VBA on the events composing 
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the risk scenarios to mimic the original computer model [Jelen and Syrstad 2004]. 
MS Excel is a very popular software tool that offers easy access to the data. It is 
therefore easy to conduct simulations of the mimic model for uncertainty assessment. 
The mimic model also offers a transparent structure so that we can calculate the 
variance of the mimic model through algebraic operations. 
 
For conducting the uncertainty analysis, the dependent basic events need to be 
expressed as the linear transformation of a set of independent standard normal 
variables. We select a linear transformation that is suitable for the context of risk 
analysis. Usually we implement the linear transformation through the Cholesky 
decomposition of the covariance matrix [Scheuer and Stoller 1962]. The Cholesky 
algorithm requires that the covariance matrix must be positive definite [Scheuer and 
Stoller 1962]. In the context of risk analysis, however, the covariance matrix can be 
positive semi-definite. To solve this issue, we select the linear transformation 
through the decomposition vectors and eigenvalues, which is called eigen-
decomposition. Furthermore, in the context of risk analysis, the variance of the input 
parameters can be very small. The variance of the precursors related to the hazardous 
event HET-12 in the RSSB-SRM, for example, spreads over 2419 10~10 −−  [Harrison, 
Griffin et al. 2008]. For such a covariance matrix, the calculation of the eigenvalues 
and eigenvectors is more expensive and large errors can be incurred [Wilkinson 1965; 
Watkins 1991]. To solve this problem, we implement the linear transformation 
through the eigen-decomposition of the correlation matrix instead of the covariance 
matrix. 
 
Based on the linear transformation, we then develop Monte-Carlo simulations to 
build the empirical distribution of the output. We also develop the analytical solution 
for the variance through algebraic operations. The two methods are implemented 
independently and therefore can be used for cross check for each other. The whole 
scheme of the uncertainty assessment of a Fault-tree and Event-tree model is 
demonstrated in Fig. 5.1. Blocks 1, 2 and 3 represent the procedures for building the 
Excel mimic model, which are to be developed in Section 5.2. Block 5 represents the 
procedure for building the uncertainty model in the precursors through elicitation, 
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which is related to Chapter 3. Block 7 represents the procedure for building the 
uncertainty model in the rule sets, which is related to Chapter 4. The uncertainty 
model in the precursors and the uncertainty model in rule sets are represented in 
Block 4 and Block 6 respectively, as the outcomes of Block 5 and Block 7. Block 8 
and 9 represent the procedures for uncertainty assessment, for which a set of methods 
are to be developed in this chapter. The software design for implementing the mimic 
model, the simulations and the analytical solution of the variance is developed in 
Section 5.7. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1 Scheme for conducting the uncertainty assessment of a Fault-tree and Event-tree model 
 
 
In Appendix A, a set of new methods are also proposed. These methods need to be 
developed further especially with techniques for error control. Consequently they are 
2. Output the existing 
point values of the 
precursors 
4. Precursor uncertainty model including: 
(1) covariance matrices; (2) the samples 
6. Rule set uncertainty model including: (1) the means of the rule sets and 
means of the products of two rule sets; (2) the samples. 
5. Building the covariance 
matrix of the precursors 
through elicitation 
7. Building the uncertainty model of 
the rule sets through elicitation 
3. Output the map from the 
consequences to the rule sets 
8. Simulations of the 
output 
9. Analytical solution of the variance 
of the output 
1. Output the cut sets; identify 
the codes of the precursors 
and consequences 
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not applied in this research. These methods, however, have the potential to calculate 
the uncertainty propagation and are worth more effort in the future. 
 
5.2 Mimic Model with MS Excel 
Usually we use an event tree to model the risk scenarios. A path from the initiating 
event through all the escalation events is called an accident sequence. At the end of 
an accident sequence, the risk scenario is defined. The initiating event of the event 
tree can be further broken down into the basic events with a fault tree. A cut set is a 
collection of the basic events that together certainly cause the top event of the fault 
tree. A minimum cut set is one that is no longer a cut set when any of its basic events 
is removed. When the rare event approximation is applied, the occurrence of the top 
event can be approximated by the sum of the occurrences of the minimum cut sets 
[Bedford and Cooke 2001]. Consequently a finite set of risk scenarios can be defined 
by the combinations of the minimum cut sets and the outcomes of the events along 
the event tree. 
 
The frequency of the risk scenario ℓS  can be calculated as 
 
 
( )( )
( )
∏∏
∈∈
⋅=
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ℓ ℓ
SieSp
i iepf
i ,
,Pr  (5.1) 
 
where ip  stands for a basic event; ( )ie ,ℓ  stands for the outcome of the escalation 
event iE  associated with ℓS ; ( )( )ie ,Pr ℓ  stands for the probability of ( )ie ,ℓ . 
 
Suppose that the consequence associated with ℓS  is ℓc , the risk associated with ℓS  is 
calculated as 
 
 ℓℓℓ cfr ⋅=  (5.2) 
 
The overall risk associated with the fault-tree and event tree can then be defined as 
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where ( )SN  is the number of risk scenarios of the fault tree and event tree. 
 
Using Equations 5.1-5.3, we can define a mimic model of the fault tree and event 
tree when we obtain for each risk scenario: (1) the codes of the basic events; (2) the 
codes of the outcomes of the escalation events; and (3) the code of the consequence. 
These codes are referred to as the risk scenario definition codes. Once the fault tree 
and event tree are built with the commercial software, the risk scenario definition 
codes can be generated and then output in plain text or MS Excel etc. The software 
Isograph FT+, for example, can output the risk scenario definition codes into an 
Excel worksheet. An example of this is demonstrated in Fig. 5.2.a. On the top row 
are the titles of the fields as summarized in Table 5.1; underneath the top row, each 
row defines a risk scenario. While most fields are output for explanation or cross-
checking, the fields Cut Set and Consequence Name are the two key fields containing 
the risk scenario definition codes. 
 
The field “Cut Set” consists of a character string that is composed of the codes of the 
basic events and the codes of the outcomes of the escalation events defining the risk 
scenario [Isograph 2005]. An example of the Cut Set string is extracted as 
 
“OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. PABCLOVSTH”. 
 
The character string can be parsed by programming into the individual codes. These 
codes can then the stored separately in the following columns as shown in Fig. 5.2.b. 
By the codes of the events and the outcomes, we can link the mimic model to the 
uncertainty model of the input parameters. 
 
The filed “Consequence Name” contains the code of the consequence. As explained 
in Chapter 4, a consequence is associated with a rule set and the number of the 
people exposed to the risk scenario. The rule set defines the individual injury 
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probabilities, of which the uncertainty model can be built on the injury atoms as 
developed in Chapter 4. Therefore by the code of the consequence, we can link the 
mimic model to the uncertainty model of the rule sets. 
 
As a conclusion, we can mimic the Fault-tree and Event-tree model by Equations 
5.1-5.3 with the risk scenario definition codes. MS Excel is a very popular software 
tool and we can easily manipulate the data within Excel. With the mimic model, we 
can conveniently conduct simulations and calculate the analytical solution of the 
variance of the output risk. We will continue to develop these methods by starting 
with the linear transformation of the normal random variables. 
 
 
Table 5.1 Summary of the fields defining the risk scenarios in the mimic model 
No Code Description 
1. Risk The risk associated with the associated risk scenario 
2. Frequency The frequency of the risk scenario 
3. Weight The consequence, i.e. the number of the fatalities 
associated with the risk scenario 
4. Cut Set Character string composing the codes of the basic events 
and the codes of the outcomes of the escalation events 
5. ID A unique index code of the risk scenario 
6. Event 
Description 
Description regarding to the risk scenario 
8. Consequence 
Name 
Index code of the consequence associated with the risk 
scenario 
9. Consequence 
Description 
Description of the consequence 
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Risk Frequency W eight Cut Set ID Event DescriptionsFussell-Vesely ImportanceConsequence Name Consequence Description
2.3E-05 0.003258 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. VAOCLDRRTHT12-OFN-1.1Number of train miles3.42E-05 T12-OFN-1 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. VAOCLDRRT
6.09E-06 0.000862 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. VAOCLDELTHT12-OFN-1.2Number of train miles9.05E-06 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
6.76E-07 9.58E-05 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. VAOCLDRTTHT12-OFN-1.3Number of train miles1.01E-06 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
4.17E-07 5.9E-05 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. VABCLDRRTHT12-OFN-1.4Number of train miles6.2E-07 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
3.29E-07 4.66E-05 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. VAOCLSUIXPET12-OFN-1.5Number of train miles4.89E-07 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
1.86E-07 2.63E-05 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. WAOCLENVTET12-OFN-1.6Number of train miles2.77E-07 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
1.75E-07 2.48E-05 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. VABCLSUIXPET12-OFN-1.7Number of train miles2.6E-07 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
1.55E-07 2.19E-05 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. VABCLDELTHT12-OFN-1.8Number of train miles2.3E-07 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
1.35E-07 1.92E-05 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. VAOCLSTRTET12-OFN-1.9Number of train miles2.01E-07 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
1.33E-07 1.89E-05 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. VABCLSTRTET12-OFN-1.10Number of train miles1.99E-07 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
5.68E-08 8.05E-06 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. WABCLENVTET12-OFN-1.11Number of train miles8.45E-08 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
2.11E-09 2.99E-07 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. LAOCLLSETFT12-OFN-1.12Number of train miles3.14E-09 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
2.11E-09 2.99E-07 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. PAOCLOVSTHT12-OFN-1.13Number of train miles3.14E-09 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
2.03E-09 2.88E-07 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. PABCLOVSTHT12-OFN-1.14Number of train miles3.03E-09 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
2.03E-09 2.88E-07 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. LABCLBLETFT12-OFN-1.15Number of train miles3.03E-09 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
1.64E-09 2.32E-07 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. PAOCLSPDTH. PSPDDRECPHT12-OFN-1.16Number of train miles2.44E-09 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
1.58E-09 2.24E-07 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. PABCLSPDTH. PSPDDRECPHT12-OFN-1.17Number of train miles2.35E-09 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
2.11E-10 2.99E-08 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. PAOCLSPDTH. PSPDMISCPHT12-OFN-1.18Number of train miles3.14E-10 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
2.04E-10 2.89E-08 0.007059 OPEN-TRACK*. EL-N----PI. ELCDAOCSPP. -ELFS----PP. PABCLSPDTH. PSPDMISCPHT12-OFN-1.19Number of train miles3.03E-10 T12-OFN-1 0.007 (10)
 
 
Fig. 5.2.a MS Excel mimic model of the Isograph FT+ Fault-tree and Event-tree models 
 
Number Events C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP VAOCLDRRTH
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP VAOCLDELTH
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP VAOCLDRTTH
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP VABCLDRRTH
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP VAOCLSUIXPE
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP WAOCLENVTE
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP VABCLSUIXPE
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP VABCLDELTH
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP VAOCLSTRTE
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP VABCLSTRTE
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP WABCLENVTE
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP LAOCLLSETF
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP PAOCLOVSTH
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP PABCLOVSTH
5 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP LABCLBLETF
6 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP PAOCLSPDTH PSPDDRECPH
6 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP PABCLSPDTH PSPDDRECPH
6 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP PAOCLSPDTH PSPDMISCPH
6 OPEN-TRACK EL-N----PI ELCDAOCSPP -ELFS----PP PABCLSPDTH PSPDMISCPH
 
Fig. 5.2.b Codes of the events composing the risk scenario. 
 
 
5.3 Linear Transformation of Dependent Normal Random 
Variables 
5.3.1 Overview 
Suppose a column vector of N normal random variables is defined as 
 
 [ ]TNpp ,,1 ⋯=p  (5.4) 
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We define the means and the covariance matrix of p  as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]TNpEpEE ,,1 ⋯=p  (5.5) 
 
 
( ) pΣp =cov , NN×∈RpΣ  (5.6) 
 
The joint distribution of p  is then completely defined by ( )pE  and ( )pcov . It is 
however difficult to sample or to conduct other calculation directly on the dependent 
normal random variables. Therefore we prefer to define p  in terms of a linear 
transformation of a set of independent normal random variables. Suppose there are N 
independent standard normal random variables that are defined as 
 
 ( )1,0~ NZ i , Ni ,,1⋯=  (5.7) 
 
 ( ) NIZ =cov  (5.8) 
 
where NI  is an NN ×  dimensional identity matrix. 
 
Accordingly we define the column vector 
 
 
( )TNZZ ,,1 ⋯=Z  (5.9) 
 
We search for a linear transformation from Z  to p  of the form 
 
 ( )pZLp E+⋅=  (5.10) 
 
where NN×∈RL  stands for a linear transformation matrix. 
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We know that the joint normal distribution of p  can be completely defined by the 
means ( )pE  and the covariance matrix pΣ . The transformation matrix L  can be 
derived in terms of ( )pE  and pΣ . Based on Equation 5.7, we have 
 
 ( ) 0Z =E  (5.11) 
 
Consequently we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0ZLZL =⋅=⋅ EE   
 
Therefore the mean vector ( )pE  is automatically preserved by the linear 
transformation. By Equation 5.10, we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) TLZLZLp ⋅⋅=⋅= covcovcov  
 
Based on Equations 5.6 and 5.8, we then have 
 
 
TLLΣp =  (5.12) 
 
Therefore once the transformation matrix L  is built to satisfy Equation 5.12, the 
linear transformation in Equation 5.10 will preserve the covariance matrix pΣ  as 
required. We know that the covariance matrix pΣ  must be symmetrical and positive 
semi-definite. When pΣ  is positive definite, L  can be solved through Cholesky 
decomposition [Scheuer and Stoller 1962; Herstein and Winter 1988; Law and 
McComas 1999], where the outcome L  is a lower triangular matrix. 
 
In risk analysis context, however, the covariance matrix pΣ  can be positive semi-
definite. The Cholesky cannot be used in this situation [Scheuer and Stoller 1962; 
Law and McComas 1999]. To solve this problem, we are going to implement the 
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linear transformation through eigen-decomposition as used in principal component 
analysis [Krzanowski 1988; Jolliffe 2002]. 
 
5.3.2 Linear Transformation through Eigen-decomposition 
We know that the covariance matrix pΣ  must be symmetric matrix and positive 
semi-definite. Therefore, associated with pΣ , there exist N non-negative real 
eigenvalues 0≥iλ  Ni ,,1⋯= , [Burden and Faires 1997]. Corresponding to each 
0≥iλ , there exists an eigenvector 1×∈ Ni RU  that satisfies 
 
 iii UUΣp λ= , Ni ,,1⋯=  (5.13) 
 
We define the eigenvalue matrix as 
 
 










=
Nλ
λ
⋯
⋮⋱⋮
⋯
0
01
Λ  (5.14) 
 
Therefore Λ  is a diagonal matrix with all the eigenvalues on the diagonal. 
According to Λ , we define the eigenvector matrix as 
 
 [ ]NUUU ,,1 ⋯= , NN×∈RU  (5.15) 
 
By Equations 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15, we have 
 
 UΛUΣp =  (5.16) 
 
Usually the eigenvectors are normalized so that 
 
 1=⋅ i
T
i UU  (5.17) 
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The eigenvectors iU , Ni ,,1⋯= , are mutually orthogonal [Burden and Faires 1997]. 
Consequently we have 
 
 0=⋅ j
T
i UU , ji ≠  (5.18) 
 
By Equations 5.17 and 5.18, we have 
 
 N
T IUU =⋅  (5.19) 
 
Therefore the eigenvector matrix U  is orthogonal. By the definition of the inverse 
matrix, we have 
 
 
TUU =−1  (5.20) 
 
where 1−U  stands for the inverse matrix of U . 
 
Therefore we have 
 
 N
T IUU =  (5.21) 
 
where NI  stands for the NN ×  dimensional identity matrix as defined before. 
 
Based on Equation 5.21, by right-multiplying TU  on both sides of Equation 5.16 we 
have 
 
 
TT UUΣUUΣp Λ==  (5.22) 
 
From Equation 5.14, we define 
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









=
Nλ
λ
⋯
⋮⋱⋮
⋯
0
01
2
1
Λ  (5.23) 
 
Therefore we have 
 
 
2
1
2
1
ΛΛΛ ⋅= ,   2
1
2
1
ΛΛ =







T
 (5.24) 
 
Based on Equations 5.22, 5.23 and 5.24, we have 
 
 
T
T
T
















=







⋅=
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
UΛUΛUΛUΛΣp  (5.25) 
 
Based on Equations 5.12 and 5.25, we can define 
 
 
2
1
ΛUL ⋅=  
 
Since L  is defined by the eigenvectors and the eigenvalues, the decomposition 
defined in Equation 5.25 is called eigen-decomposition [Dillon and Goldstein 1984]. 
Based on Equations 5.10, we can define the linear transformation as 
 
 ( )pZΛUp E+⋅






⋅=
2
1
 (5.26) 
 
where ( )TNZZ ,,1 ⋯=Z  is a column vector of independent standard normal random 
variables as defined in Equations 5.7-5.9. 
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The linear transformation through Eigen-decomposition can be used when the 
covariance matrix pΣ  is positive semi-definite; while the linear transformation 
through the Cholesky decomposition can be used only when pΣ  is positive definite. 
 
In the uncertainty analysis of risk assessment models, the variance of the input 
parameters can be very small. The variance of the precursors related to the hazardous 
event HET-12 in the RSSB-SRM, for example, spreads over 2419 10~10 −−  [Harrison, 
Griffin et al. 2008]. We have 
 
 
( ) ∑∑
==
==
N
i
i
N
i
i
11
2tr λσpΣ  (5.27) 
 
where ( )pΣtr  is the trace of pΣ ; iσ  stands for the standard deviation of ip . 
 
Because pΣ  is positive semi-definite, we have 0≥iλ , Ni ,,1⋯= . By Equation 5.27, 
we have 
 
 ∑
=
≤≤
N
i
ii
1
20 σλ  
 
When all the standard deviations are very small, the eigenvalues of pΣ  cluster in the 
small interval 





∑
=
N
i
i
1
2
,0 σ . For such a covariance matrix pΣ , the calculation of the 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors is more expensive while large errors are incurred 
[Wilkinson 1965; Watkins 1991]. To solve this problem, we are going to develop the 
linear transformation through the eigen-decomposition of the correlation matrix. 
 
5.3.3 Linear Transformation based on the Correlation Matrix 
Suppose the correlation matrix of p  is defined as 
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( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 














=
1,,
,1,
,,1
1
1
11
⋯⋯
⋮⋱⋮⋮⋮
⋯⋯
⋮⋮⋮⋱⋮
⋯⋯
iNN
Nii
Ni
XXrXXr
XXrXXr
XXrXXr
r p  
 
The correlation matrix ( )pr  is symmetric and positive semi-definite. Therefore ( )pr  
can be decomposed with the eigenvalue matrix and the eigenvector matrix as 
 
 ( )
T
Tr 







⋅







=⋅⋅=
2
1
2
1
VMVMVΜVp  (5.28) 
 
where V  and M  stand for the eigenvector matrix and the eigenvalue matrix and of 
( )pr  respectively. 
 
We define 
 
 
















=
N
i
σ
σ
σ
⋯⋯
⋮⋱⋮⋮⋮
⋯⋯
⋮⋯⋮⋱⋮
⋯⋯
00
00
001
pσ  
 
where iσ  stands for the standard deviation of ip . 
 
Therefore pσ  is a diagonal matrix and we have 
 
 
T
pp σσ =  (5.29) 
 
Consequently we have 
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( ) ppp σpσΣ ⋅⋅= r  (5.30) 
 
By applying Equation 5.28 with Equation 5.30 we have 
 
 
T
T








⋅⋅⋅







⋅⋅=
⋅







⋅⋅







⋅⋅=
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
MVσMVσ
σMVMVσΣ
pp
ppp
 (5.31) 
 
Based on Equations 5.12 and 5.31, we can define 
 
 
2
1
MVσL p ⋅⋅=  
 
Correspondingly we can define the linear transformation by Equation 5.10 as 
 
 ( )pZMVσp E+⋅






⋅⋅=
2
1
 (5.32) 
 
where ( )TNZZ ,,1 ⋯=Z  is a column vector of independent standard normal random 
variables as defined in Equations 5.7-5.9. 
 
Based on the linear transformation, we can generate independently the samples of the 
standard normal random variables ( )1,0~ NZk , Nk ,,1⋯= , by the standard 
algorithms [Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. The samples of p  can then be generated 
by Equation 5.10 based on the samples of Z . 
 
Based on the linear transformation, we can also develop the analytical solution of the 
mean of the product of the correlated normal random variables. It will then be used 
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for calculating the analytical solution of the variance of the mimic model of the 
Fault-tree and Event-tree model. 
 
5.4 Mean of Product of Correlated Normal Random Variables 
Suppose that a set of normal random variables are defined as in Equations 5.4-5.6. 
We want to calculate the mean of the product ∏
= Ni
ip
,1
, which is to be used for 
calculating the variance of the mimic model of the Fault-tree and Event-tree model. 
We are going to develop the analytical solution based on the linear transformation as 
defined in Equation 5.10. 
 
We define the thi  row vector of the transformation matrix L  as 
 
 
[ ]Nikiii ,,1, ,,,, ℓ⋯ℓ⋯ℓ=L  (5.33) 
 
Therefore we have 
 
 
















=
N
i
L
L
L
L
⋮
⋮
1
 
 
Based on Equations 5.10 and 5.33, we have 
 
 ( ) ( )i
N
k
kkiiii pEZpEp +⋅=+⋅= ∑
=1
,
ℓZL  (5.34) 
 
Consequently we have 
 
 ( )∏ ∑∏
= ==






+⋅=
Ni
i
N
k
kki
Ni
i pEZp
,1 1
,
,1
ℓ  (5.35) 
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Therefore the product ∏
= Ni
ip
,1
 can be defined as a polynomial expansion as 
 
 ∑∏ =
= j
j
Ni
i Tp
,1
 (5.36) 
 
and 
 
 
Njkjj
Nkjj ZZZT
,,1,
1
βββ
α ⋯⋯=  (5.37) 
 
where jα  is the coefficient; kj ,β 's are the integer exponents. 
 
In Equation 5.37, jT  is the product of N terms, one and only one of which is either 
kki Z,ℓ  or ( )ipE  that is associated with each ip  as defined in Equation 5.34. We 
define the index 
 
 
( ) ( )

=
ji
jkki
TpE
TZk
ijs
in  included  terma is   if ,0
in  included  terma is  if ,
,
,
ℓ
 (5.38) 
 
Therefore we have ( ) [ ]Nijs ,0, ∈ . We define the delta function 
 
 ( )


 =
=
otherwise ,0
 if ,1
,
ck
kcδ  (5.39) 
 
Based on Equations 5.35-5.39, we have 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )∏
=
⋅⋅−+⋅=
Ni
ijsijsiij ZijspEijsT
,1
,,,
,,01,,0 ℓδδ  (5.40) 
 
Applying Equation 5.40 with Equation 5.37, we have 
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 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )∏
=
⋅−+⋅=
Ni
jikiij ijspEijs
,1
,,
,,01,,0 ℓδδα  (5.41) 
 
and 
 
 ( )( )∑
=
=
N
i
kj ijsk
1
,
,,δβ  (5.42) 
 
By Equation 5.39, we have 
 
 Nkj ≤≤ ,0 β  
 
With jα  and kj ,β  defined in Equations 5.41 and 5.42, we continue to derive the 
mean of ∏
= Ni
ip
,1
. Based on Equation 5.36, we have 
 
 
( )∑∏ =






= j
Nj
Ni
i
Njj ZZEpE ,1,1
,1
ββ
α ⋯  
 
Recalling that NZZ ,,1 ⋯  are independent, we have 
 
 
( ) ( )∑∏ =






= j
Nj
Ii
i
Njj ZEZEpE ,1,1
,1
ββ
α ⋯  (5.43) 
 
In Equation 5.43, ( )kjkZE ,β  represents the kj ,β -order moment of kZ . Because kZ  is a 
standard normal random variable, this moment can be calculated as given in 
[Johnson and Balakrishnan 1994] as: 
 
 ( ) ⋯2,1,012 ==− iZE ik  (5.44.a) 
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 ( ) ( )( ) ⋯⋯ 2,1,1332122 =⋅−−= iiiZE ik  (5.44.b) 
 
The moment ( )kjkZE ,β  can also be calculated through an iterative process [Johnson 
and Balakrishnan 1994] as 
 
 ( ) 10 =kZE  (5.45.a) 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ⋯2,1,12122 =−=− iiZEZE ikik  (5.45.b) 
 
We have ( )2 1 0ikE Z − =  because the normal distribution is symmetric. 
 
Some moments of a standard normal random variable are calculated and summarized 
in Table 5.2. Therefore Equation 5.43 offers a way to calculate the mean of the 
product of correlated normal random variables. This formula is to be used in 
calculating the variance of the mimic model of the Fault-tree and Event-tree model. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Moments of a standard normal random variable 
Order i Moment ( )iZE  
0 1 
1 0 
2 1 
3 0 
4 3 
5 0 
6 15 
7 0 
8 105 
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5.5 Mean of Product of two Correlated Normal Random 
Variables 
Suppose that ip  and jp  are two correlated normal random variables. The mean of 
the product of ip  and jp  can be calculated directly rather than through the linear 
transformation as developed above. 
 
The correlation between ip  and jp  is defined as 
 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )ji
ji
ji pp
pp
ppr
varvar
,cov
, =  (5.46) 
 
where the covariance is defined as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jijiji pEpEppEpp ⋅−⋅=,cov  (5.47) 
 
Applying Equation 5.47 with Equation 5.46, we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jijijiji pppprpEpEppE varvar,+=  (5.48) 
 
Based on Equation 5.48, the mean of the product of two correlated normal random 
variables can be calculated based on the means, the variance and correlation. This 
analytical solution will be used to calculate the analytical solution of the variance of 
the mimic model. 
 
5.6 Analytical Solution of the Variance of the Mimic Model 
5.6.1 Overview 
When rare event approximation is applied [Bedford and Cooke 2001], the mimic 
model of a Fault-tree and Event-tree model can be approximated as in Equations 5.1-
5.3. Based on Equation 5.3, we have 
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 ( ) ( )( )∑
=
=
SN
rErE
1ℓ
ℓ  (5.49) 
 
and 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
∑ ∑∑ ∑
= == =
⋅=







⋅=
SN SNSN SN
rrErrErE
11 12
21
11 12
21
2
ℓ ℓ
ℓℓ
ℓ ℓ
ℓℓ  (5.50) 
 
where ( )SN  is the number of the risk scenarios. 
 
We know that the variance of the risk r can be calculated by 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )rErErEr ⋅−= 2var  (5.51) 
 
Therefore to calculate ( )rvar , we need to calculate ( )ℓrE  and ( ) ( )( )21 ℓℓ rrE ⋅ . We 
assume that the occurrence frequency ℓf  and the consequence ℓc  are independent. 
Consequently from Equation 5.2 we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )ℓℓℓ cEfErE ⋅=  (5.52) 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )212121 ℓℓℓℓℓℓ ccEffErrE ⋅⋅⋅=⋅  (5.53) 
 
From Equations 5.52 and 5.53, to calculate ( )rvar , we need to calculate ( )ℓfE , 
( )ℓcE , ( ) ( )( )21 ℓℓ ffE ⋅  and ( ) ( )( )21 ℓℓ ccE ⋅ . The methods are to be developed later on. 
 
5.6.2 Calculation of ( )ℓcE  and ( ) ( )( )21 ℓℓ ccE ⋅  
When a simplified model of two injury levels is applied, the individual casualty 
probability is calculated for each rule set as developed in Chapter 4. Within the 
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casualties, a ratio of the fatalities to the major injuries can be set. The consequence 
can then be calculated as the equivalent fatalities that counts both the fatalities and 
the scaled-down major injuries. We denote by φ  the proportion of the fatalities in he 
casualties. We suppose that W  major injuries are counted as one equivalent fatality. 
The equivalent fatalities of ℓS  can then be defined as the mean as 
 
 ( ) ( )( )WNc i φφpi −+××= 14ℓℓ  (5.54) 
 
where ℓN  stands for the mean of the number of people exposed to the risk scenario 
ℓS ; ( )4ipi  stands for the individual casualty probability of the rule set iR  that is 
associated with ℓS . 
 
Because a rule set can be associated with multiple consequences, the subscript of the 
rule set is not necessarily equal to the subscript of the consequence in Equation 5.54. 
 
As discussed previously, in this research, we don't study the uncertainties in ℓN , φ , 
and W . The uncertainty in the consequence ℓc  is then driven by the uncertainty in 
the associated rule set only. Consequently based on Equation 5.54, we have 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )41 iEWNcE piφφ ×−+×= ℓℓ  (5.55) 
 
In Equation 5.55, the individual casualty probability ( )4ipi  has been defined on the 
injury atoms as in Equation 4.67 as 
 
 ( ) ( )∏
=








⋅−−=
D
j
j
j
ji
i A
z
1
,
4,1
114
γ
pi  (5.56) 
 
where iA  stands for the i
th
 injury atom; D  stands for the number of the injury atoms. 
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The injury atoms jA  have been assumed to be independent. Consequently by 
Equation 5.56, we have 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )∏
=








⋅−−=
D
j
j
j
ji
i AE
z
E
1
,
4,1
114
γ
pi  (5.57) 
 
We have assumed that the uncertainty in the injury atom jA  follows a Beta 
distribution as defined in Equation 4.71. The mean of the injury atom ( )jAE  can then 
be calculated by 
 
 
( )
jj
j
jAE βα
α
+
=  (5.58) 
 
The definition parameters jα  and jβ  can be derived for jA  through elicitation by 
the method developed in Chapter 4. Applying Equations 5.58 and 5.57 with Equation 
5.55, we can calculate the mean of the consequence ℓc . We continue to derive the 
mean of the product of two consequences. 
 
Suppose there are two consequences ( )1ℓc  and ( )2ℓc  that are associated with rule set 
( )1iR  and ( )2iR  respectively. By Equation 5.54, we have 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )441 2122121 iiEWPNPNccE pipiφφ ⋅⋅−+⋅⋅=⋅ ℓℓℓℓ  (5.59) 
 
We need to calculate the mean ( )( ) ( )( )( )44 21 iiE pipi ⋅ . By Equation 5.56, we have 
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  (5.60) 
 
Applying Equation 5.56 with Equation 5.60, we have 
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  (5.61) 
 
Each injury atom is defined for one hazard type as given in Chapter 4. The injury 
atoms have also been assumed to be independent, i.e. a known transition probability 
of one injury atom does not tell any information on the transition probability of 
another injury atom. Therefore, we have 
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 (5.62) 
 
In Equation 5.62, the mean of the injury atom ( )jAE  can then be calculated by 
Equation 4.72 as discussed above. Because the injury atom jA  is assumed to follow 
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a Beta distribution as defined in Equation 4.71, we can calculate the variance of jA  
by 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1var 2 +++= jjjj
jj
jA βαβα
βα
 (5.63) 
 
where jα  and jβ  are the definition parameters of jA . 
 
Based on Equations 5.58 and 5.63, we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
2
1
var








+
+
+++
=
⋅+=
jj
j
jjjj
jj
jjjj AEAEAAE
βα
α
βαβα
βα
 (5.64) 
 
By applying Equations 5.62, 5.58 and 5.64 with Equation 5.59, we can calculate the 
mean of the product of two consequence, i.e. ( ) ( )( )21 ℓℓ ccE ⋅ . The means ( )ℓcE  and 
( ) ( )( )21 ℓℓ ccE ⋅  can then be used to calculate the mean and the variance of the output of 
the Fault-tree and Event-tree model by Equations 5.49-5.53. 
 
We continue to develop the calculation of ( )ℓfE  and ( )kffE ⋅ℓ  for calculating the 
analytical solution of the variance of the output of Fault-tree and Event-tree models 
by Equations 5.52 and 5.53. 
 
5.6.3 Calculation of ( )ℓfE  and ( ) ( )( )21 ℓℓ ffE ⋅  
As defined in Equation 5.1, the frequency of a risk scenario is the product of the 
associated basic events and the probabilities of the associated outcomes of the 
escalation events. As stated in Chapter 4, in this research we study the uncertainty of 
the means of the basic events and treat the probabilities of the outcomes of the 
escalation event as constant. Therefore based on Equation 5.1, we have  
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where ip  stands for a basic event; ( )( )ie ,Pr ℓ  stands for the probability of the 
outcome ( )ie ,ℓ  of the escalation event iE  associated with the risk scenario ℓS . 
 
For the product of the frequencies of two risk scenarios, we have 
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We have assumed that the basic events ip ’s follow a joint normal distribution. 
Therefore 

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ppE  can be calculated by Equation 5.43. 
The means ( )ℓfE  and ( )21 ℓℓ ffE  can be calculated consequently. 
 
Suppose that in Equation 5.66, all the basic events ( )1ℓSpi ∈  are independent and all 
the basic events ( )2ℓSp j ∈  are independent. Consequently one basic event ( )1ℓSpm ∈  
can be correlated with at most one basic event ( )2ℓSpn ∈ . Accordingly 
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where mp  and np  stand for a pair of dependent basic events one from each risk 
scenario; kp  stands for an independent basic event that can be from either risk 
scenario. 
 
Consequently, the mean ( )nm ppE  can be calculated by Equation 5.48 that represents 
a simpler way than that represented by Equation 5.43. As a result, the mean 
( ) ( )







 ∏∏
∈∈ 21 ℓℓ Sp
j
Sp
i
ji
ppE  can also be calculated in a simpler way. 
 
As a summary, after ( )ℓfE , ( )ℓcE , ( ) ( )( )21 ℓℓ ffE ⋅  and ( ) ( )( )21 ℓℓ ccE ⋅  are calculated, the 
variance ( )rvar  can be calculated by Equations 5.49-5.53. 
 
5.7 Software Design 
5.7.1 Overview 
The whole mission is carried out with three Excel workbooks designated for: (1) 
building the uncertainty model in the rule sets; (2) building the uncertainty model for 
the basic events; and (3) calculating the analytical variance and conducting 
simulations. Based on the methods developed in the previous sections, the software 
design for calculating the variance of the mimic models is divided into three major 
procedures: (1) the console procedure; (2) the procedure for calculating the mean of 
the consequence and the mean of the product of two consequences; (3) the procedure 
for calculating the mean of the frequency and the mean of the product of two 
frequencies. The three procedures are implemented by programming with Excel 
VBA associated with the three Excel workbooks. We then discuss the methods for 
validating the software. 
 
5.7.2 Console Procedure 
The console procedure is designed based on Equations 5.50-5.51 to calculate the 
variance of the mimic model of the Fault-tree and Event-tree models. It is 
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implemented by the function outputVar(). As shown in Fig. 5.3, the function 
outputVar() is implemented with two loops. The outer loop is designed to go through 
all the risk scenarios included in the mimic model as demonstrated in Fig. 5.2. The 
loop variable i changes from 1 to N(S) that stands for the risk scenario number. For 
each risk scenario, the mean of the consequence EFi is calculated by Equations 5.55 
and 5.24; the mean of the frequency EFQi is calculated by Equations 5.65 and 5.43. 
The product of EFQi and EFi represents the mean of the equivalent fatalities 
associated with the current risk scenario as defined in Equation 5.52, which is added 
up to the variable ESCS standing for the expectation of the sum of the risk scenario. 
The value of ESCS after the loop conveys the mean ( )rE  as defined in Equation 5.49. 
 
For each risk scenario, the mean of the square of the consequence EFii is calculated 
by Equations 5.59 and 5.62; the mean of the square of the frequency EFQii is 
calculated by Equations 5.66 and 5.43. The product of EFQii and EFii represents the 
mean of the square of the equivalent fatalities associated with the current risk 
scenario, which is added up to the variable ESCSS standing for the expectation of the 
sum of the risk scenario square. 
 
As shown in Fig. 5.3, the inner loop is designed to calculate the mean of the product 
of two different risk scenarios. The loop variable j changes from i to CN. Within the 
loop, the mean of the product of the ith risk scenario frequency and the jth risk 
scenario frequency, denoted as EFQij, is calculated based on Equations 5.66 an 5.43; 
the mean of the product of the ith risk scenario consequence and the jth risk scenario 
consequence, denoted as EFij is calculated based on Equations 5.59 and 5.62. The 
product of EFQij and EFji represents the mean of the product of the ith risk scenario 
risk and the jth risk scenario risk as defined in Equation 5.53, which is doubled and 
then added up to ESCSS. The value of ESCSS after the both loops conveys the mean 
( )2rE  as defined in Equation 5.50. 
 
At the end of the procedure, the variance of the mimic model output can be 
calculated as ESCSESCSESCSS ×−  by the Equation 5.51. 
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As shown in Fig. 5.3, the function outputVar() calls two functions CutSetMean(i,j) 
and consequencesMean(i, j). The function CutSetMean(i,j) calculates the mean of the 
product of two risk scenario frequencies. By setting 0=j , the mean of the ith risk 
scenario frequency can be calculated by the same function. The function 
consequencesMean(i, j) calculates the mean of the of the product of two risk scenario 
consequences. By setting 0=j , the mean of the ith risk scenario consequence can be 
calculated by the same function. The flowcharts of the two functions are to be 
defined separately as follows. 
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Fig. 5.3 Flowchart of Function outputVar() for calculating the variance of the mimic model of 
the Fault-tree and Event-tree models 
 
Set N(S) with the number of 
the risk scenarios 
For i=1 to N(S) 
For j=i+1 to CN 
EFi=consequenceMean(i,0) 
Set ESCS=0, ESCSS=0 
ESCS+=EFQi*EFi 
EFQi=CutsetMean(i,0) 
EFii=consequenceMean(i,i) 
EFQii=CutsetMean(i,i) 
EFij=consequenceMean(i,j) 
EFQij=CutsetMean(i,j) 
ESCSS+=EFQii*EFii 
ESCSS+=2*EFQij*EFij 
j=N(S) 
i=N(S) 
Variance=ESCSS-
ESCS*ESCS 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
i=i+1 
j=j+1 
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5.7.3 Procedure for Calculating the Mean of the Consequence and 
the Mean of the Product of two Consequences 
As shown in Fig. 5.3, the console procedure calls the function consequenceMean(i, j) 
for calculating the mean of the consequence and the mean of the product of two 
consequences. The flowchart of the procedure is demonstrated in Fig. 5.4. When 
0=j  the procedure consequenceMean(i, j) calculates the mean of the consequence 
associated with the ith risk scenario by Equation 5.55. When 0>≥ ij , the procedure 
consequenceMean(i, j) calculates the mean of the product of the two consequences 
associated with the ith risk scenario and the jth risk scenario by Equation 5.59. The 
procedure consequenceMean(i, j) requires two the inputs: (1) the means of the rule 
sets, defined RSMeans(1 To RSN); (2) the means of the products of a pair of rule sets 
RSCPMeans(1 To RSN, 1 To RSN), where RSN stands for the number of the rule sets; 
RSMeans(1 To RSN) is defined as a one-dimensional data vector; RSCPMeans(1 To 
RSN, 1 To RSN) is defined as a two-dimensional data matrix. The two values 
RSMeans and RSCPMeans are calculated in the procedure consequenceMean(i,j) as 
illustrated in Fig. 5.5. 
 
As illustrated in Fig. 5.5, the procedure RuleSetsMeans() start with reading in three 
data sets: RSIA(1 to RSN, 1 to IAN), IADef(1 to IAN, 1 to 2) and IAMeans(1 to IAN, 1 
to 2), where IAN stands for the number of the injury atoms. The data set RSIA is a 
two-dimensional matrix comprising the definition information of the rule sets on the 
injury atoms. Analogous to Table 4.3, the matrix RSIA composes of the weight 
coefficients jkz ,  and each row of RSIA corresponds to one rule set defined by 
Equation 4.9. The data set IADef is a two-dimensional matrix of the definition 
parameters of the injury atoms. Analogous to Table 4.2, each row of RSIA 
corresponds to one injury atom; and the two columns contain the parameters α  and 
β  of a Beta distribution respectively. The data set IAMeans is a two-dimensional 
matrix. With each row corresponding to one injury atom, the two columns of 
IAMeans contain the mean of the injury atom and the mean of the square of the 
injury atom that can be calculated by Equations 5.58 and 5.64 respectively. 
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The function RuleSetsMeans() then goes into the first loop to calculate the means of 
the rule sets by Equation 5.58. The results are stored in the one-dimensional matrix 
RSMeans(1 to RSN), with the cell RSMeans(RSi) contains the mean of the RSith rule 
set. The function then enters into an embedded loop to calculate the means of the 
product of two rule sets by Equation 5.64. The results are stored in the two-
dimensional matrix RSCPMeans(1 to RSN, 1 to RSN), with the cell RSCPMeans(RSi, 
RSj) contains the mean of the product of the RSith and the RSjth rule set. The data sets 
RuleSetsMeans and RSCPMeans are then called in the function consequenceMean(i, 
j) to calculate the means of the consequence and the product of two consequence. 
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Fig. 5.4 Flowchart of Function consequenceMean(i,j) for calculating the mean of the ith risk 
scenario consequence when 0=j  or the mean of the product of the ith risk scenario 
consequence and the jth risk scenario consequence when 0>≥ ij  
 
COLi=the rule set number 
associated with the ith cut set 
Npi = number of people 
exposed to risk associated with 
the ith cut set 
EFi=Npi*RSMeans(COLi) 
Cut Set # j =0 
Yes 
theEFMean=EFi 
Return theEFMean 
EFij=Npi*Npj*RSCPMeans(
COLi, COLj) 
No 
Read in Cut Set number i and 
Cut Set number j 
COLj=the rule set number 
associated with the jth cut set 
Npj = number of the people 
exposed to risk associated with 
the jth cut set 
theEFMean=EFij 
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Fig. 5.5 Flowchart of the function RuleSetsMeans() for calculating the means of the rule set and 
mean of the product of two rule sets through injury atoms 
Read in RSIA(,) and IADef(,) and IAMeans(,) 
For IAj=1 to IAN 
RSMeans(RSi)*=(1-RSIA(RSi, IAj)*IAMeans(IAj,1)) 
MT1*=(1+RSIA(RSi, IAj)*IAMeans(IAj,2)–2*RSIA(RSi, IAj)*IAMeans(IAj,1)) 
MT2*=(1-RSIA(RSi, IAj)*IAMeans(IAj,1)) 
IAj=IAj+1 
For RSi=1 to RSN 
RSMeans(RSi)=1;  RSCPMeans(RSi,RSi)=0;  MT1=1;  MT2=1 
RSMeans(RSi)=1-RSMeans(RSi) 
RSCPMeans(RSi, RSi)=1+MT1-2*MT2 
For RSi=1 to RSN 
For RSj =RSi+1 to RSN 
MT1=1 
For IAj=1 to IAN  
MT1*=(1-(RSIA(RSi,IAj)+RSIA(RSj,IAj))*IAMeans(IAj,1) 
+RSIA(RSi,IAj)*RSIA(RSj,IAj)*IAMeans(IAj,2)) 
IAj=IAj+1 
RSCPMeans(RSi,RSj)=RSMeans(RSi) 
+RSMeans(RSj)-1+MT1 
RSCPMeans(RSi,RSj)=RSCPMeans(RSj,RSi) 
Output: RSMeans(1 to RSN) 
RSCPMeans(1 to RSN, 1 to RSN) RSi<RSN 
RSi<RSN 
RSj<RSN 
Yes No 
No 
Yes 
Yes No 
RSi=RSi+1 
RSi=RSi+1 
RSj=RSj+1 
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5.7.4 Procedure for Calculating the Mean of the Frequency and 
the mean of the Product of two Frequencies 
The procedure for calculating the mean of the frequency and the mean of the product 
of two frequencies is implemented in the function CutsetMean(i, j). It is called in the 
function console procedure outputVar() as illustrated in Fig. 5.3. 
 
In the case studies [Harrison, Griffin et al. 2008] of this research, all the basic events 
composing one risk scenario are independent. Accordingly the procedure 
CutsetMean(i, j) is designed based on Equation 5.67. As illustrated in Fig. 5.6, the 
procedure CutsetMean(i, j) has two input parameters i and j that are the number of 
the risk scenarios in the mimic model as shown in Fig. 5.2. The procedure starts with 
reading in the codes of the basic events composing the ith risk scenario and, when 
0≠j , those codes associated with the jth risk scenario. These event codes are stored 
in the vector ECodes(1 to EN), where EN stands for the number of the read-in events. 
Corresponding to the events defined in ECodes(1 to EN), the correlation matrix, the 
standard deviation and the means are then read into corr(1 to EN, 1 to EN), std(1 to 
EN) and EMeans(1 to EN) respectively. 
 
The procedure CutsetMean(i, j) with initializes theMean=1 and Done(1 to EN)=0. It 
then enters into the loop for Ei=1 to EN. When Done(Ei)=0, the mean EMeans(Ei) is 
recorded. The procedure then goes into the embedded loop for Ej=Ei+1 to EN. The 
correlation corr(Ei,Ej) is checked. When corr(Ei,Ej)≠0, the event ECodes(Ej) is the 
only one correlated with the event ECodes(Ei). The mean of the product of 
ECodes(Ej) and ECodes(Ei), i.e. ( )ji ppE , is calculated by Equation 5.48. The 
procedure CutsetMean(i, j) then marks the event ECodes(Ej) as having been dealt 
with by setting Done(Ej)=1. After that, the procedure jumps out of the embedded 
loop. Depending if there exists a correlated event ECodes(Ej), the output mean 
theMean is multiplied by EMeans(Ei) or ( )ji ppE . 
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Fig. 5.6 Flowchart of the procedure CutsetMean(i, j) for calculating the mean of the frequency 
and the mean of the product of two frequencies 
 
Set: theMean=1, EN=the number of the basic events, Done(1 to EN)=0 
For Ei=1 to EN 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Return theMean 
MCont=MeanCont*EMeans(Ej)+covEiEj 
MCont=EMeans(Ei) 
Ej>EN 
Ei>EN 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
theMean= theMean*MCont Done(Ej)=1 
Read in ECodes(), corr(,), std() and Emeans() 
corr(Ei,Ej)=0 
For Ej=Ei+1 to EN 
Doner(Ei)=1 
No 
Ei=Ei+1 
Ej=Ej+1 
covEiEj=corr(Ei,Ej)*std(Ei)*std(Ej) 
CutsetMean(i, j) 
Ej=EN 
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5.7.5 Software Implementation 
5.7.5.1 Overview 
Based on the mimic model as illustrated in Fig. 5.2, the software for calculating the 
variance can be developed with MS Excel. According to Fig. 5.1, the software can be 
partitioned into three parts defined as: (1) Part 1 for building the uncertainty model in 
the rule sets corresponding to Block 6; (2) Part 2 for building the uncertainty model 
of the precursors corresponding to Block 4; and (3) Part 3 for conducting uncertainty 
analysis corresponding to the rest blocks. Parts 1 to 3 are implemented in three Excel 
workbooks named as rulesetsUM.xls, precursorsUM.xls and UAnalysis.xls 
respectively. When needed, the data stored in the three workbooks can be accessed 
from any other ones by programming with Excel VBA [Jelen and Syrstad 2004]. 
 
5.7.5.2 Workbook rulesetsUM 
Workbook rulesetsUM.xls composes of 4 parts including: 
• the definition of the injury atoms;  
• the definition of the rule sets on the injury atoms; 
• the means of the rule sets and the products of two rule sets; 
• the samples of the rule sets 
 
As demonstrated in Fig. 5.7, the injury atoms are defined with the code, the 
definition parameters Alpha and Beta, the mean and the standard deviation. The 
codes are uniquely defined and used to access to the injury atoms. The definition of 
the rule sets on the injury atoms is demonstrated in Fig. 5.8. Based on these two 
definitions, the means of the rule sets and the means of the products of two rule sets 
can be calculated by programming with VBA. It is implemented by the function 
RuleSetsMeans() as illustrated in Fig. 5.5. The outcome means of the rule sets and 
the means of the products of two rule sets can be stored in a worksheet in Workbook 
'rulesetsUM.xls'', which can then be accessed by the function consequenceMeans(i,j) 
for calculating the means of the consequences and the means of the products of the 
consequences, as illustrated in Fig. 5.4. 
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The samples of the rule sets can also be generated by programming with Excel VBA 
in Workbook rulesetsUM.xls. The samples are stored in a worksheet of Workbook 
rulesetsUM.xls and to be accessed from Workbook UAnalysis.xls for conducting 
simulations. 
 
 
Injury Atom Code Alpha Beta mean std
DERTNL 7.9486 1846.6 0.004286003 0.001516552
CARONSTNL 5.025 15.676 0.242741897 0.092035306
STROnTNOS 4.9327 14.798 0.250001267 0.095103037
SecCollTNL 5.3845 19.743 0.214287136 0.080275137
FireTNL 20.309 2.2566 0.899998227 0.061799566
ToxicTNL 20.309 2.2566 0.899998227 0.061799566
Onbridge 6.2706 37.624 0.142855841 0.052225052
 
 
Fig. 5.7 Excel worksheet layout of the definition of the injury atoms 
 
 
Rule Sets DERTNL CARONSTNL STROnTNOS SecCollTNL FireTNL ToxicTNL OnBridge
T12-BG-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
T12-OF-01 0.333333333 0 0 0 0 0 0
T12-OF-02 0.333333333 0 0 0 0 0 0
T12-OF-03 0.333333333 0 0 0.045684307 0 0 0
T12-OF-04 0.333333333 0 0 0.045684307 0.031746032 0 0
T12-OF-05 0.333333333 0 1 0.045684307 0 0 0
T12-OF-06 0.333333333 0 1 0.045684307 0.031746032 0 0
T12-OF-07 0.333333333 0.54096812 0 0 0 0 0
T12-OF-08 0.333333333 0.54096812 0 0 0.031746032 0 0
T12-OF-09 0.333333333 0.54096812 0 0.133333333 0 0 0
T12-OF-10 0.333333333 0.54096812 0 0.133333333 0.031746032 0 0
T12-OF-11 0.333333333 0.54096812 0.657142857 0.133333333 0 0 0
T12-OF-12 0.333333333 0.54096812 0.657142857 0.133333333 0.047619048 0 0
 
 
Fig. 5.8 Excel worksheet layout of the definition of the rule sets on the injury atoms 
 
5.7.5.3 Workbook precursorsUM 
Workbook precursorsUM.xls contains the covariance matrix and the means of the 
precursors. As shown in Fig. 5.9 the codes of the precursors are put on the top row of 
the worksheet. These codes are uniquely defined and are used to access the variance. 
The map from the precursor codes to the associated column numbers can be built by 
programming. Suppose that there are two precursors PC1 and PC2 and the associated 
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column numbers are NPC1 and NPC2 respectively. The covariance between PC1 and 
PC2 can be accessed by either Cells(NPC1+1, NPC2) or Cells(NPC2+1, NPC1) for 
the symmetric covariance matrix [Jelen and Syrstad 2004]. 
 
The samples of the precursors can be generated by the methods developed in Section 
5.3. These samples are stored in a separate worksheet in Workbook 
precursorsUM.xls, which are accessed during simulations. 
 
 
POSL----PHPSNT----PFPSPD----PHUTRN----UEBTRE----UERLNS----UFRQAK----UERSLP----PFWFLD----UEWSNO----UEWWIN----UE
3E-21 1.56E-21 1.59E-20 1.59E-22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.56E-21 1.53E-21 9.36E-21 9.36E-23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.59E-20 9.36E-21 1.59E-19 9.54E-22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.59E-22 9.36E-23 9.54E-22 1.59E-23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 6.11E-20 1.68E-19 0 2.65E-20 7.08E-24 1.38E-20 8.42E-23
0 0 0 0 1.68E-19 5.5E-19 0 7.94E-20 2.13E-23 4.14E-20 2.53E-22
0 0 0 0 0 0 5.19E-27 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 2.65E-20 7.94E-20 0 1.36E-20 3.34E-24 6.5E-21 3.97E-23
0 0 0 0 7.08E-24 2.13E-23 0 3.34E-24 1.32E-27 1.61E-24 1.06E-26
0 0 0 0 1.38E-20 4.14E-20 0 6.5E-21 1.61E-24 4.08E-21 2.07E-23
 
 
Fig. 5.9 Excel worksheet layout of the covariance matrix of the precursors 
 
 
5.7.5.4 Workbook UAnalysis 
Workbook UAnalysis.xls contains the definitions of the mimic models as 
demonstrated in Fig. 5.2. The three functions outputVar(), consequenceMean(i, j) 
and CutSetMean(i,j) are implemented by programming with Excel VBA in this 
workbook for calculating the mean and variance of the mimic model. These 
functions access Workbook precursorsUM.xls and Workbook rulesetsUM.xls for the 
uncertainty models of the precursors and the rule sets respectively. 
 
The simulations process is also implemented on Workbook UAnalysis.xls. The 
samples of the precursors and the rule sets are fetched from Workbook 
precursorsUM.xls and Workbook rulesetsUM.xls respectively. 
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5.8 Methods for Validating the Software 
At the first stage, the mimic models need to be validated. We need to prove that the 
mimic model is set up correctly and therefore can be used for uncertainty analysis. 
This can be done by comparing the result from the mimic model with that from the 
original model. Given the same values of the input parameters, we run the original 
Fault-tree and Event-tree model and the mimic model separately. The outcome 
results are compared to see if the difference is less than the required precision. 
 
At the second step, we need to test the methods and the software codes for 
calculating the variance of the mimic model. This can be done through a small mimic 
model of a few risk scenarios. For such a small mimic model, the analytical solutions 
of the mean and the variance can be calculated manually. The results can then be 
used to check the outcome results from running the mimic model. Although the 
mimic model composes of only a few risk scenarios, all the methods and the software 
codes have to be run in the same way as for a large real mimic model to calculate the 
mean and the variance. Therefore a small mimic model is efficient to test the 
methods and the software codes for calculating the variance. 
 
At the third step, we need to test that the methods and the software codes can work 
robustly with large real mimic models. We know that unbiased estimations of the 
mean and the variance of the mimic model can be obtained from the Monte-Carlo 
simulations [Helton and Davis 2000; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. We can then 
compare the analytical solutions with the simulation results. Consistent results 
demonstrate that the methods and the software for analytical solutions are robust for 
large real mimic models. 
 
5.9 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a set of methods are developed for conducting uncertainty analysis of 
Fault-tree and Event-tree models built on the commercial software such as Isograph 
FT+. It is generally difficult to access and manipulate the data of such Fault-tree and 
Event-tree models [Isograph 2004; Isograph 2005]. It causes the problem in 
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conducting simulations for uncertainty assessment. Because the computer models of 
the Fault-tree and Event-tree models are the “black-box” to the user, it is impossible 
to conduct any kind of analytical analysis of the uncertainty in the output. To solve 
these problems, we develop a mimic MS Excel model for the original Fault-tree and 
Event-tree model. The first benefit is that the MS Excel models are completely 
transparent. The simulations on the mimic models are therefore easy to implement. 
We can also calculate the analytical variance of the mimic model. The second benefit 
of developing the mimic models is associated with the popularity of MS Excel 
especially in business related analysis. An Excel mimic model can be used easily by 
more analysts for various purposes. 
 
Based on the mimic models, we use simulations to build up the empirical distribution 
of the risk. We also develop the method for calculating the analytical solution of the 
variance of the risk. These two methods are implemented independently and 
therefore can be used for cross check to each other. In these two methods, we need to 
cope with the dependent basic events which uncertainty is assumed to follow a joint 
normal distribution. As usually, the dependent basic events are expressed in terms of 
a set of independent standard normal random variables by linear transformation. In 
risk analysis context, however, there are two issues that affect the implementation of 
the linear transformation. First, the covariance matrix can be the positive semi-
definite, to which the Cholesky decomposition is not suitable. To solve this issue, we 
select the linear transformation through eigen-decomposition. Second, the basic 
events may have very small standard deviation [Harrison, Griffin et al. 2008], which 
makes the calculation of the eigenvalues and the eigenvectors more expensive and 
exposed to larger errors. To solve this issue, we select the linear transformation 
through the correlation matrix. 
 
We then design the software to implement the above methods. The software is 
implemented on MS Excel workbooks and therefore can be conveniently installed 
and run in applications. The software is validated at three stages including: (1) 
validate the mimic model; (2) validate correctness of the methods and the software; 
(3) validate the robustness of the methods and the software. 
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For future research work, we can compare the Eigen-decomposition of the 
correlation matrix to the factors elicited for building the correlation matrix. We can 
also continue to investigate the method for calculating the distribution of the sum of 
products of lognormal random variables, which can be used in the future. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Case Studies with RSSB-SRM HET10 and HET12 
 
 
6.1 Overview 
In this chapter, we will conduct two case studies to assess the uncertainties in the 
output of a Fault-tree and Event-tree model. Through these case studies, we will test 
the practical performance of the procedure and the methods for uncertainty analysis 
that are developed in the previous chapters. For each case study, at the first step, we 
will build the covariance matrix of the basic events of the fault tree by the procedure 
developed in Chapter 3. We then build the uncertainty model in the rule sets of the 
event tree by the method developed in Chapter 4. With the uncertainty models in the 
basic events and the rule sets, we then assess the uncertainties in the output by the 
methods developed in Chapter 5. 
 
The case studies are made on the Safety Risk Model (SRM) developed by the Rail 
Safety and Standards Board (RSSB). RSSB was established on 1 April 2003, as the 
implementation of one of the core recommendations from the second part of Lord 
Cullen’s public inquiry into Ladbroke Grove train accident. The prime objective of 
RSSB is to lead and facilitate the railway industry’s work to achieve continuous 
improvement in the safety performance on the Great Britain mainline railways. As a 
part of the efforts, RSSB has built the SRM to measure the risk and the underlying 
causes [Harrison 2004]. 
 
The RSSB-SRM is composed of a series of Fault-tree and Event tree models 
corresponding to the 125 hazardous events respectively. Currently the “best-
estimated” values are set to the input parameters; consequently a point estimation of 
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the yearly equivalent expected fatalities can be obtained by running the model 
[Dennis 2006]. To support decision making, the assessment of the uncertainty in the 
output is needed. It therefore offers good case studies to test the procedure and the 
methods developed in the previous chapters. Our case studies are to be conducted on 
the hazardous events HET10 and HET12 as they are the two largest contributors to 
the safety risk in RSSB-SRM [Dennis 2006]. The acronym HET stands for 
Hazardous Event related to Train. More details on the two hazardous events are to be 
included later in the case studies. 
 
6.2 Elicitation Process 
In line with the processes summarized in [O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006], we design the 
elicitation process for building up the uncertainty model of multiple input parameters. 
The major development of the process is on the development of the structures to 
model the dependency of high dimensional input, which is the most complex and 
difficult part of building uncertainty model of multiple input parameters [Kurowicka 
and Cooke 2006; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 2006]. 
 
As shown in Fig. 6.1, the whole elicitation process consists of 6 stages. At Stage 1, 
we develop models describing the uncertainty in the basic events of the fault trees 
and the uncertainty in the consequences. As developed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
respectively, the models require reasonable elicitation workload that makes the 
models practical for the stakeholders. 
 
At Stage 2 we choose the experts for the elicitation. The experts are chosen from 
RSSB for three reasons. First, it is the RSSB that builds the safety risk model. The 
RSSB now is concerned with their uncertainty in the model. The experts are likely to 
have a positive attitude towards this exercise. Second, the experts know how the 
RSSB-SRM is built and how it is used in practice. As such, they are knowledgeable 
about the uncertainty sources. Third, the experts have at least basic understanding of 
statistics. Therefore they can understand elicitation questions. 
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At Stage 3, we train the experts with the procedures and models for modelling the 
uncertainties in the basic events and the consequences respectively. At the first step 
of the training, the experts read the documents on the models. After that, a meeting 
was organized on which the models are discussed and demonstration examples were 
made. After the training process, the experts understand the types of information to 
be elicited and how the elicited information is used to assess the uncertainty of the 
input parameters. 
 
At Stage 4: we conduct the elicitation to build up the uncertainty models for the basic 
events and the consequences respectively. At the first step, we develop a software 
tool with MS Excel to build up the benchmark of the qualitative correlation 
assessment by the method described in Chapter 3. The details of the benchmark are 
included in Section 6.3. 
 
For each case study, we elicit the experts’ judgement to build the covariance matrix 
of the basic events of the fault tree. The inconsistent assessments regarding the 
correlations between the basic events and the uncertainty factors can be identified 
during the process by the method developed in Chapter 3. For each case study, we 
also build up the uncertainty model of the consequences of the event tree through 
elicitation. The details of the elicitation are included in the case studies. 
 
At Stage 5: we build up the uncertainty models in the input parameters based on the 
elicited information. For each case study, we build up the covariance matrix of the 
basic events of the fault tree by the procedure developed in Chapter 3. We build up 
also the uncertainty model of the consequences by the method developed in Chapter 
4. 
 
At State 6 the whole elicitation work is reviewed. The experts check the elicited data 
and make sure that no important factors are missed. The experts also check the 
outcome correlations among the basic events and the plots of the samples of the rule 
sets. When the experts find any outcomes inconsistent with their judgement, the 
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associated assessments are then adjusted and the uncertainty models in the inputs are 
updated accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.1 The elicitation process for the case studies 
 
6.3 Benchmark of the Qualitative Correlation Assessment 
Following the methods developed in Chapter 4, qualitative assessment plus 
benchmark is used for the elicitation of the correlations. Based on the literature and 
the discussion with the experts, we use five correlation levels including: Very Weak 
(VW), Weak(W), Medium(M), Strong(S), and Very Strong(VS). The benchmark 
exercise is conducted with 200 samples of the preset correlation XYρ . These preset 
correlations are then pooled into five groups based on the expert assessment. The 
minimum, average and the maximum of the correlations associated with the five 
Stage 1: Build up the structures for modelling 
the dependence elicit from the experts 
Stage 2: Recruit the experts 
Stage 4: Conduct elicitation 
Stage 5: Build up the uncertainty models in the 
input parameters based on the elicited data 
Stage 6: Review the elicitation 
Stage 3: Train the experts 
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levels are summarized in Table 6.1. The average values are to be used for the case 
studies. 
 
 
Table 6.1 Summary of the statistics of the qualitative correlation levels 
Correlation Levels Minimum Average Maximum 
VW 0.007322779 0.179473026 0.387266054 
W 0.039863085 0.330255985 0.565863759 
M 0.34533765 0.563091162 0.711791892 
S 0.683938713 0.775600499 0.843917637 
VS 0.848889018 0.939226752 0.999453956 
 
6.4 Case Study with HET10 
6.4.1 Elicitation process for building the covariance matrix of the 
precursors 
The hazardous event HET10 is defined as passenger train collision with road vehicle 
on level crossings [Dennis 2005]. On the British mainline railways, there are eight 
types of level crossings (LC) called: ABCL, AHB, AOCL, MG/B, OC, UWC, UWC, 
MWL and UWC(T) [RSSB 2004]. The basic events of the fault tree are called 
precursor in the RSSB-SRM. There are 52 precursors related to HET10. Each 
precursor is associated with one type of level crossings. Therefore a group of 
precursors can be defined on the same event except being associated with the 
different types of level crossings. For instance, a group of precursors are defined as 
road vehicle (RV) driver error causing RV struck by train on level crossing L, where 
L denotes one of the eight types of LC. The experts believe that such a group of 
precursors form a family. The variant factors of the family are the uncertainty factors 
that are related to or affected by any differences among the eight types of level 
crossings. After the effect of the variant factors is accounted, the residual 
uncertainties of the family members form an invariant factor. Therefore the linear 
model of the family is defined as in Equation 3.80. The experts believe as well that 
there is no common factor between the families and, as a result, the precursors from 
different families are independent. Accordingly the elicitation process for building up 
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the covariance matrix of the precursors is made as shown in Fig. 6.2. The elicitation 
process starts with identifying the families by the definitions of the precursors. 
Secondly the differences among the different types of level crossings are elicited. 
Accordingly, the variant factors are identified for each precursor family.  
 
For the elicited variant factor classes, the correlations between the precursors and the 
variant factors are elicited as shown in Block 4a. The explanation coefficient iq  as 
defined in Equation 3.71 is calculated for each member as shown in Block 6. The 
value of 1>iq  indicates that the experts over estimate some variant factors and 
therefore need to adjust their judgement as shown in Block 7. When the coefficient 
iq  is very small for all the family members, the correlations within a factor class 
have insignificant impact on the family correlation matrix. Therefore they are 
assumed to be zero. Otherwise, the correlations within a factor class need to be 
elicited as shown in Block 5. 
 
For some families related with HET10, no significant variant factors can be elicited. 
In this case, the proportion of the variance due to the family commonality, i.e. iq−1 , 
is elicited as shown in Block 4b. The marginal variance is attributed to an 
unspecified exclusive factor for each member precursor as shown in Block 9. 
 
With the elicitations regarding the variant factors, the family correlation matrix can 
be derived in Block 10. The variance of the family is elicited in Block 2 and the 
family covariance matrix can then be derived in Block 11 by the methods developed 
in Chapter 3. 
 
We will continue to discuss elicitation in details. To make the elicitation easy to 
follow, the following subsections are headed according to the structure of Fig. 6.2. At 
the beginning of each subsection, we also locate the subsection with reference to the 
blocks in Fig. 6.2. 
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Fig. 6.2 Flow chart for building covariance matrix of the precursors 
 
1. Identify the families by the definitions of the precursors 
3. Identify for each family the variant factors related to 
the differences between the types of level crossings 
5. Elicit correlations 
between variant factors 
of the same class 
4a. Elicit correlations 
between the precursor 
and its variant factors. 
10. Derive family 
correlations matrix 
4b. Elicit the proportion of the 
variance due to the family 
commonality for each 
precursor member. 
9. Attribute the marginal 
variance to an unspecified 
exclusive factor 
Yes 
No 
6. For each family member, 
calculate the proportion 
of the variance explained 
by the variant factors 
Yes 
No 
4. Any major variant factors 
found for this family? 
7. Do the variant factors 
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member precursors? 
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of the family 
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6.4.2 Precursor Families 
This subsection is referred to Block 1 in Fig. 6.2. We will identify the precursor 
families. 
 
The 52 precursors related to HET10 are put into nine groups by the definitions. The 
experts believe that the group of “RV Driver error causing RV struck by train on 
various types of LCs” and the group of “RV driver deliberate action causing RV 
struck by train on various types of LCs” are identical. The two groups are therefore 
combined. As a result, eight precursor families are identified as summarized in Table 
6.2. Within each family, the precursors are defined on various types of level 
crossings. As summarized in Table 6.3, a tick indicates that the precursor family in 
the most left column has a precursor defined on the type of level crossing as titled on 
the top row. 
 
Table 6.2 Precursor families identified for RSSB-SRM HET10 
No. Family Code Description 
1 RVSTRENV  RV incorrectly on various types of LCs and struck by train due to 
environmental factors 
2 TOVRSPD  Train over-speeding causes RV struck by train on various types of LCs. 
3 RVSTRAN  RV stranded and struck by train on the various types of LCs 
4 SPADPROT  RV struck by train due to SPAD at signal protecting the various types of 
LCs 
5 SIGERR  Signalman or Crossing keeper error causes RV struck by train on various 
types of LCs.  
6 RVDRVERR RV driver error causing RV struck by train on various types of LCs and; 
RV driver deliberate action causing RV struck by train on various types of 
LCs 
7 RVDRVSUI  RV stuck by train due to RV driver suicide on various types of LCs.  
8 LTBRFAI  RV stuck by train due to Lights/Barriers fail to operate on various types of 
LCs  
 
Table 6.3 Precursor families and the associated types of level crossings 
Family Code ABCL AHB AOCL MG/B OC UWC 
UWC 
MWL 
UWC 
(T) 
1 RVSTRENV √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
2 TOVRSPD √ √ √ √     
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3 RVSTRAN √ √ √ √  √ √ √ 
4 SPADPROT √  √ √     
5 SIGERR  √  √    √ 
6 RVDRVERR √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
7 RVDRVSUI √ √ √  √ √ √ √ 
8 LTBRFAI √ √ √ √     
 
6.4.3 Variance of Families 
This subsection is referred to Block 2 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the variance of each 
of the eight precursor families as identified in the subsection 6.4.2. 
 
The occurrence rate of a family, denoted as λ , is the sum of the occurrence rates of 
the precursors in the family. It is assumed that λ  follows normal distribution. The 
mean of λ  is, denoted as µ , is set as the sum of the existing point values of the 
family members. Given λ , the waiting time between two successive occurrences, 
denoted as T , is assumed to be exponentially distributed. Subsequently, the 
predictive distribution of T  can be developed by Bayes theorem. The waiting time T 
is an observable variable and the expert’s ability in assessing the percentiles has been 
well proven [Pearson and Tukey 1965; Keefer and Bodily 1983; Cooke 1991; 
Garthwaite, Kadane et al. 2005; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006; O'Hagan, Buck et al. 
2006]. As developed in Chapter 3, we will elicit the 95 percentile of the waiting time, 
denoted as 95.0t , and consequently derive λσ , i.e. the standard deviation of λ . 
 
As summarized in Table 6.4, the value of 95.0t  is elicited within a reference interval 
for each family. The minimum 95.0t  is calculated on with the pure exponential 
distribution when λ  is fixed to µ . The experts agree that λσ  has a maximum 
boundary at 8.3µ , based on with the possible maximum 95.0t  is calculated 
accordingly. The experts then are asked to give their belief of 95.0t  within the given 
interval. The elicited 95.0t  and the derived λσ  for the eight families related to HET10 
are presented in Table 6.4. These standard deviations are to be used in developing the 
family covariance matrix. 
 196 
 
Table 6.4 Elicited 95 percentile of the waiting time, i.e. 95.0t , and the outcome standard 
deviation of the occurrence rate of the families related with HET10 
Family Code Minimum 95.0t  Maximum 95.0t  
Assessment of 
95.0t  
Standard 
Deviation 
λσ  
RVSTRENV  111 months 126 months 118 months 2.36E-10 
TOVRSPD  93 years 106 years 100 years 2.33E-11 
RVSTRAN  42 months 47 months 44 months 6.28E-10 
SPADPROT  197 years 224 years 210 years 1.10E-11 
SIGERR  110 months 125 months 118 months 2.36E-10 
RVDRVERR 78 days 89 days 83 days 1.02E-08 
RVDRVSUI  70 months 80 months 75 months 3.71E-10 
LTBRFAI  93 years 106 years 100 years 2.33E-11 
 
 
Based on the variance elicited above, we are going to derive the covariance matrix of 
each precursor family. For this purpose, we need to elicit for each family the variant 
factors and the information on the variant factors. The elicitation starts from Block 3 
in Fig. 6.2. The choice of the following route depends on the answer to Block 4 in 
Fig. 6.2. When there is a variant factor, we follow the route through Block 4a, Block 
5, Block 10 to Block 11. When there is no variant factor, we follow the route through 
Block 4b, Block 10 to Block 11. Each of the following eight subsections is dedicated 
to one of the eight precursor families summarized as Table 6.2. 
 
6.4.4 Covariance Matrix of the Precursor Family RVSTRENV 
6.4.4.1 Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 3 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the variant factors for 
the precursor family RVSTRENV. 
 
The precursor family RVSTRENV is defined for “RV incorrectly on various types of 
LCs and struck by train due to environmental factors”. As summarized in Table 6.5, 
one variant factor class is elicited as “RV drivers' ability to respond to the prevailing 
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weather conditions”. The level crossings are put into two categories: user worked 
crossings (UWC) and non-UWC [RSSB 2004]. The two categories of LCs have their 
own users. Accordingly the two groups of users are defined as UWC users and non-
UWC users. 
 
Table 6.5 Elicited factor class for the family RVSTRENV 
Family RVSTRENV – RV incorrectly on various types of LCs and struck by train due to 
environmental factors 
No. Variant Class 
1.  RV drivers' ability to respond to the prevailing weather conditions. 
 
6.4.4.2 Correlations between the Precursors and the Associated 
Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 4a in Fig. 6.2 because one variant factor class has 
been elicited for the family RVSTRENV. We will elicit the correlations between the 
precursors and the associated variant factors. 
 
A medium correlation is elicited between the precursors on UWC LCs and the UWC 
users; a medium correlation is also elicited between the precursors on non-UWC LCs 
and the non-UWC users. The elicited results are summarized in Table 6.6. Because 
the elicited correlations are positive in this case study we do not mark the correlation 
sign explicitly. 
 
Table 6.6 Elicited correlations between the variant factors and the associated precursors of the 
family RVSTRENV 
Precursor Family RVSTRENV – RV incorrectly on LC and struck by train due 
to environmental factors 
Variant Class RV drivers' ability to respond to the prevailing weather 
conditions. 
NO. Variant Factors Associated precursor Correlation 
1. Concerning UWC LCs RVSTRENV on UWC LCs M 
2. Concerning Non-UWC LCs RVSTRENV on Non-UWC LCs M 
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6.4.4.3 Correlations within the Variant Factor Class 
This subsection is related to Block 5 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the correlations within 
the factor class of "RV drivers' ability to respond to the prevailing weather 
conditions". 
 
A medium correlation between UWC users and non-UWC users is elicited as 
summarized in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7 Correlations within the factor class for the family RVSTRENV 
Family name RVSTRENV – RV incorrectly on LCs and struck by train due to 
environmental factors 
Variant class RV drivers' ability to respond to the prevailing weather conditions 
Variant factor 1 On UWC LCs 
Variant factor 2 On Non-UWC LCs 
The correlation between the 
above two variant factors 
M 
 
6.4.4.4 Family Correlation Matrix 
This subsection is related to Block 10 in Fig. 6.2. We will derive the family 
correlation matrix based on the elicitations on the variant factors. 
 
The above qualitative correlations regarding the variant factors are then mapped to 
the benchmark averages as summarized in Table 6.1. The correlation matrix of the 
family RVSTRENV can then be derived. As summarized in Table 6.8, the family 
correlation is divided into two blocks corresponding to the UWC users group and the 
non-UWC users group. 
 
Table 6.8 Correlation matrix of the family RVSTRENV 
 ABCL AHB AOCL MG/B OC UWC UWC-
MWL 
UWC+T 
ABCL 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.86 0.86 
AHB 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.86 0.86 
AOCL 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.86 0.86 
MG/B 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.86 0.86 
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OC 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.86 0.86 
UWC 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 1 1 1 
UWC-
MWL 
0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 1 1 1 
UWC+T 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 1 1 1 
 
6.4.4.5 Family Covariance Matrix 
This subsection is related to Block 11 in Fig. 6.2. We will derive the family 
covariance matrix.  
 
Based one the family variance as summarized in Table 6.4 and the above elicitations 
on the variant factors, the family covariance matrix is derived by the method 
developed in Chapter 3. The outcome family covariance matrix is summarized in 
Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.9 Covariance matrix of the precursor family RVSTRENV 
WABCL
ENVTE 
WAHB-
ENVTE 
WAOCL
ENVTE 
WMG/B
ENVTR 
WOC--
ENVTE 
WUWC-
ENVTE 
WUWCM
ENVTE 
WUWCT
ENVTE 
5.48E-24 4.73E-23 1.41E-23 8.69E-23 6.04E-24 1.99E-22 1.34E-23 1.4E-22 
4.73E-23 4.08E-22 1.22E-22 7.5E-22 5.21E-23 1.71E-21 1.16E-22 1.21E-21 
1.41E-23 1.22E-22 3.62E-23 2.24E-22 1.55E-23 5.1E-22 3.45E-23 3.6E-22 
8.69E-23 7.5E-22 2.24E-22 1.38E-21 9.58E-23 3.15E-21 2.13E-22 2.22E-21 
6.04E-24 5.21E-23 1.55E-23 9.58E-23 6.65E-24 2.19E-22 1.48E-23 1.54E-22 
1.99E-22 1.71E-21 5.1E-22 3.15E-21 2.19E-22 9.69E-21 6.56E-22 6.84E-21 
1.34E-23 1.16E-22 3.45E-23 2.13E-22 1.48E-23 6.56E-22 4.44E-23 4.63E-22 
1.4E-22 1.21E-21 3.6E-22 2.22E-21 1.54E-22 6.84E-21 4.63E-22 4.83E-21 
 
6.4.5 Precursor Family TOVRSPD 
The precursor family TOVRSPD is defined as “Train over-speeding causes RV 
struck by train on various types of LCs”. For this family, no significant variant factor 
is identified by the experts. As proposed previously, the proportion of the variance 
due to the family commonality is elicited for each family member as presented in 
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Appendix B. The family correlation matrix and the family covariance matrix are 
derived as presented in Table 6.10 and Table 6.11 respectively. 
 
Table 6.10 Correlation matrix of the precursor family TOVRSPD 
 ABCL AHB AOCL MG/B 
ABCL 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 
AHB 0.9 1 0.9 0.9 
AOCL 0.9 0.9 1 0.9 
MG/B 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 
 
Table 6.11 Covariance matrix of the precursor family TOVRSPD 
PABCLOVSTH PAHB-OVSTH PAOCLOVSTH PMG/BOVSTH 
5.61E-25 5E-24 1.49E-24 9.2E-24 
5E-24 5.51E-23 1.48E-23 9.11E-23 
1.49E-24 1.48E-23 4.89E-24 2.71E-23 
9.2E-24 9.11E-23 2.71E-23 1.86E-22 
 
6.4.6 Precursor Family RVSTRAN 
The precursor family RVSTRAN is defined as “RV stranded on LC causes RV struck 
by train on various types of LCs”. For this family, two variant factor classes are 
identified as summarized as: 
• FC1: Propensity for there to be blocking back on a crossing, i.e. where you get 
traffic jams extending back over level crossings 
• FC2: Profile of the RV drivers using the crossing, i.e. the propensity of certain 
drivers to violate rules 
 
The elicited data regarding the two variant factors are presented in Appendix B. The 
family correlation matrix and the family covariance matrix are derived as presented 
in Table 6.12 and Table 6.13. 
 
Table 6.12 Correlation matrix of the precursor family RVSTRAN 
 ABCL AHB AOCL MG/B UWC UWC-MWL UWC+T 
ABCL 1.00 0.62 0.86 0.85 0.72 0.72 0.72 
 201 
AHB 0.62 1.00 0.41 0.40 0.46 0.46 0.46 
AOCL 0.86 0.41 1.00 0.94 0.65 0.65 0.65 
MG/B 0.85 0.40 0.94 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 
UWC 0.72 0.46 0.65 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 
UWC-MWL 0.72 0.46 0.65 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 
UWC+T 0.72 0.46 0.65 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Table 6.13 Covariance matrix of the precursor family RVSTRAN 
VABCLST
RTE 
VAHB-
STRTE 
VAOCLST
RTE 
VMG/BST
RTE 
VUWC-
STRTE 
VUWCMS
TRTE 
VUWCTST
RTE 
5.39E-23 2.64E-22 1.1E-22 6.69E-22 1.5E-21 1.02E-22 1.06E-21 
2.64E-22 3.38E-21 4.14E-22 2.49E-21 7.64E-21 5.17E-22 5.39E-21 
1.1E-22 4.14E-22 2.99E-22 1.74E-21 3.18E-21 2.15E-22 2.25E-21 
6.69E-22 2.49E-21 1.74E-21 1.14E-20 2.02E-20 1.37E-21 1.43E-20 
1.5E-21 7.64E-21 3.18E-21 2.02E-20 8.01E-20 5.41E-21 5.65E-20 
1.02E-22 5.17E-22 2.15E-22 1.37E-21 5.41E-21 3.67E-22 3.82E-21 
1.06E-21 5.39E-21 2.25E-21 1.43E-20 5.65E-20 3.82E-21 4E-20 
 
6.4.7 Precursor Family SPADPROT 
The precursor family SPADPROT is defined as “SPAD at signal protecting the LC 
causes RV struck by train on various types of LCs”. One factor class is identified by 
the experts as “the effectiveness of the signal protecting the LCs”. The elicited data 
regarding the variant factors are presented in Appendix B. The family correlation 
matrix and the family covariance matrix are derived as presented in Table 6.14 and 
Table 6.15. 
 
Table 6.14 Correlation matrix of the precursor family SPADPROT 
 ABCL AOCL MG/B 
ABCL 1.00 0.97 0.97 
AOCL 0.97 1.00 0.97 
MG/B 0.97 0.97 1.00 
 
Table 6.15 Covariance matrix of the precursor family SPADPROT 
PABCLSPDTH PAOCLSPDTH PMG/BSPDTH 
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2.34E-25 6.96E-25 4.3E-24 
6.96E-25 2.19E-24 1.31E-23 
4.3E-24 1.31E-23 8.34E-23 
 
6.4.8 Precursor Family SIGERR 
The precursor family SIGERR is defined as “Signalman or Crossing keeper error 
causes RV struck by train on various types of LCs”. One factor class is identified as 
“Complexity of operating the crossing”. The elicited data regarding the variant 
factors are presented in Appendix B. The family correlation matrix and the family 
covariance matrix are derived as presented in Table 6.16 and Table 6.17. 
 
Table 6.16 Correlation matrix of the precursor family SIGERR 
 
AHB MG/B UWC+T 
AHB 1.00 0.74 0.93 
MG/B 0.74 1.00 0.74 
UWC+T 0.93 0.74 1.00 
 
Table 6.17 Covariance matrix of the precursor family SIGERR 
LAHB-SKPTH LMG/BSKPTH VUWCTSKPTH 
2.2E-21 2.47E-21 5.8E-21 
2.47E-21 5.07E-21 7.02E-21 
5.8E-21 7.02E-21 1.78E-20 
 
6.4.9 Precursor Family RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL 
The experts believe that the precursors “RV Driver error causing RV struck by train 
on LCs” and the precursors “RV driver deliberate action on various types of 
crossing” are identical on the same level crossing in terms of the uncertainty 
modelling. Correspondingly these two groups of precursors are defined within in one 
family RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL. One factor class is identified by the experts 
as “the quality of the users”. The elicited data regarding the variant factors are 
presented in Appendix B. 
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The correlation matrix for the family RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL is then derived 
as presented in Table 6.18. The correlation matrix composes eight rows and eight 
columns corresponding to the eight LCs because the RV Driver error and the RV 
driver deliberate action on the same LC are combined together. Denote this 88×  
correlation matrix as cr , where the subscript c stands for combination. The 
correlation matrix for the 16 precursors related to RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL 
respectively can then be defined as 
 
 
( ) 





=
cc
cc
rr
rr
r EDLERR,  
 
Table 6.18 Correlation matrix of the precursor family RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL 
 ABCL AHB AOCL MG/B OC UWC UWC-MWL UWC+T 
ABCL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.84 
AHB 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.84 
AOCL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.84 
MG/B 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.84 
OC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.84 
UWC 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 
UWC-MWL 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 
UWC+T 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Denote the covariance matrix for the combined family as: 
 
 
[ ]2
, jic σ=Σ , 8,,1, ⋯=ji  (6.1) 
 
where c stands for the combination of RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL. 
 
The covariance matrix cΣ  can be derived as presented in Table 6.19. From cΣ  the 
covariance matrix for the 16 precursors related to RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL 
can be defined as 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 




=
DELcovERRDEL,cov
DELERR,covERRcov
DELERR,cov  (6.2) 
 
where ( ) [ ]2
,
ERRcov jiE=  and ( ) [ ]2,DELcov jiD=  are the covariance matrix related to 
RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL respectively; ( ) [ ]2
,
DELERR,cov jiED=  is the 
covariance matrix between RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL; ( )ERRDEL,cov  is the 
transposition of ( )DELERR,cov . 
 
Based on Equation 6.2, we are going to derive 2
, jiE , 
2
, jiD  and 
2
, jiED . Because the RV 
Driver error and the RV driver deliberate action on the same LC are believed 
identical, they can be defined by the same random variable with different factors. 
The factors are defined by the associated means as summarized in Table 6.20. We 
define 
 
 
iDiE
iE
iEc
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,
, µµ
µ
+
=  (6.3) 
 
iDiE
iD
iDc
,,
,
, µµ
µ
+
=  (6.4) 
 
where iE ,µ  and iD,µ  stand for are the mean of the ith precursor corresponding to 
RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL respectively. 
 
Based on Equations 6.3 and 6.4, we have 
 
 
2
,,,
2
, jijEiEji ccE σ⋅⋅=  (6.5) 
 
2
,,,
2
, jijDiDji ccD σ⋅⋅=  (6.6) 
 
2
,,,
2
, jijDiEji ccED σ⋅⋅=  (6.7) 
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By Equations 6.5-6.7, the matrix ( )ERRcov , ( )DELcov  and ( )DELERR,cov  can be 
calculated from cΣ  and are presented in Tables 6.21-6.23 respectively. 
 
Table 6.19 Covariance matrix of the precursor family RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL 
ABCL AHB AOCL MG/B OC UWC UWC-
MWL 
UWC+T 
9.20E-21 8.38E-20 2.5E-20 1.54E-19 1.07E-20 3.44E-19 2.33E-20 2.43E-19 
8.38E-20 7.64E-19 2.28E-19 1.4E-18 9.76E-20 3.14E-18 2.12E-19 2.22E-18 
2.50E-20 2.28E-19 6.78E-20 4.19E-19 2.91E-20 9.35E-19 6.33E-20 6.6E-19 
1.54E-19 1.4E-18 4.19E-19 2.58E-18 1.79E-19 5.77E-18 3.91E-19 4.07E-18 
1.07E-20 9.76E-20 2.91E-20 1.79E-19 1.25E-20 4.01E-19 2.71E-20 2.83E-19 
3.44E-19 3.14E-18 9.35E-19 5.77E-18 4.01E-19 1.81E-17 1.23E-18 1.28E-17 
2.33E-20 2.12E-19 6.33E-20 3.91E-19 2.71E-20 1.23E-18 8.31E-20 8.67E-19 
2.43E-19 2.22E-18 6.6E-19 4.07E-18 2.83E-19 1.28E-17 8.67E-19 9.05E-18 
 
Table 6.20 Means of the precursors related to RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL 
 ABCL AHB AOCL MG/B OC UWC UWC-MWL UWC+T 
ERR 2.42E-10 7.45E-09 1.33E-08 3.92E-10 1.96E-09 5.10E-09 2.75E-09 1.02E-08 
DEL 8.97E-11 2.66E-09 3.53E-09 3.92E-10 2.28E-14 1.17E-09 2.38E-10 1.34E-09 
 
Table 6.21 Covariance matrix related to RVDRVERR 
VABCLD
RRTH 
VAHB-
DRRTH 
VAOCLD
RRTH 
VMG/BD
RRTH 
VOC--
DRRTH 
VUWC-
DRRTH 
VUWCM
DRRTH 
VUWCT
DRRTH 
4.89E-21 4.51E-20 1.44E-20 5.62E-20 7.81E-21 2.04E-19 1.56E-20 1.57E-19 
4.51E-20 4.15E-19 1.33E-19 5.18E-19 7.19E-20 1.88E-18 1.44E-19 1.44E-18 
1.44E-20 1.33E-19 4.24E-20 1.65E-19 2.3E-20 6.01E-19 4.6E-20 4.61E-19 
5.62E-20 5.18E-19 1.65E-19 6.46E-19 8.97E-20 2.35E-18 1.8E-19 1.8E-18 
7.81E-21 7.19E-20 2.3E-20 8.97E-20 1.25E-20 3.26E-19 2.5E-20 2.5E-19 
2.04E-19 1.88E-18 6.01E-19 2.35E-18 3.26E-19 1.2E-17 9.19E-19 9.21E-18 
1.56E-20 1.44E-19 4.6E-20 1.8E-19 2.5E-20 9.19E-19 7.04E-20 7.06E-19 
1.57E-19 1.44E-18 4.61E-19 1.8E-18 2.5E-19 9.21E-18 7.06E-19 7.07E-18 
 
Table 6.22 Covariance matrix related to RVDRVDEL 
VABCLD
ELTH 
VAHB-
DELTH 
VAOCLD
ELTH 
VMG/BD
ELTH 
VOC--
DELTH 
VUWC-
DELTH 
VUWCM
DELTH 
VUWCTD
ELTH 
6.73E-22 5.96E-21 1.41E-21 2.09E-20 3.37E-26 1.74E-20 5.02E-22 7.62E-21 
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5.96E-21 5.28E-20 1.25E-20 1.85E-19 2.98E-25 1.54E-19 4.45E-21 6.75E-20 
1.41E-21 1.25E-20 2.97E-21 4.38E-20 7.08E-26 3.66E-20 1.05E-21 1.6E-20 
2.09E-20 1.85E-19 4.38E-20 6.46E-19 1.04E-24 5.39E-19 1.55E-20 2.36E-19 
3.37E-26 2.98E-25 7.08E-26 1.04E-24 1.69E-30 8.71E-25 2.51E-26 3.81E-25 
1.74E-20 1.54E-19 3.66E-20 5.39E-19 8.71E-25 6.33E-19 1.83E-20 2.77E-19 
5.02E-22 4.45E-21 1.05E-21 1.55E-20 2.51E-26 1.83E-20 5.27E-22 8E-21 
7.62E-21 6.75E-20 1.6E-20 2.36E-19 3.81E-25 2.77E-19 8E-21 1.21E-19 
 
Table 6.23 Covariance between RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL 
 VABCLD
ELTH 
VAHB-
DELTH 
VAOCLD
ELTH 
VMG/BD
ELTH 
VOC--
DELTH 
VUWC-
DELTH 
VUWCM
DELTH 
VUWCTD
ELTH 
VABCLD
RRTH 
1.82E-21 1.61E-20 3.81E-21 5.62E-20 9.08E-26 4.69E-20 1.35E-21 2.05E-20 
VAHB-
DRRTH 
1.67E-20 1.48E-19 3.51E-20 5.18E-19 8.37E-25 4.32E-19 1.25E-20 1.89E-19 
VAOCLD
RRTH 
5.34E-21 4.73E-20 1.12E-20 1.65E-19 2.67E-25 1.38E-19 3.98E-21 6.05E-20 
VMG/BD
RRTH 
2.09E-20 1.85E-19 4.38E-20 6.46E-19 1.04E-24 5.39E-19 1.55E-20 2.36E-19 
VOC—
DRRTH 
2.9E-21 2.56E-20 6.08E-21 8.97E-20 1.45E-25 7.48E-20 2.16E-21 3.28E-20 
VUWC-
DRRTH 
7.58E-20 6.71E-19 1.59E-19 2.35E-18 3.79E-24 2.76E-18 7.95E-20 1.21E-18 
VUWCM
DRRTH 
5.8E-21 5.14E-20 1.22E-20 1.8E-19 2.9E-25 2.11E-19 6.09E-21 9.25E-20 
VUWCTD
RRTH 
5.82E-20 5.15E-19 1.22E-19 1.8E-18 2.91E-24 2.12E-18 6.11E-20 9.27E-19 
 
6.4.10 Precursor Family RVDRVSUI 
The precursor family RVDRVSUI is defined as “RV driver suicide causes RV struck 
by train on various types of LCs”. For this family, no significant variant class is 
identified by the experts. As proposed previously, the proportion of the variance due 
to the family commonality is elicited for each precursor as presented in Appendix B. 
The family correlation matrix and the family covariance matrix are derived as 
presented in Table 6.24 and Table 6.25. 
 
Table 6.24 Correlation of the precursor family RVDRVSUI 
 ABCL AHB AOCL OC UWC UWC-MWL UWC+T 
ABCL 1 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
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AHB 0.95 1 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
AOCL 0.95 0.95 1 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
OC 0.95 0.95 0.95 1 0.95 0.95 0.95 
UWC 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 1 0.95 0.95 
UWC-
MWL 
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 1 0.95 
UWC+T 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 1 
 
Table 6.25 Covariance matrix of the precursor family RVDRVSUI 
VABCLSU
IXPE 
VAHBSUI
XPE 
VAOCLSU
IXPE 
VOC--
SUIXPE 
VUWCSU
IXPE 
VUWCLS
UIXPE 
VUWCTS
UIXPE 
1.32E-23 1.28E-22 3.82E-23 1.64E-23 6.24E-22 4.23E-23 4.41E-22 
1.28E-22 1.37E-21 3.89E-22 1.67E-22 6.36E-21 4.3E-22 4.49E-21 
3.82E-23 3.89E-22 1.22E-22 4.96E-23 1.89E-21 1.28E-22 1.34E-21 
1.64E-23 1.67E-22 4.96E-23 2.24E-23 8.11E-22 5.49E-23 5.73E-22 
6.24E-22 6.36E-21 1.89E-21 8.11E-22 3.26E-20 2.1E-21 2.19E-20 
4.23E-23 4.3E-22 1.28E-22 5.49E-23 2.1E-21 1.49E-22 1.48E-21 
4.41E-22 4.49E-21 1.34E-21 5.73E-22 2.19E-20 1.48E-21 1.63E-20 
 
6.4.11 Precursor Family LTBRFAI 
The precursor family LTBRFAI is defined as “That Light/barriers fail to operate 
causes RV struck by train on various types of LCs”. One factor class is identified by 
the experts as “the technical workings of the lights and barriers and their failure 
rates”. The elicited data regarding the variant factors are presented in Appendix B. 
The family correlation matrix and the family covariance matrix are derived as 
presented in Table 6.26 and Table 6.27. 
 
 
Table 6.26 Correlation matrix of the precursor family LTBRFAI 
 ABCL AHB AOCL MG/B 
ABCL 1.00 0.98 0.79 0.88 
AHB 0.98 1.00 0.79 0.88 
AOCL 0.79 0.79 1.00 0.88 
MG/B 0.88 0.88 0.88 1.00 
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Table 6.27 Covariance matrix of the precursor family LTBRFAI 
LABCLBLETF LAHB-BLETF LAOCLLSETF LMG/BLSETF 
7.43E-25 6.29E-24 1.5E-24 1.04E-23 
6.29E-24 5.54E-23 1.3E-23 9E-23 
1.5E-24 1.3E-23 4.91E-24 2.68E-23 
1.04E-23 9E-23 2.68E-23 1.87E-22 
 
6.4.12 Uncertainty Models in the Rule Sets 
6.4.12.1 Identification of hazards 
As summarized in Appendix B, there are 12 rule sets defined for the consequences 
related to HET10 [Dennis 2005]. Three hazard sources are identified as mechanical 
impact, fire, and toxic goods. For the mechanical impact, the train approaching speed 
is the major factor. The trains’ approaching speeds are put into two levels associated 
with the automotive LCs (ABCL and AOCL) and the other level crossings 
respectively [RSSB 2004]. Accordingly two hazards are defined related to the 
mechanical impact as summarized in Table 6.28. 
 
The fire hazard is affected by whether there are extra flammable goods involved in 
the accidence. Toxic goods are believed flammable and therefore cause extra 
casualties due to fire. As a result, three hazards related to fire are defined as fire 
without extra flammable goods, fire with flammable goods carried in the involved 
road vehicle, and fire with toxic goods as a flammable goods carried in the involved 
road vehicle as summarized in Table 6.28. 
 
The toxic hazard source is specified for the toxic goods carried in the involved road 
vehicle only. Consequently one hazard related to toxic is defined as summarized in 
Table 6.28. 
 
The five hazards identified above are to be defined on the injury atoms next. 
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Table 6.28 Hazards identified for HET10 
Hazard Code Hazard Source Description 
MIPAU Mechanical 
impact 
Mechanical impact with train approaching speed on 
automotive level crossings 
MIPRO Mechanical 
impact 
Mechanical impact with train approaching speed on the 
other non-automotive level crossings 
Fire Fire Fire without extra flammable goods or toxic goods carried 
in the involved road vehicle 
FireFGs Fire Fire with extra flammable goods carried in the involved 
road vehicle 
FireTGs Fire Fire with toxic goods as a flammable goods carried in the 
involved road vehicle 
ToxicGs Toxic goods Toxic goods carried in the involved road vehicle 
 
6.4.12.2 Definitions of Injury Atoms 
The injury atoms are defined for each hazard source at the worst level. The injury 
atom associated with the mechanical impact is defined on the hazard associated with 
non-automotive level crossings. The injury atom associated with fire is defined on 
the hazard associated with extra flammable goods. The injury atom associated with 
toxic is defined on the only hazard with toxic goods carried in the road vehicle. 
 
The injury atoms are assumed to follow Beta distributions that are derived by the 
methods developed in Chapter 4. As summarized in Table 6.29, the means and the 99 
percentiles of the three reference injury atoms can be derived from the description of 
RSSB-SRM [Dennis 2005]. Accordingly the definition parameters of the Beta 
distribution, i.e. α  and β , are derived for the injury atoms as presented in Table 
6.29. The standard deviation is also included in Table 6.29. The hazards are then 
defined relative to the associated injury atoms as summarized in Table 6.30. 
 
Table 6.29 Definitions of the injury atoms related to HET10 
IA Code The Mean 99 
percentile 
α  β  Std 
MIPRO 7.543% 15.086% 7.09 86.93 0.027 
FireFGs 14.2857% 28.571% 6.27 37.62 0.052 
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ToxicGs 21.428% 42.856% 5.38 19.74 0.0803 
 
Table 6.30 Definitions of the hazards on the associated injury atoms related to HET10 
 MIPRO (7.543%) FireFGs (14.2857%) 
MIPAU (1.103%) 0.1462 n/a 
Fire (2.857%) n/a 0.2 
FireTGs (7.14285%) n/a 0.5 
 
6.4.12.3 Definitions of Rule Sets 
The 12 rule sets related to HET10 are defined by the sequences of hazards as 
summarized in Table 6.31. A number 1 indicates that the rule set on the left column 
includes the hazard titled on the top row. Based on Table 6.30, the rule sets are then 
defined on the three injury atoms as summarized in Table 6.32. The 12 rule sets can 
be simulated by sampling the three injury atoms. Demonstrated in Fig. 6.3 are the 
smoothed density probability curves of the 6 rule sets related to the automotive level 
crossings. By Table 6.32, the other 6 rule sets have the similar patterns of the injury 
atoms and should have the similar shapes as demonstrated in Fig. 6.3 
correspondingly. 
 
Table 6.31 Definition of the rule sets related to HET10 on the hazards 
Rule Sets MIPAU MIPRO Fire FireFGs FireTGs ToxicGs 
T10-LCPAU-2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T10-LCPAU-3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T10-LCPAU-4 1 0 1 0 0 0 
T10-LCPAU-5 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T10-LCPAU-6 0 0 0 0 1 1 
T10-LCPAU-7 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T10-LCPRO-2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T10-LCPRO-3 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T10-LCPRO-4 0 1 1 0 0 0 
T10-LCPRO-5 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T10-LCPRO-6 0 0 0 0 1 1 
T10-LCPRO-7 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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Table 6.32 Definitions of the rule sets related to HET10 on the injury atoms 
Rule Sets MIPRO FireFGs ToxicGs The mean 
T10-LCPAU-2 0 0.2 0 0.02857 
T10-LCPAU-3 0.1462 0 0 0.01103 
T10-LCPAU-4 0.1462 0.2 0 0.03929 
T10-LCPAU-5 0 0 1 0.21429 
T10-LCPAU-6 0 0.5 1 0.27041 
T10-LCPAU-7 0 1 0 0.14286 
T10-LCPRO-2 0 0.2 0 0.02857 
T10-LCPRO-3 1 0 0 0.07543 
T10-LCPRO-4 1 0.2 0 0.10185 
T10-LCPRO-5 0 0 1 0.21429 
T10-LCPRO-6 0 0.5 1 0.27041 
T10-LCPRO-7 0 1 0 0.14286 
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Fig. 6.3.a Density probability curve of the rule set T10-LCPAU-2 
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Fig. 6.3.b Density probability curve of the rule set T10-LCPAU-3 
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Fig. 6.3.c Density probability curve of the rule set T10-LCPAU-4 
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Fig. 6.3.d Density probability curve of the rule set T10-LCPAU-5 
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Fig. 6.3.e Density probability curve of the rule set T10-LCPAU-6 
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Fig. 6.3.f Density probability curve of the rule set T10-LCPAU-7 
 
The scatter plots are then drawn to demonstrate the dependence between the rule sets. 
Shown Fig. 6.4 is the scatter plot between the rule sets T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-
LCPPRO-7. By Table 6.31, T10-LCPPRO-4 is defined by the sequence of the 
hazards MIPRO and Fire; T10-LCPPRO-7 is defined by the hazard FireFGs. The two 
rule sets are connected by the fire-related hazards Fire and ToxicFGs. The hazard 
MIPRO is however more than twice stronger than the hazard Fire in T10-LCPPRO-4. 
Consequently a moderate dependence is shown for the two rule sets. 
 
Shown in Fig. 6.5 is the scatter plot between T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-LCPPRO-3. 
By Table 6.31, the two rule sets share the hazard MIPRO. T10-LCPPRO-4 has the 
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extra hazard Fire. By Table 6.29 and Table 6.30, the hazard MIPRO is more than 
twice stronger than the hazard Fire. As a result, a much stronger dependence is 
shown for the two rule sets than that for T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-LCPPRO-7 as 
shown in Fig. 6.4. Due to the extra hazard Fire, T10-LCPPRO-4 always has a higher 
individual casualty probability than T10-LCPPRO-3. This order relationship is 
demonstrated in Fig. 6.5 where all the samples fall under the 45-degree line. 
 
Shown in Fig. 6.6 is the scatter plot between T10-LCPPRO-5 and T10-LCPAU-6. 
Based on Table 6.31, the two rule sets share the toxic-related hazards ToxicGs. The 
rule set T10-LCPPRO-6 has the extra hazard FireTGs. By Table 6.29 and Table 6.30, 
the hazard ToxicGs is three times stronger than the injury atom FireTGs. As a result, 
the stronger dependence is shown for the two rule sets than that for T10-LCPPRO-4 
and T10-LCPPRO-3 as shown in Fig. 6.5. Due to the extra hazard FireTGs, the rule 
set T10-LCPPRO-6 has always larger individual casualty probability than the rule set 
T10-LCPPRO-5 does. This order relationship is demonstrated in Fig. 6.6 where all 
the samples fall above the 45-degree line. 
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Fig. 6.4 Scatter plot of the two rule sets T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-LCPPRO-7 
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Fig. 6.5 Scatter plot of the two rule sets T10-LCPPRO-4 and T10-LCPPRO-3 
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Fig. 6.6 Scatter plot of the two rule sets T10-LCPPRO-5 and T10-LCPAU-6 
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6.4.13 Uncertainty Assessment 
We have built the covariance matrix of the precursors and the individual casualty 
probabilities of the rule sets related to HET10. We can then assess the uncertainty in 
the output of HET10 by the methods developed in Chapter 5. 
 
At the first step, the mimic model is built on MS Excel. The mimic model is 
composed of 12,425 risk scenarios. With the mimic model, the analytical solutions of 
the mean and the standard deviation of the output are calculated as summarized in 
Table 6.33. The calculated analytical mean differentiates from the result from the 
SRM FT+ model by 0.0001 that means a relative error as small as 57.2 −e . Monte-
Carlo simulations are then conducted with 6000 sets of samples of the precursors and 
the rule sets. With the simulated outputs of HET10, the empirical mean and standard 
deviation are calculated as shown in Table 6.33. The relative errors compared with 
the calculated analytical solutions are 0.22% and 3.7% for the mean and the standard 
deviation respectively. The calculated analytical solutions and the simulations-based 
empirical solutions coincide very well and therefore verify each other. With the 
simulated outputs of HET10, the empirical density probability curve is drawn as 
shown in Fig. 6.7. The five vertical dash lines mark five percentiles as summarized in 
Table 6.34. 
 
 
Table 6.33 Summary of the uncertainty assessment of HET10 
Method Mean Standard Deviation 
SRM FT+ 3.7328 n/a 
Analytical Solution 3.7327 0.7974 
Monte-Carlo Simulations 3.7399 0.8271 
Relative error 0.22% 3.7% 
 
Table 6.34 Percentiles of the simulations of HET10 
 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
Percentile 2.344 3.181 3.734 4.285 5.060 
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Fig. 6.7 Empirical density probability curve from the simulations of HET10 
 
6.5 Case Study with HET12 
6.5.1 Elicitation process for building the covariance matrix of the 
precursors 
The hazardous event HET12 is defined as the derailment of passenger trains. It is the 
second largest contributor to the over all risk in RSSB-SRM [Dennis 2006]. There 
are 52 precursors related to HET12. To build up the covariance matrix of the 
precursors, we designed the elicitation process as shown in Fig. 6.8. At the first step, 
the precursor families are identified by the experts. After that, we elicit the 
uncertainty factors of all the precursors. The experts are then asked to identify the 
invariant factors for each precursor family. At the fourth step, the correlations 
regarding the uncertainty factors are elicited with the qualitative assessment plus the 
benchmark as designed in Chapter 3. The elicited correlations are monitored during 
the process by the indicator parameter iq  as defined in Chapter 3. As a result, the 
correlation matrix can be derived for the precursors. At the last step, the variance of 
each family is derived through elicitation by the method developed in Chapter 3. The 
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standard deviation of the precursors can then be derived within the families and the 
covariance matrix can then be derived. 
 
We will continue to discuss the elicitations in details. To make the elicitation work 
easy to follow, the following subsections are headed according to the structure of Fig. 
6.8. At the beginning of each subsection, we also locate the subsection with reference 
to the blocks in Fig. 6.8. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.8 Elicitation process for building up the covariance matrix for HET12 precursors 
 
1. Identify the parameter families 
4. Elicit the correlations regarding 
the uncertainty factors 
9. Derive the covariance matrix 
8. Elicit and derive the 
variance of each family 
7. Derive the 
correlation matrix 
5. Calculate variance proportion 
explained by the factors iq  
6. 1<iq ? 
Yes 
No: adust the elicitation 
accordingly 
2. Identify the uncertainty factors 
3. Identify the invariant factors for each family 
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6.5.2 Precursor Families 
This subsection is referred to Block 1 in Fig. 6.8. We will identify the precursor 
families. 
 
The experts partition the 52 precursors related to HET12 by the definitions into 7 
families that are related to: drivers' errors; environment issues; infrastructure defects; 
rolling stock defects; RV faults; staff errors; and track defects. The family codes, the 
associated precursors, and the descriptions of the precursors are summarized in the 
first three columns in Fig. 6.9. 
 
6.5.3 Uncertainty Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 2 in Fig. 6.8. We will elicit the uncertainty factors 
of the precursors. 
 
For all the 52 precursors, 13 uncertainty factors are elicited as: 
• Driver monitoring training; 
• Extreme climate conditions; 
• Network Rail performance; 
• Signalling failures; 
• Structural failure; 
• Road vehicle driver error; 
• Train maintenance; 
• Vandalism; 
• Public errors; 
• Shunter training; 
• Signaller error; 
• Track maintenance; 
• S&C maintenance. 
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6.5.4 Invariant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 3 in Fig. 6.8. We will elicit the invariant factors 
for each precursor family. 
 
From the 13 uncertainty factors elicited in Subsection 6.5.4, the invariant factors for 
each family are elicited as summarized in Table 6.35. 
 
Table 6.35 Invariant factors of the precursor families related to HET12 
No. Family Code Invariant Factor 
1.  Driver Error Driver monitoring training 
2.  Environment Extreme climate conditions 
3.  Infra Network Rail 
4.  Rolling Stock Train maintenance 
5.  RV RV driver error 
6.  Staff Error Residual uncertainty 
7.  Track Defect Network Rail 
 
6.5.5 Elicitations on the Uncertainty Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 4 in Fig. 6.8. We will elicit the correlations 
between the precursors and the uncertainty factors. 
 
The qualitative correlations between the precursors and the factors are elicited as 
summarized in Fig. 6.9. All these correlations are positive. 
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Driver Error POSL----PH Overspeeding leading to PT derailment V S
Driver Error PSNT----PF Severe braking/snatch leading to PT derailment S W
Driver Error PSPD----P H SPAD at S &C leading to PT derailment S
Driver Error UTRN----UE Running into train derailed while in depots/sidings leading 
to train derailment S
E nvironment BTRE----UE Running into trees leading to train derailment S M
E nvironment RLNS----UF Running into landslip leading to train derailment S M
E nvironment RQAK ----UE Structural damage due to earthquake leading to train 
derailment M S
E nvironment RSLP----PF Subsidence/ landslip under track leading to PT derailment S M
E nvironment WFLD----UE Running into flooding lea ding to train derailment S W
E nvironment WSNO----UE Running into snow/ice leading to train derailment M S
E nvironment WWIN----UE High  winds leading to train derailment S M
E nvironment RSCR----UE Rail  bridge collapse - scour leading to train derailment S M
Infra RBGD----UF Running into to debris from overbridges leading to train 
derailment W W S
Infra RBGS ----UF Rail  bridge structural failure leading to train derailment M M
Infra RBLD----UF Running into debris from lineside structures/buildings 
leading to train derailment M M
infra RDRN----UF Drainage culvert/pipework collapse leading to train 
derailment M M
Infra ROHL----UF Running into debris from OHLE structures leading to train 
derailment S M
Infra RSIG----UF Running into debris from signalling gantries leading to train 
derailment S M
 
Fig. 6.9.a Elicited uncertainty factors of the precursors related to HET12, Part 1 
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Infra RTUNWALLU
F
Running into debris in the tunnel leading to train 
derailment
M M
Infra RWAL----UF Running into debris from retaining walls leading to train 
derailment M M
Infra SWRG----PF Wrongside signal failure at S&C leading to PT derailment M M
Rolling Stock PAXB----PF Seized axle box bearing leading to PT derailment S
Rolling Stock PAXL----PF Axle failure leading to PT derailment S
Rolling Stock PBUF----PF Buffer locking leading to PT derailment M
Rolling Stock PCUP----PF Coupl ing failure leading to PT derailment M
Rolling Stock PSUS ----P F Suspension system/bogie failures leading to PT derailment S
Rolling Stock PTRA----PF Running into objects fallen from trains leading to PT 
derailment M
Rolling Stock PWHF----PF Wheel flats or wheel/tyre wear beyond limits leading to PT 
derailment ES
Rolling Stock PWHL----PF Wheel failure leading to PT Derailment S
RV RBSHCO L-UE Rail  bridge collapse - bridge bashing leading to train 
derailment S
RV RBSH----UE Bridge bashing leading to bridge displacement (not 
collapse) and train derai lment S
RV VBGV----UE Running into vehicles fallen from overbridge leading to 
train derailment M M
RV VBND----UE Running into vehicles through boundary fence leading to 
train derailment M M
S taff Error BBLD----UE Running into objects from buil ding site leading to train 
derailment VW M M
S taff Error MMAT----UE Running into Engineers materials left foul leading to train 
derailment W W S
 
Fig. 6.9.b Elicited uncertainty factors of the precursors related to HET12, Part 2 
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S taff Error PCATDR--PH Cat D SPAD or runaway leading to PT derailment M M M
Staff Error PCRW----PH Other driver/train crew error at S&C leading to PT 
derailment VS
Staff Error PSHN----PH Shunter errors leading to  PT derailment VS
Staff Error TTKD----UE Track damage from other undetected derailment leading to 
train derailment M S
Staff Error VMVE----UE Running into maintenance vehicles leading to train 
derailment M S
Staff Error XPRD----PH Track maintenance staff errors leading to PT derailment W S
Staff Error XSCO----PH Incorrect scotch and clip of points leading to PT derailment VW VS
Staff Error XSGM----PH Signaller/ crossing keeper error leading to PT derailment M M
Track Defect TBCK----PF Buckled rail leading to PT derailment M S VW
Track Defect TBKR----PF Broken rail leading to PT derailment M M
Track Defect TFSH----PF Broken fishplate leading to PT derailment M M
Track Defect TSPG----PF Gauge spread (assumed always slow speed) leading to 
PT derailment M M
Track Defect TTUNBKR-PF Broken rail in tunnel leading to PT derailment M M
Track Defect TTWS----PF Track twist leading to PT derailment M M
Track Defect XDSC----PF Defective S&C leading to PT derailment M M
Track Defect XPOS----PF Points in the wrong position and not detected leading to 
PT derailment M M VW
Track Defect XSCM----PF Movement of points under train (equipment faults) leading 
to PT derailment M VW M
 
Fig. 6.9.c Elicited uncertainty factors of the precursors related to HET12, Part 3 
 224 
 
6.5.6 Correlation Matrix 
This subsection is related to Block 7 in Fig. 6.8. We will derive the correlation 
matrix of all the 52 precursors based on the elicitations regarding the uncertainty 
factors. 
 
By the benchmarks given on Table 6.1, the qualitative correlations are mapped to 
numbers. The correlation matrix can then be built for the as shown in Fig. 6.10. For 
presentation, the correlation matrix is split into two 4 blocks as: 
 
( ) 





=
2,21,2
2,11,1HET12
rr
rr
r  
 
The block 1,1r  represents the correlation matrix of the first group of 26 precursors as 
shown in Fig. 6.10.a. The block 2,2r  represents the correlation matrix of the second 
group of 26 precursors as shown in Fig. 6.10.b. The block 2,1r  represents the 
correlation matrix of between the two groups as shown in Fig. 6.10.c. The block 1,2r  
is the transposition of 2,1r . 
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POSL----PH 1.00 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PSNT----PF 0.73 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.26
PSPD----PH 0.73 0.60 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UTRN----UE 0.73 0.60 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BTRE----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.44 0.92 0.79 0.87 0.92 0.92 0.19 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RLNS----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 1.00 0.44 0.92 0.79 0.87 0.92 0.92 0.19 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RQAK----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.44 1.00 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RSLP----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.92 0.44 1.00 0.79 0.87 0.92 0.92 0.19 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WFLD----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.79 0.44 0.79 1.00 0.69 0.79 0.79 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WSNO----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.87 0.32 0.87 0.69 1.00 0.87 0.87 0.26 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.60 0.60 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WWIN----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.92 0.44 0.92 0.79 0.87 1.00 0.92 0.19 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBGD----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.92 0.44 0.92 0.79 0.87 0.92 1.00 0.19 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBGS----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.19 0.11 0.26 0.19 0.19 1.00 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.26 0.37 0.37 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBLD----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.19 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.37 1.00 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.44 0.63 0.63 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RDRN----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.19 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.63 1.00 0.63 0.75 0.44 0.63 0.63 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROHL----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.19 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.63 0.63 1.00 0.75 0.44 0.63 0.63 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RSCR----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.26 0.60 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.60 0.75 0.75 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RSIG----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.44 0.26 0.60 0.44 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.60 1.00 0.44 0.44 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RTUNWALLUF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.19 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.44 1.00 0.63 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RWAL----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.19 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.44 0.63 1.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SWRG----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.32 0.19 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.75 0.32 0.32 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PAXB----PF 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.44 0.44 0.60
PAXL----PF 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.44 0.44 0.60
PBUF----PF 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.44 1.00 0.32 0.44
PCUP----PF 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.32 1.00 0.44
PSUS----PF 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.60 0.44 0.44 1.00
 
Fig. 6.10.a Correlation matrix of the precursors related to HET12: Part 1 
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PTRA----PF 1.00 0.56 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PWHF----PF 0.56 1.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PWHL----PF 0.44 0.78 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBSHCOL-UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBSH----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VBGV----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.44 1.00 0.63 0.32 0.19 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VBND----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.63 1.00 0.32 0.19 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBLD----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 1.00 0.49 0.44 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.27 0.37 0.20 0.45 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
MMAT----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.49 1.00 0.28 0.15 0.15 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.18 0.44 0.40 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.19 0.19 0.19
PCATDR--PH 0.32 0.56 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.28 1.00 0.60 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PCRW----PH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.15 0.60 1.00 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PSHN----PH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.12 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TTKD----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.91 0.06 0.10 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.18 0.49 0.58 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.32 0.32 0.32
VMVE----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.91 0.06 0.10 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.18 0.49 0.58 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.32 0.32 0.32
XPRD----PH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.94 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.94 0.94 1.00 0.22 0.51 0.40 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.19 0.19 0.19
XSCO----PH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.22 1.00 0.28 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.63 0.27 0.63
XSGM----PH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.44 0.13 0.21 0.21 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.28 1.00 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
TBCK----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.58 0.40 0.14 0.44 1.00 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.44 0.44 0.44
TBKR----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.62 0.10 0.32 0.54 1.00 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.32 0.32 0.32
TFSH----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.62 0.10 0.32 0.54 0.63 1.00 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.32 0.32 0.32
TSPG----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.62 0.10 0.32 0.54 0.63 0.63 1.00 0.63 0.63 0.32 0.32 0.32
TTUNBKR-PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.62 0.10 0.32 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.63 1.00 0.63 0.32 0.32 0.32
TTWS----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.62 0.10 0.32 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 1.00 0.32 0.32 0.32
XDSC----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.63 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 1.00 0.42 0.63
XPOS----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.27 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.42 1.00 0.52
XSCM----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.63 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.63 0.52 1.00
 
 
Fig. 6.10.b Correlation matrix of the precursors related to HET12: Part 2 
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POSL----PH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PSNT----PF 0.19 0.33 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PSPD----PH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UTRN----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BTRE----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.87 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
RLNS----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.87 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
RQAK----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RSLP----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.87 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
WFLD----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.06 0.19 0.69 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
WSNO----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.26 0.14 0.44 0.92 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
WWIN----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.87 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
RBGD----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.87 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
RBGS----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.60 0.44 0.44 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.06 0.19 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
RBLD----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
RDRN----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
ROHL----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
RSCR----UE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.26 0.14 0.44 0.60 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
RSIG----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.26 0.14 0.44 0.60 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.75 0.54
RTUNWALLUF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
RWAL----UF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
SWRG----PF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.63 0.42
PAXB----PF 0.44 0.78 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PAXL----PF 0.44 0.78 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PBUF----PF 0.32 0.56 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PCUP----PF 0.32 0.56 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PSUS----PF 0.44 0.78 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 
Fig. 6.10.c Correlation matrix of the precursors related to HET12: Part 3 
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6.5.7 Variance of Each Family 
This subsection is referred to Block 8 in Fig. 6.8. We will elicit the variance of each 
of the seven precursor families as elicited in Subsection 6.5.2. 
 
By the method developed in Chapter 3, the 95 percentile of the waiting time is 
elicited for the seven families as summarized in Table 6.36. The standard deviations 
are then derived as summarized in Table 6.36. 
 
Table 6.36 Elicited 95 percentile of the waiting time, i.e. 95.0t , and the derived standard 
deviation of the occurrence rate of the families related to HET12 
Family Code 
Minimum 95.0t  
(Months) 
Maximum 95.0t  
(Months) 
Assessment of 95.0t  
(Months) 
Std 
λσ  
Driver Error 55.8 63.5 59.5 4.69E-10 
Environment 23.0 26.0 24.5 1.14E-09 
Infra 10.0 11.3 10.6 2.62E-09 
Rolling Stock 37.6 42.8 40 6.95E-10 
RV 77.0 87.6 82 3.40E-10 
Staff Error 24.0 27.3 25.5 1.09E-09 
Track Defect 8.1 9.2 8.7 3.22E-09 
 
6.5.8 Covariance Matrix 
This subsection is related to Block 9 in Fig. 6.8. We will derive the standard 
deviations of the precursors and consequently derive the covariance matrix of all the 
52 precursors. 
 
Based one the family variance as summarized in Table 6.36 and the elicitations 
regarding the uncertainty factors, the standard deviations of the precursors are 
derived within the associated families as summarized in Table 6.37. 
 
 229 
With the standard deviations summarized in Table 6.37 and the correlation matrix 
presented in Fig. 6.10, the covariance matrix of the 52 precursors can be built 
straightforwardly and therefore is not presented here. 
 
Table 6.37 Standard deviation of the 52 precursors related to HET12 
Family Precursors Mean STD 
Driver Error POSL----PH 3.060E-10 5.480E-11 
Driver Error PSNT----PF 1.801E-10 3.906E-11 
Driver Error PSPD----PH 1.836E-09 3.982E-10 
Driver Error UTRN----UE 1.836E-11 3.982E-12 
Environment BTRE----UE 1.224E-09 2.472E-10 
Environment RLNS----UF 3.672E-09 7.417E-10 
Environment RQAK----UE 3.602E-13 1.002E-13 
Environment RSLP----PF 5.771E-10 1.166E-10 
Environment WFLD----UE 1.801E-13 3.638E-14 
Environment WSNO----UE 2.295E-10 6.385E-11 
Environment WWIN----UE 1.836E-12 3.708E-13 
Infra RBGD----UF 2.295E-10 3.502E-11 
Infra RBGS----UF 7.205E-12 2.582E-12 
Infra RBLD----UF 2.295E-10 4.824E-11 
infra RDRN----UF 1.836E-10 3.859E-11 
Infra ROHL----UF 1.836E-12 3.859E-13 
Infra RSCR----UE 9.006E-11 1.374E-11 
Infra RSIG----UF 1.836E-13 2.802E-14 
Infra RTUNWALLUF 1.191E-08 2.504E-09 
Infra RWAL----UF 3.672E-11 7.718E-12 
Infra SWRG----PF 3.846E-10 8.084E-11 
Rolling Stock PAXB----PF 4.246E-10 8.616E-11 
Rolling Stock PAXL----PF 2.123E-10 4.308E-11 
Rolling Stock PBUF----PF 2.123E-10 5.934E-11 
Rolling Stock PCUP----PF 3.602E-11 1.007E-11 
Rolling Stock PSUS----PF 2.123E-10 4.308E-11 
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Family Precursors Mean STD 
Rolling Stock PTRA----PF 1.801E-09 5.034E-10 
Rolling Stock PWHF----PF 1.201E-10 1.890E-11 
Rolling Stock PWHL----PF 4.503E-10 9.137E-11 
RV RBSHCOL-UE 2.161E-11 3.621E-12 
RV RBSH----UE 2.202E-10 3.689E-11 
RV VBGV----UE 2.295E-10 5.296E-11 
RV VBND----UE 1.224E-09 2.824E-10 
Staff Error BBLD----UE 7.344E-12 1.748E-12 
Staff Error MMAT----UE 2.295E-10 7.432E-11 
Staff Error PCATDR--PH 2.295E-10 1.429E-10 
Staff Error PCRW----PH 5.771E-10 2.311E-10 
Staff Error PSHN----PH 2.295E-10 9.189E-11 
Staff Error TTKD----UE 7.205E-11 3.473E-11 
Staff Error VMVE----UE 1.836E-11 8.849E-12 
Staff Error XPRD----PH 5.771E-10 1.475E-10 
Staff Error XSCO----PH 4.328E-10 2.033E-10 
Staff Error XSGM----PH 3.060E-09 6.955E-10 
Track Defect TBCK----PF 1.154E-09 2.217E-10 
Track Defect TBKR----PF 1.154E-09 3.054E-10 
Track Defect TFSH----PF 5.662E-10 1.498E-10 
Track Defect TSPG----PF 3.060E-09 8.097E-10 
Track Defect TTUNBKR-PF 5.771E-09 1.527E-09 
Track Defect TTWS----PF 6.755E-10 1.787E-10 
Track Defect XDSC----PF 3.060E-09 8.097E-10 
Track Defect XPOS----PF 4.328E-10 1.145E-10 
Track Defect XSCM----PF 2.164E-10 5.726E-11 
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6.5.9 Uncertainty Models in the Rule Sets 
6.5.9.1 Hazards 
There are 123 rule sets associated with the consequences in HET12. The rule sets are 
summarized in Appendix B. Seven injury sources are elicited as: (1) train derailment; 
(2) carriage on its side; (3) structure collapsed onto the train; (4) secondary collision 
after derailment; (5) fire; (6) toxic goods; (7) train falling down the bridge. The 
injury sources related to HET12 are mainly affected by the locations on the track. 
Different locations of the track are associated with different derailment speeds and 
the different equipment structures. The locations are classified into: Bridge (BG), 
Open Fast (OF), Open Slow (OS), Single Track Tunnel (ST), Twin Track Tunnel 
(TT), and Station Fast (SF). The injury source of fire is also affected by whether 
there are extra flammable goods. Depending on the locations on the track and 
whether there are flammable goods, the hazards related to HET12 are defined as 
summarized in Table 6.38. 
 
Table 6.38 Hazards related to HET12. 
Hazard Types Hazard specification Weight 
Falling down bridge Falling down bridge 1 
On open track 0.333 Derailment 
In tunnel 1 
On open slow track 0.303 
On open fast AUTO track with the average speed of 
derailment assumed as 50mph 
0.356 
On open fast track with the average speed of derailment 
assumed as 55mph. 
0.541 
Carriage on its side 
after derailment 
In twin track tunnel 1 
On open slow track 0.4 Structure collapsed 
onto train following 
the collision On open fast track 1 
Carriage hitting line side structure when train not on its side; 
on open slow track 
0.010 
Carriage hitting line side structure when train not on its side; 
on open fast AUTO track with the average derailment speed 
assumed as 50mph 
0.028 
Second collision after 
the derailment 
Carriage hitting line side structure when train not on its side; 
on open fast track with the average derailment speed 
assumed as 55mph 
0.046 
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Hazard Types Hazard specification Weight 
Carriage hitting line side structure when train on its side; on 
open slow track 
0.020 
Carriage hitting line side structure when train on its side; on 
open fast track  
0.133 
Carriage in contact with tunnel wall  0.181 
In collision with platform at a station 0.067 
In collision with another train; on open track 0.667 
In collision with another train; at a station 0.767 
In collision with another train; in twin track tunnel 1 
Either in collision on line side structure or with carriage on 
its side; open slow track 
0.016 
Either in collision on line side structure or with carriage on 
its side; open fast track 
0.032 
The structure in collision collapsed onto the train on open 
slow track 
0.016 
The structure in collision collapsed onto the train on open 
fast track 
0.032 
Fire at a station 0.008 
In collision with a train without flammable goods on open 
track 
0.040 
In collision with a train without flammable goods at a station 0.048 
With flammable goods released from the freight train in 
collision on open track 
0.159 
With flammable goods from the freight train in collision at a 
station 
0.254 
Fire 
In tunnel 1 
Toxic goods release from the freight train in collision on 
open track 
0.238 
Toxic goods release from the freight train in collision at a 
station 
0.317 
Toxic goods 
Toxic goods release from the freight train in collision in twin 
track tunnel 
1 
 
6.5.9.2 Definitions of the Injury Atoms and the Rule Sets 
For each hazard source, the injury atom is defined by the hazard with the worst 
hazard level. The weights of the hazards relative to the associated injury atoms are 
included in Table 6.38. We have assumed that the injury atoms follow Beta 
distributions. By the methods developed in Chapter 4, the definition parameters of 
the seven injury atoms are derived as summarized in Table 6.39. 
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On the injury atoms defined in Table 6.39, the 123 rule sets related to HET12 are 
then defined as summarized in Table 6.40. 
 
Table 6.39 Definitions of the injury atoms related to HET12 
Injury Source Code The 
Mean 
99 
percentile 
α
 
β
 
Std 
Derailment DERTNL 0.0043 0.0086 7.95 1846 0.002 
Carriage on side CARONSTNL 0.2427 0.4855 5.02 15.7 0.092 
Structure collapsed 
onto the train 
STROnTNOS 0.25 0.5 4.93 14.8 0.095 
Second collision SecCollTNL 0.2143 0.4286 5.38 19.7 0.080 
Fire FireTNL 0.90 0.99 20.31 2.26 0.062 
Toxic goods ToxicTNL 0.90 0.99 20.31 2.26 0.062 
Falling off a bridge onBridge 0.1429 0.2857 6.27 37.6 0.052 
 
Table 6.40 Definitions of the rule sets related to HET12 on the injury atoms. 
Rule Sets DER 
TNL 
CARON
STNL 
STRO
n 
TNOS 
SecColl
TNL 
FireTNL Toxic 
TNL 
On 
Bridge 
T12-BG-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
T12-OF-01 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-02 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-03 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-04 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-05 0.333 0.000 1.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-06 0.333 0.000 1.000 0.046 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-07 0.333 0.541 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-08 0.333 0.541 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-09 0.333 0.541 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-10 0.333 0.541 0.000 0.133 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-11 0.333 0.541 0.657 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-12 0.333 0.541 0.657 0.133 0.048 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-13 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-14 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-15 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-16 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-17 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.238 0.000 
T12-OF-18 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.238 0.000 
T12-OF-19 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-20 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.198 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-21 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-22 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
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T12-OF-23 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OF-24 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-01 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-02 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-03 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-04 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-05 0.333 0.000 1.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-06 0.333 0.000 1.000 0.028 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-07 0.333 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-08 0.333 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-09 0.333 0.356 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-10 0.333 0.356 0.000 0.133 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-11 0.333 0.356 0.657 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-12 0.333 0.356 0.657 0.133 0.048 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-13 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-14 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-15 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-16 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-17 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.238 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-18 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.238 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-19 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-20 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.198 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-21 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-22 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-23 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OFAUTO-24 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-03 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-04 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.016 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-05 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-06 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.010 0.016 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-07 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-08 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-09 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-10 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.020 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-11 0.000 0.030 0.400 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-12 0.000 0.030 0.400 0.020 0.016 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-17 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.238 0.000 
T12-OS-18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.238 0.000 
T12-OS-19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.198 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-OS-23 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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T12-OS-24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T12-ST-1 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-ST-2 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-ST-3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-1 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-2 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-7 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-13 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-15 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-17 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
T12-TT-18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
T12-TT-19 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-21 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-23 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12-TT-24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-1 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-2 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-3 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-4 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-7 0.333 0.541 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-8 0.333 0.541 0.000 0.067 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-9 0.333 0.541 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-10 0.333 0.541 0.000 0.200 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-13 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-14 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.048 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-15 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-16 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.048 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-17 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.317 0.000 
T14-SF-18 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.040 0.317 0.000 
T14-SF-19 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-20 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.254 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-21 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-22 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.040 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-23 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14-SF-24 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.008 0.000 0.000 
T10-LCPAU-2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T10-LCPAU-3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T10-LCPAU-4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T10-LCPAU-5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.000 
T10-LCPAU-6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.238 0.000 
T10-LCPAU-7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.000 
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T10-LCPRO-2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T10-LCPRO-3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.352 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T10-LCPRO-4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.352 0.032 0.000 0.000 
T10-LCPRO-5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.000 
T10-LCPRO-6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.238 0.000 
T10-LCPRO-7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.000 
 
6.5.10 Uncertainty Assessment 
We have built the covariance matrix for the precursors and the uncertainty model of 
the rule sets. We can then assess the uncertainty in the output of HET12 by the 
methods developed in Chapter 5. 
 
At the first step, the mimic model is built on MS Excel. The mimic model is 
composed of 28132 risk scenarios. The analytical solutions of the mean and the 
standard deviation are calculated as summarized in Table 6.41. The calculated 
analytical mean differentiates from the result from the FT+ model by 0.008 that 
means a relative error as small as 37.2 −e . Monte-Carlo simulations are then 
conducted with 6000 sets of samples of the precursors and the rule sets. With the 
simulated outputs of HET12, the empirical mean and standard deviation are 
calculated as shown in Table 6.41, of which the relative errors compared with the 
calculated analytical solutions are 0.31% and 0.56% respectively. The calculated 
analytical solutions and the simulations-based empirical solutions coincide very well 
and therefore verify each other. With the simulated outputs, the empirical density 
probability curve of HET12 is drawn as shown in Fig. 6.11. The five vertical dash 
lines mark the five percentiles as summarized in Table 6.42. 
 
 
Table 6.41 Summary of the uncertainty assessment of HET12 
Method Mean Standard Deviation 
SRM FT+ 3.136422777 n/a 
Analytical Solution 3.127937928 0.623461051 
Monte-Carlo Simulations 3.11814552 0.619988727 
Relative error 0.31% 0.56% 
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Table 6.42 Percentiles of the simulations of HET12 
 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
Percentile 2.19 2.68 3.06 3.51 4.21 
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Fig. 6.11 Empirical density probability curve from the simulations of HET12 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have conducted two case studies on the RSSB-SRM hazardous 
event HET10 and HET12 respectively. We build the covariance matrices for the 
precursors by the procedure developed in Chapter 3. The case studies show that the 
experts are satisfied to use uncertainty factors as a structure to define the correlations 
among a set of input parameters. The experts feel also confident to make the 
qualitative assessment of the correlations regarding the uncertainty factors. In 
conjunction with the benchmark technique as used in Crystal Ball [ORACLE 2008], 
qualitative assessment proves an efficient way for eliciting the correlations regarding 
a large number of uncertainty factors. By the procedure developed in Chapter 3, the 
assessments of the correlations regarding the uncertainty factors are monitored 
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during the process. The case studies show that such a monitoring scheme can help 
the experts to adjust their assessment. With the monitoring scheme, the outcome 
correlation matrix can be guaranteed to be positive semi-definite. For each family, 
the percentile of the waiting time is elicited for deriving the variance. The standard 
deviations of the precursors are then derived within the associated family. The case 
studies demonstrate that the experts are confident to make the assessment on the 
waiting time percentile of a precursor family rather than the individual precursors. 
 
The uncertainty in the rule sets is modelled on the injury atoms by the methods 
developed in Chapter 4 for the two case studies. The case studies demonstrate that 
the experts are confident in identifying the hazard types and structuring the rule sets 
into the injury atoms. The case studies demonstrate also that modelling on the injury 
atoms is an efficient way to model the uncertainty in the rule sets including the 
dependence and the order relationship among the rule sets. 
 
Based on the uncertainty models in the precursors and the rule sets built previously, 
the uncertainty of the output is assessed by the methods developed in Chapter 6 for 
HET10 and HET12 respectively. The case studies demonstrate that the Excel mimic 
model is a reliable and efficient way to representing the Fault-tree and Event-tree 
models. With the case studies, the analytical solutions of the variance match the 
results from the simulations very well. It shows that the analytical solution is a robust 
way even for a large mimic model of tens of thousands of risk scenarios. The case 
studies also show that the software tools are correct and reliable. 
 
As the RSSB-SRM HET10 and HET12 represent typical Fault-tree and Event-tree 
models, the case studies demonstrate that the procedure and the methods developed 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are efficient for conducting the subjective uncertainty analysis 
of Fault-tree and Event-tree models. 
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Chapter 7  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
7.1 Review of the Aims of the Research 
7.1.1 Overview of the Context of This Research 
The goal of this research is to assess the subjective uncertainty in the output of a 
PRA model composed of fault trees and event trees. As shown in Fig. 1.8, a PRA 
model is usually built up on three layers. In the inner layer are the fault trees and 
event trees that are generally built up with computer software tools such as Isograph 
FT+. Therefore these fault trees and event trees are represented as computers codes. 
The fault trees and event trees are then parametralized; the database of the input 
parameters forms the parameter layer around the inner layer of the fault trees and 
event trees. In the context of risk analysis, the parameters are usually assessed 
through expert judgement elicitation. The experts usually make some assumptions 
from where to assess the parameters. The assumptions are narrated outside the 
parameter layer. 
 
The uncertainty analysis in this research is conducted at the parameter layer. We 
cannot assess with certainty the value of each input parameters. Our uncertainty in 
the parameters is due to the lack of knowledge and therefore is categorized into 
epistemic uncertainty [Bedford and Cooke 2001]. For uncertainty analysis, we need 
firstly to model the uncertainty in the input parameters. In this research we focus on 
studying the uncertainty in the basic events and the consequences while we treat as 
constants the numbers of people exposed to risk scenarios and the probabilities of the 
outcomes of the escalation events. After building up the uncertainty in the input 
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parameters, we need to compute the uncertainty in the output, which is the 
uncertainty propagation of the uncertainty in the input parameters through the PRA 
model. 
 
According to the above procedure, we identify three aims for this research as to be 
discussed in details. 
 
7.1.2 Aim 1: A Procedure for Building the Covariance Matrix 
through Expert Judgement Elicitation 
For a large group of input parameters, it is difficult to build the uncertainty model 
through expert judgment elicitation. In practice, it is usually split into two tasks: (1) 
building the marginal distributions for all the individual parameters; and (2) building 
the dependence among all the parameters [Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. When the 
normal distribution is assumed as the marginal for each single parameter, the 
uncertainty in a group of input parameters can be completely defined by the means 
and the covariance matrix. 
 
It is however a challenge to build up the covariance matrix for a large group of input 
parameters through expert judgement elicitation. Mainly there are two major issues. 
First, it requires too much elicitation workload from the experts. For n random 
variables, there are ( ) 21−nn  correlation coefficients needed to elicit to build the 
correlation matrix. We need also to elicit the variance of each input parameter to 
build up the covariance matrix from the correlation matrix. Second, it is even more 
difficult to keep the outcome correlation matrix positive definite or positive semi-
definite. Different methods have been developed to obtain a positive semi-definite 
correlation matrix by adjusting the outcome matrix from elicitation. For this purpose, 
however, arbitrary information has to be introduced [Ghosh and Henderson 2002; 
Ghosh and Henderson 2003; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006]. 
 
According to the above issues, we aim to develop a procedure for building the 
covariance matrix through expert judgement elicitation. The procedure should 
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require reasonable elicitation time from experts. The procedure should also be able to 
guarantee that the outcome covariance matrix is positive semi-definite. 
 
7.1.3 Aim 2: Methods for Modelling the Uncertainty in the 
Consequences of an Event Tree 
An event tree starts with an initiating event that has the potential to cause safety risk. 
A set of events follows the initiating event. These events can take different outcomes 
that affect the final consequences. Therefore they are called escalation events. A path 
from the initiating event through all the escalation events is called an accident 
sequence. The risk scenario is specified at the end of each accident sequence. Each 
individual exposed to the risk suffers a probability of getting injured at one of the 
four levels including: no injuries, minor injuries, major injuries and fatalities. We 
assume that all the individuals exposed to one risk scenario get injured independently. 
The consequences associated with a risk scenario are defined as the means of injuries 
at the four levels, i.e. the product of the number of people exposed to the risk 
scenario and the individual injury probabilities. Consequently the uncertainty in the 
consequences can be modelled on the uncertainty in the number of the people 
exposed to the risk scenario and the uncertainty in the individual injury probabilities. 
In this research, we don’t study the uncertainty in the number of people exposed to 
the risk scenario as presented before. We focus on modelling the uncertainty in the 
individual injury probabilities. 
 
The escalation events that affect the individual injury probabilities form a subset of 
the escalation events. A rule set is defined when each escalation event in the subset 
takes a specific outcome. Multiple risk scenarios can be associated with the same 
rule set. Once the individual injury probabilities of a rule set are defined, they can be 
used for all the associated risk scenarios. Therefore the workload for populating the 
risk model can be reduced by modelling on the rule sets. 
 
There are still difficulties in modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets of an event tree 
containing many escalation events. First, the rule sets are intensively interwoven to 
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each other through the escalation events. It makes it very difficult to directly assess 
the correlations among rule sets. Second, the number of the rule sets increases 
exponentially with the number of the escalation events, which implies too many pair-
wise correlations to assess for a large event tree. Third, the individual injury 
probabilities should have a monotonicity property: a rule set associated with worse 
outcomes of all the escalation events should have individual injury probabilities not 
less than another rule set associated with better outcomes. 
 
According to the above difficulties, we aim to develop suitable methods for 
modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets of an event tree. The methods should 
require reasonable elicitation time from the experts. Furthermore, the methods should 
be able keep the monotonicity property among the rule sets. 
 
7.1.4 Aim 3: Efficient Methods for Conducting Uncertainty 
Analysis of a Large Fault Trees and Event Trees 
As described above, the fault trees and event trees are usually built with commercial 
software packages such as Isograph FT+. They are represented as the computers 
codes and data that are stored in the internal database of the software tools. The 
internal databases, however, are usually not transparent to the users in terms of the 
limits on accessing and manipulating the internal database. It results in difficulties in 
conducting uncertainty assessment in two aspects. First, for conducting simulations, 
we need to set the input parameters, run the model and obtain the results. It is very 
difficult if possible given the limits on accessing the database of the fault tree and 
event tree computer models. Second, the computer model composed of the codes and 
data stored in the internal database is completely a “black-box” to the analysts. It is 
impossible to do any analytical analysis with such a computer model. This is the first 
problem with conducting uncertainty analysis of fault trees and event trees. 
 
For conducting the uncertainty analysis, usually we can do simulations of the model 
and build up the empirical distribution based on the simulations. We can also try to 
calculate the analytical solution of the variance of the output. For both, we need to 
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deal with the dependences among the input parameters, which is usually very 
difficult. 
 
According to the above problems, we aim to select or develop the efficient methods 
to conduct uncertainty propagation through a large PRA model. The methods should 
be able to cooperate with the commercial software tools. The methods should also be 
able to work efficiently on a large Fault-tree and Event-tree model containing as 
many as thousands of correlated input parameters. 
 
7.2 Summary of the Development of this Research 
7.2.1 A New Procedure for Building the Covariance Matrix 
through the Expert Judgement Elicitation 
A new procedure has been developed for building the covariance matrix through the 
elicitation of expert judgement. The procedure is composed of three developments 
including: (1) the procedure for building up the correlation matrix of a group of input 
parameters; (2) deriving the variance of the input parameters within a family; (3) a 
new way for assessing the correlation between two random variables, which is a 
combination of qualitative assessment and benchmark. 
 
7.2.1.1 The Procedure for Building up the Correlation Matrix of a 
Group of Input Parameters 
The procedure is developed based on uncertainty factors that have been employed as 
an efficient way to model the uncertainty in input parameters. The elicitation 
workload can be reduced significantly by modelling on the uncertainty factors [Van 
Dorp 2005]. We use uncertainty factors to structure the uncertainty of the input 
parameters through a linear model [Cheng, Bedford et al. 2007]. The uncertainty 
factors of one input parameter are assumed independent. Two uncertainty factors 
from different input parameters can be correlated or identical. Consequently the 
uncertainty factors are put into three categories: (1) exclusive factors that belong to 
one input parameters only; (2) common factors that belong to all the input parameters; 
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and (3) a factor class composed of correlated factors one and only one from each 
input parameter. The input parameters are correlated through the common factors 
and the factor classes. The correlation matrix of the input parameters is derived based 
on the elicitation of the correlations regarding the uncertainty factors. 
 
An indicative value is derived to measure the proportion of the parameter's variance 
that is explained by the factors. This indicative value cannot exceed 1, which can be 
used as a constraint to monitor the assessment during the elicitation. The experts 
have to compare between the factors and give the consistent assessment that satisfies 
the constraint. As a result, a positive semi-definite correlation matrix can be 
guaranteed for multiple input parameters, which is a big feature of this method. 
Suppose there are n parameters having m common factors. The number of elicitation 
parameters is mn × . Compared with directly filling in the correlation matrix of 
( ) 21−nn  cells, this method requires fewer values to be elicited. 
 
7.2.1.1.1 Deriving the Variance of the Input Parameters within a Family 
When a group of parameters are defined physically in a similar way, the concept of 
parameter family is defined. A common factor that is not affected by any differences 
across the family is defined as an invariant factor of the family. The set of invariant 
factors is called the family commonality, of which the contribution to the standard 
deviation of the family members is assumed to be proportional to the members’ 
means. In the context of risk and reliability analysis, most of the input parameters are 
defined as the occurrence rate of the basic events [Kumamoto and Henley 1996; 
Modarres 2006]. The sum of the input parameters can therefore be defined as 
occurrence rate of the family which is meaning to assess the variance. We elicit the 
variance of the family from which we derive the family members’ standard deviation 
by the invariant factors and the correlation matrix. 
 
The method has two main features. First, the method requires less elicitation 
workload regarding the variance. Second, the assessment of a high level event is 
more reliable as agreed by the experts. 
 245 
 
7.2.1.2 Qualitative Assessment plus Benchmark for Assessing the 
Correlation between Two Random Variables 
As a supporting technique, we select the combination of the qualitative assessment 
and benchmark for eliciting the correlation between two random variables. 
Qualitative assessment is believed to be an easy way for experts to assess the 
correlation between two random variable [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000]. The 
assessments however need to be mapped into numbers for conducting numerical 
analysis. Usually the qualitative assessments are mapped linearly into the interval 
between 0 and 1 [Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000]. The linear numerical mapping 
however implies a strong assumption and makes the qualitative assessment method 
less rigorous in terms of probability theory. We do the mapping in another way as 
employed in the Excel Add-in Crystal Ball for training the experts. For a given pair 
of random variables of preset correlation, the scatter plot is made on the samples and 
presented on the screen. The experts are then asked to draw a position on the 
continuous line to shown their belief of the correlation strength. By repeating this 
process many times, a map can be made between the positions and the underlying 
correlations. Based on the assumption that the experts can perceive the correlations 
in a way consistent with their subjective correlation perception, we think this map 
can be used as benchmark in the qualitative assessment of the correlations. This has 
proven in the case studies in this research. 
 
The combination of the qualitative assessment and benchmark as defined above 
holds the threes features for a good elicitation method that are summarized in 
[Clemen, Fischer et al. 2000]. First, it has rigorous foundations that are defensible in 
terms of probability theory. Second, it is a general one that can be used in a wide 
variety of situations. Third, it is easy to implement and be able to be linked directly 
to the modelling procedure. 
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7.2.2 A New Method for Building the Uncertainty in the Rule Sets 
of an Event Tree 
Along the sequence of the escalation events of an event tree, we identify the hazard 
types that are the materials or activities with potential to cause injuries. Depending 
on the outcomes of the escalation events associated with a risk scenario, each hazard 
type is defined at a specific level, which is called a hazard. The individual injury 
probabilities of the rule set are then defined in terms of the hazards. 
 
We assume that, given the sequence, the hazards are independent in terms of causing 
the injuries to the people exposed to the risk scenario. When an individual person 
caught in a risk scenario is not lucky enough to escape all the hazards, the person 
becomes part of the consequence. After each hazard in the sequence, an individual 
exposed to the risk scenario either keeps the same level of injury or suffers a higher 
level injury. We assume that the transition probabilities associated with a hazard 
depend only on the person’s injury level before the hazard. Consequently, the 
individual injury probabilities of a rule set can be defined on the associated hazards 
by a Markov Chain model [Ross 2003]. To build up the Markov Chain model, we 
need to elicit the transition probabilities associated with each hazard. Once the 
transition probabilities are elicited for one hazard, they can be used for all the rule 
sets containing the same hazard. Therefore, modelling on the hazards can 
significantly reduce the elicitation work. 
 
For modelling the uncertainty in the rule sets, we can model the subjective 
uncertainty in the transition probabilities. We assume that the transition probabilities 
associated with different hazard types to be independent. It means that a given 
transition probability of one hazard does not tell any information on the transition 
probability of the hazards of another type. We assume that the transition probabilities 
associated with the same hazard type are proportional. By the assumption, an injury 
atom is defined for each hazard type. All the transition probabilities associated with 
the same hazard type are then defined on the injury atom. Consequently the 
individual injury probabilities of the rule sets are modelled on the injury atoms. 
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In most of the cases, we are more concerned with the major injuries and the fatalities 
than with the minor injuries. We need also to keep the elicitation work and time 
reasonable to the experts. For these two purposes, we develop a model of two levels 
of injuries as a simplified case of the model of four levels of injuries. 
 
The above methods require reasonable elicitation time from experts. The 
dependences among the rule sets are modelled automatically through the injury 
atoms. The monotonicity property of the rule sets can also be kept between two rule 
sets associated with general worse and better hazards respectively. 
 
7.2.3 Suitable Methods for Conducting Uncertainty Analysis of 
Fault-tree and Event-tree Models 
At the first step, we develop a mimic model of the fault trees and event trees that are 
built with a commercial software tool. The top event of a fault tree is broken down 
into the basic events, also called precursors. A cut set is a collection of the basic 
events that together certainly cause the top event. A minimum cut set is one that is no 
longer a cut set when any of its basic events is removed. The basic events are called 
rare events when they have very small occurrence probabilities. For two minimum 
cut sets composed of rare events, the simultaneous occurrence probability is orders of 
magnitude smaller than the occurrence probability of either minimum cut sets. Based 
on this idea, the occurrence probability of the top event can be approximated as the 
sum of the occurrence probabilities of all the minimum cut sets, which is called rare 
event approximation [Bedford and Cooke 2001]. Once the fault trees and event trees 
are built with a commercial software tool such as Isograph and the input parameters 
are set, the minimum cut sets can be generated and associated with a risk scenario. 
The codes of the events composing the risk scenarios can then be output into a plain 
text file such as MS Excel. We can then program with MS Excel VBA on the events 
composing the risk scenarios to mimic the original computer model. MS Excel is a 
very popular software tool that offers easy access to the data. It is therefore easy to 
conduct simulations of the mimic model for uncertainty assessment. The mimic 
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model also offers a transparent structure so that we can calculate the variance of the 
mimic model through algebraic operations. 
 
As assumed above, in this research we study the uncertainty in the basic events of the 
fault trees and the uncertainty the consequences of the event trees; we then calculate 
the uncertainty propagation through the fault trees and event trees. The uncertainty in 
the basic events and the uncertainty in the consequences are assumed to be 
independent. However the uncertainty in the basic events is assumed to follow a joint 
normal distribution. For conducting the uncertainty analysis, the basic events need to 
be expressed as the linear transformation of a set of independent standard normal 
variables. We select a linear transformation that is suitable for the context of risk 
analysis. Usually we implement the linear transformation through the Cholesky 
decomposition of the covariance matrix [Scheuer and Stoller 1962]. The Cholesky 
algorithm requires that the covariance matrix must be positive definite [Scheuer and 
Stoller 1962]. In the context of risk analysis, however, the covariance matrix can be 
positive semi-definite. To solve this problem, we select the linear transformation 
through the decomposition vectors and eigenvalues, which is called eigen-
decomposition. Furthermore, in the context of risk analysis, the variance of the input 
parameters can be very small. The variance of the precursors related to the HET-12 
in the RSSB-SRM, for example, spreads over 2419 10~10 −−  [Harrison, Griffin et al. 
2008]. For such a covariance matrix, the calculation of the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors is more expensive and large errors can be incurred [Wilkinson 1965; 
Watkins 1991]. To solve this problem, we implement the linear transformation 
through the eigen-decomposition of the correlation matrix instead of the covariance 
matrix. 
 
Based on the linear transformation, we then develop Monte-Carlo simulations to 
build the empirical distribution of the output. We also develop the analytical solution 
for the variance through algebraic operations. The two methods are implemented 
independently and therefore can be used for cross-check for each other. 
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We then design the software to implement the above methods. The software is 
implemented on MS Excel workbooks and therefore can be conveniently installed 
and run in applications. The software is validated in three stages including: (1) 
validate the mimic model; (2) validate the correctness of the methods and the 
software; (3) validate the robustness of the methods and the software. 
 
As a summary, the methods developed in this research can be applied directly with 
the computer models of the fault trees and event trees that are built with commercial 
software tools. The methods for assessing the uncertainty in the output is able to 
work efficiently even for a large model containing tens of thousands of risk scenarios. 
 
7.2.4 Case Studies 
As a validation of the developed methods, in this research we conduct two case 
studies of assessing the uncertainties in the output of a Fault-tree and Event-tree 
model. 
 
The case studies are made on the Safety Risk Model (SRM) developed by the Rail 
Safety and Standards Board (RSSB). The RSSB-SRM is composed of a series of 
Fault-tree and Event tree models corresponding to the 125 hazardous events 
respectively. Currently the “best-estimated” values are set to the input parameters; 
consequently a point estimation of the yearly equivalent expected fatalities can be 
obtained from the model [Dennis 2006]. To support decision making, the assessment 
of the uncertainty in the output is needed. It therefore offers good case studies to test 
the procedure and the methods developed in this research. Our case studies are 
conducted on the hazardous events HET10 and HET12 as they are the two largest 
contributors to the safety risk in RSSB-SRM [Dennis 2006]. 
 
For the both case study, we build the covariance matrices for the precursors by the 
procedure developed in Chapter 3. The case studies show that the experts are 
satisfied to use uncertainty factors as a structure to define the correlations among a 
set of input parameters. The experts feel also confident to make the qualitative 
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assessment of the correlations regarding the uncertainty factors. In conjunction with 
the benchmark technique as used in Crystal Ball [ORACLE 2008], qualitative 
assessment proves an efficient way for eliciting the correlations regarding a large 
number of uncertainty factors. By the procedure developed in Chapter 3, the 
assessments of the correlations regarding the uncertainty factors are monitored 
during the process. The case studies show that such a monitoring scheme helps the 
experts to adjust their assessment. With the monitoring scheme, the outcome 
correlation matrices are guaranteed to be positive semi-definite. The standard 
deviations of the precursors are derived within the associated families. The case 
studies also demonstrate that the experts are confident to make the assessment on the 
waiting time percentile of a precursor family rather than the individual precursors. 
 
For the both case studies, the uncertainty in the rule sets is modelled on the injury 
atoms by the methods developed in Chapter 4. The case studies demonstrate that the 
experts are confident in identifying the hazard types and structuring the rule sets in 
terms of the injury atoms. Modelling on the injury atoms is demonstrated as an 
efficient way to model the uncertainty in the rule sets including the dependence and 
the order relationship among the rule sets. 
 
Based on the uncertainty models in the precursors and the rule sets built above, the 
uncertainty of the output is assessed by the methods developed in Chapter 6 for the 
both case studies respectively. The case studies demonstrate that the Excel mimic 
model is a reliable and efficient way to representing the Fault-tree and Event-tree 
models. With the case studies, the analytical solutions of the variance match the 
results from the simulations very well. It shows that the analytical solution is a robust 
way even for a large mimic model of tens of thousands of risk scenarios. The case 
studies also show that the corresponding software tools developed in this research are 
correct and reliable. 
 
As the RSSB-SRM HET10 and HET12 represent typical Fault-tree and Event-tree 
models, the case studies demonstrate that the procedure and the methods developed 
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in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are efficient for conducting the subjective uncertainty analysis 
of Fault-tree and Event-tree models. 
 
7.3 Validation of the Development 
The developments are validated in three stages. In the first stage, all the assumptions 
taken in this research are well discussed and agreed with the experts in RSSB. RSSB 
is dedicated to achieving continuous improvement in the safety performance on the 
Great Britain mainline railway. RSSB has built the SRM to measure the risk and the 
underlying causes, which has been updated to its 5th version by 2006. During the 
process, the experts in RSSB have gained substantial knowledge and experience in 
risk analysis and expert judgement elicitation. All the assumptions taken in this 
research have been validated by the experts in RSSB. 
 
In the second stage, the developments based on assumptions are made based on 
mathematical and statistical methods and theories. The developments therefore are 
validated automatically. 
 
In the third stage, we use case studies to validate the practical performance of the 
developments of this research. The developed procedure and methods work smoothly 
with the case studies. The experts are confident with making assessments following 
the procedure and the methods developed in this research. The methods for 
calculating the uncertainty propagation through the fault trees and event trees work 
efficiently even when tens of thousands of risk scenarios are included [Harrison, 
Griffin et al. 2008]. 
 
7.4 Future Research 
7.4.1 The Method for Modelling the Uncertainty in the Numbers of 
the People Exposed to the Risk Scenarios 
As discussed before, a number of people are supposed to be exposed to each risk 
scenario. The number needs to be elicited from the experts for each risk scenario. In 
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this research, the number is set as the best-estimated value. However, we cannot 
assess this number for sure as for the basic events and the rule sets. We therefore 
need to model the subjective uncertainty in the numbers of people exposed to the risk 
scenarios and include it in the uncertainty analysis of the fault trees and event trees. 
 
For epistemic uncertainty analysis, we model the uncertainty in the means of the 
numbers of people exposed to the risk scenarios and the possible dependence. As we 
usually do in modelling high dimensional dependence [Kurowicka and Cooke 2006], 
we can assume parametrical marginal distributions for the means of the numbers and 
then model the dependence separately. The means, however, can have monotonicity 
property: the mean of the number of people exposed to one risk scenario is always 
larger than that to another risk scenario. It brings more difficulties in modelling the 
uncertainty in the means of the numbers of people exposed to the risk scenarios. 
 
7.4.2 The Methods for Building the Uncertainty in the Outcome 
Probabilities of the Escalation Events 
In an event tree, the escalation events can take different outcomes that affect the final 
consequences. Each outcome is associated with a probability that needs to be elicited 
from the experts. However, we can not assess the probability for sure as for others 
input parameters. The subjective uncertainty in the probabilities therefore needs to be 
modelled and included in the uncertainty analysis of the fault trees and event trees. 
 
Typically the escalation events take two outcomes: yes or no. For such an escalation 
event, we can assume that probability of one outcome, say “yes”, follows a Beta 
distribution and the distribution can be built through expert judgement elicitation. 
When an escalation event has multiple outcomes, the uncertainty of the probabilities 
can be assumed to follow a Dirichlet distribution. We need to select or develop a 
method for building the distributions through expert judgement elicitation. 
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7.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
After the uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis can be conducted to identify the 
most important input parameters in terms of the contributions to the uncertainty of 
the risk assessment model. More efforts can then be exerted to reduce the uncertainty 
in these important input parameters so that uncertainty of the output can be reduced 
most efficiently. Many methods have been developed for conducting sensitivity 
analysis [Saltelli, Chan et al. 2000; Saltelli 2004]. We need however to choose the 
suitable ones for a large risk assessment model composed of fault trees and event 
trees. 
 
7.4.4 Approximate Probability Distribution of the Sum of Products 
of Continuous Random Variables 
As discussed before, the fault trees and event trees can be approximated by the sum 
of products of the input parameters corresponding to the risk scenarios. For 
uncertainty analysis, it is desirable to derive the analytical distribution function of the 
output of such a model. However, the analytical probability distribution has not been 
developed for the product of two random variables except for some special cases. 
 
As presented in Appendix A, we propose an approximate analytical solution of the 
probability distribution of the product of two random variables of a general joint 
distribution. Because normal random variables are used in the case studies of this 
research, we implement as an example the approximate probability distribution for 
two normal random variables. For two independent standard normal random 
variables, the approximate distribution is compared with the analytical distribution 
that has already been derived. For two correlated normal random variables, the 
approximate distribution is compared with the simulations. 
 
The approximate analytical solution is further expanded for the product of multiple 
random variables and for the sum of the products of random variables. The random 
variables are dealt with sequentially and only one random variable is discretised at 
each step. The method is therefore suitable for large models while it is very difficult 
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if possible to cope with the all random variables simultaneously. We test the 
expanded approximate distribution model with the product of three correlated normal 
random variables. The approximate distribution is compared with the simulations and 
shows high accuracy. 
 
The approximate analytical solutions have shown their potential to be used for 
uncertainty analysis of fault trees and event trees. However they are still not 
applicable in practice. More efforts are needed to measure and control the 
computation error. Once it is achieved, we can build the approximate analytical 
distribution function of the output of a risk assessment model composed of fault trees 
and event trees. The approximate probability distribution has the promising features 
compared with building the empirical distribution based on the simulations. 
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Appendix A  
 
Approximate Probability Distribution of the Sum of 
Products of Continuous Random Variables 
 
 
A.1 Introduction 
When the rare event approximation is applied with the Fault-tree [Bedford and 
Cooke 2001], the Fault-tree and Event-tree models can be expressed as the sum of 
products of the input parameters as 
 
 
( ) ∑∏
∈
==
ℓ ℓ
⋯⋯
Rp
ini
i
ppppfr ,,,,1  
 
where ℓR  stands for a risk path composing of the input parameters ip .  
 
For probabilistic uncertainty analysis, it is desirable to obtain the analytical 
probability distribution of the output. Building the distribution of the product of 
random variables has also a wide range of applications such as radio propagation 
[Salo, El-Sallabi et al. 2006], Bioinformatics [Brown and Alexander 1991] and 
finance engineering [Nadarajah and Ali 2006] etc. 
 
Suppose X and Y are two random variables with the joint probability distribution 
( )yxf YX ,, . The distribution of XYA =  can be expressed through their joint 
distribution as 
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From this equation, the analytical solution of ( )af A  can be obtained only for some 
specific cases such as independent ( )1,0~ NX  and ( )1,0~ NY , and independent 
( )1,0~ UX  and ( )1,0~ UY  [Glen, Leemis et al. 2004]. 
 
Efforts have also been exerted to derive the analytical solution to ( )af A  through 
Mellin transform [Fox 1961; Springer 1979]. The method based on Mellin transform 
can be extended for the product of n independent identical normal variables, negative 
exponential variables, Weibull variables, and Gamma variables respectively 
[Springer and Thompson 1966; Lomnicki 1967; Springer and Thompson 1970]. The 
method is recently extended for independent Rayleigh random variables as well [Salo, 
El-Sallabi et al. 2006]. The analytical solution of ( )af A  can also be developed when 
X and Y are distributed by Lawrance Lewis’s bivariate exponential distribution 
[Nadarajah and Ali 2006]. 
 
We can see, however, the analytical solution of ( )af A  has not been derived for many 
other cases especially for dependent variables. In this chapter, we are going to 
propose a new way to build an approximate analytical solution of ( )af A . The 
approximate analytical solution can be applied for two random variables of a generic 
joint distribution. The approximate solution is then extended for the product of 
multiple random variables and is extended further to the sum of products of random 
variables of a generic joint distribution. Some examples of the approximate 
analytical solutions are included for demonstration. 
 
The approximate analytical solutions however are still not applicable in practice. 
More efforts, for example, are still needed to measure and control the computation 
error. We are going to show that the approximate analytical solutions potentially 
offer a new way to cope with a difficult task. We do not claim that these approximate 
analytical solutions have been soundly developed. 
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A.2 Mixture Distribution Model 
A finite mixture distribution model is defined in [Titterington 1985; Bishop 1995; 
Mclachlan and Peel 2000] as  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )xfxfxp KKλλ ++= ⋯11  (A.1) 
 
where  
 
0>kλ Kk ,,1⋯= ; 1
,1
=∑
= Kk
kλ  
 
( ) 0≥xf k , ( ) 1=∫X k dxxf  
 
Following [Titterington 1985; Bishop 1995; Mclachlan and Peel 2000], the 
parameters kλ  are called mixing weight and ( )xf k  the component densities of the 
mixture. 
 
When the all component densities belong to the same parametric family, the mixture 
distribution model defined in Equation A.1 becomes 
 
 ( ) ( )∑
=
⋅=
Kk
kk θxfxp
,1
λ  (A.2) 
 
where kθ  denotes the parameter occurring in the k
th
 component associated with kλ . 
 
The mixture weights ( )Kλλλ ,,1 ⋯=  can also be thought of as a discrete prior 
distribution on the parameters kθ  [Titterington 1985]. When the parameter θ  is 
defined on a continuous domain, the mixture weight is defined by the weight 
distribution ( )θλ  that satisfies 
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( ) 0>θλ ; ( ) 1=∫θ θθλ d  
 
Correspondingly a continuous mixture distribution model can be defined as in 
[Gelman, Carlin et al. 2003] as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )∫= θ θθλ dθxfxp  (A.3) 
 
From the above mixture distribution models, an analytical solution of the distribution 
of the product of random variables is to be derived. 
 
A.3 Distribution of Product of Two Random Variables 
A.3.1 Mixture Distribution Model for Product of Two Random 
Variables 
Suppose X and Y are two continuous random variables with the joint distribution 
( )yxf YX ,, . The joint distribution can be expressed as [Ross 2003]: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )yfxfyxf
xXYXYX =⋅=,,  (A.4) 
 
where ( )xf X  is the marginal distribution of X and ( )yf xXY =  is the distribution of Y 
conditional on xX = . 
 
Suppose 
 
 YXA ⋅=  (A.5) 
 
We need to derive the distribution of A denoted as ( )af A . From Equation A.5, the 
distribution of A conditional on 0≠= xX  can be derived by standard transformation 
of variables as 
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We can then treat ( )af
xXA =  as the component and ( )xf X  the weight density of a 
mixture distribution model as defined in Equation A.3. Subsequently, ( )af A  can be 
defined as a mixture distribution model as 
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af
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dxxfafaf
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Equation A.7 defines the distribution function ( )af A  as integral over X. For some 
types of ( )yf
xXY = , a closed form of ( )af A  can be derived from the integration. For 
general conditional distribution ( )yf
xXY = , the integral can be approximated with the 
summation based on a discretisation of X. We have shown that ( )af
xXA =  is a 
parametric function of a, which can be derived from the parametric function 
( )yf
xXY =  given xX =  by Equation A.6. An approximate analytical function to 
( )af A  will be derived as the sum of the parametric functions of the form ( )af xXA =  
accordingly. 
 
A.3.2 Approximate Distribution Function 
Based on Equation A.7, the support of X can be partitioned into K  intervals by 
setting 1+K  borders kBx , , Kk ,,0 ⋯=  , where KBkBB xxx ,,0, <<<< ⋯⋯ . The two 
terminal borders 0,Bx  and KBx ,  are set as the bounds of X. When X is defined on 
( )+∞∞− , , 0,Bx  and KBx ,  can be defined by 
 
( ) TPBxF BX =0, , ( ) TPBxF KBX −= 1,  
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where ( )xFX  represents the cumulative probability of X; TPB represents the truncated 
probability bound and should be a small positive real number. 
 
Denote the interval [ ]kBkB xx ,1, ,−  as kIX , . The probability of kIXx ,∈  is defined as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1,,,Pr −−=∈= kBXkBXkIk xFxFXxm  (A.8) 
 
For each interval kIX , , a point kIk Xx ,∈  can be chosen as the representative. For 
instance, the representative can be simply set as the middle point as 
 
( ) 2
,1, kBkBk xxx += −  
 
The continuous random variable X is now discretised as 
 
 ( ) kk mxX ==Pr , Kk ,,1⋯=  (A.9) 
 
We have shown that ( )af
xXA =  is a parametric function of a, which can be derived 
from the parametric function ( )yf
xXY =  given xX =  by Equation A.6. 
Corresponding to the discretisation of X, the component ( )af
xXA =  can be 
approximated with ( )af
kxXA =
 for kXx ∈ . The integral in Equation A.7 can then be 
approximated with the following summation 
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 (A.10) 
 
When the parametric function ( )yf
xXY =  is known, the distribution function ( )ag A  is 
defined by Equation A.10 as an approximation to ( )afA  that itself cannot be derived 
explicitly for X and Y of a general joint distribution. The definition of ( )ag A  is 
demonstrated in Fig. A.1. We can see that ( )ag A  is an approximate analytical 
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solution that is a function of a. It therefore is different from the traditional numerical 
integral that calculates a discrete probability density of A =a. Therefore the 
traditional integration methods as summarized in [Burden and Faires 1997] are not 
suitable to generate the approximate distribution ( )ag A  defined in Equation A.10 
from the original integral defined in Equation A.11. Based on the mixture probability 
model defined in Equations A.3 and A.2, we actually propose a way to discretised X 
by the marginal distribution ( )xf X , the conditional distribution ( )yf XY 1=  and the 
inverse curve x1 . We are going to discuss the method for discretising X in more 
details. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A.1. The illustration for building the approximate parametric function of the 
distribution of the product of two continuous random variables 
 
 
By comparing Equation A.7 and A.10, we can see that the computation errors are 
incurred when partitioning X into the intervals kIX , . Define 1,, −−=∆ kBkBk xxx . Firstly 
the component weight density in Equation A.7 is defined by ( )xfX  while it is 
approximated with kk xm ∆  for kXx ∈  in Equation A.10. Secondly the scaling 
coefficient in Equation A.7 is defined by x1 ; while it is approximated with kx1  for 
kXx ∈  in Equation A.10. Thirdly the conditional distribution in Equation A.7 is 
( ) ( )
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defined by ( )yf
xXY = ; while it is approximated with ( )yf kxXY =  for kXx ∈  in 
Equation A.10. By properly setting 0,Bx , KBx ,  and kx  for Kk ,1=  the variability of 
( )xfX , x1  and ( )yf xXY =  can be controlled for kIXx ,∈ . Subsequently the overall 
error can be controlled within an acceptable level. Some general principles include: 
• Keep smaller kx∆  where there is a larger absolute value for ( )xfdx
d
X , ( )xdx
d 1  
or ( )yxf
xy YX
,
,∂
∂
∂
∂
; 
• When the jump discontinuity points of ( )xfX  and ( )yxf YX ,,  exist, they have to 
be set as a border kBx , ; 
• For unbounded X, the borders 0,Bx  and KBx ,  must be set to ensure the 
probability [ ]( )KBB xxX ,0, ,Pr ∈  is large enough and the impact of the truncated 
probability has to be accounted properly. 
• A singular point of Equation A.7 exists at 0=X . In case of [ ]KBB xx ,0, ,0∈ , 
three successive borders must be set at δ− , 0 and δ  where 0>δ  is a small 
real number specified for the expected accuracy. 
 
We are going to test the above methods by building the distribution of two normal 
random variables because they are used popularly for many applications including 
RSSB-SRM on which the case studies are to be carried in this research. We will test 
the impact of the different settings of TPB, kBx , , kx  on the approximation accuracy 
of the mixture model defined in Equation A.10. 
 
A.3.3 Distribution of the Product of two Normal Random Variables 
A.3.3.1 Approximate Probability Distribution Function 
The analytical solution of the distribution of the product of two independent standard 
normal variables can be built based on Bessel function [Weisstein ; Springer 1979; 
Glen, Leemis et al. 2004]. For two general normal random variables, however, no 
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analytical solution has been found in the literature. We develop the approximate 
distribution function of the product of two general normal variables by Equation 
A.10. This approximate function is then implemented with two independent standard 
normal variables, and two correlated normal variables respectively. 
 
Suppose that X and Y are two normal random variables denoted as ( )XXNX σµ ,~  
and ( )YYNY σµ ,~ , where Xµ  and Yµ  are the mean of X and Y respectively; Xσ  
and Xσ  are the standard deviation of X and Y respectively. Denote the correlation 
between X and Y as ( )YXr , . The joint distribution of X and Y is completely defined 
by Xµ , Yµ , Xσ , Xσ  and ( )YXr , . 
 
The conditional distribution of Y given xX =  is still a normal distribution that is 
defined as given in [Tong 1990] as 
 
 ( ) ( )
xXYxXYxXY Nyf === = σµ ,  (A.11) 
 
where 
 
 ( ) ( )X
X
Y
YxXY xYXr µσ
σµµ −+=
=
,  (A.12) 
 
 ( )YXrYxXY ,1−== σσ  (A.13) 
 
Based on Equation A.5, the product A given xX =  is normally distributed as well 
[Ross 2003]. The conditional distribution of A in Equation A.6 can be defined as 
 
 ( ) ( )
xXAxXAxXA Naf === = σµ ,  (A.14) 
 
where 
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( ) ( )




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−+⋅=⋅=
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YxXYxXA xYXrxx µσ
σµµµ ,  (A.15) 
 
 ( )YXrxx YxXYxXA ,1−⋅=⋅= == σσσ  (A.16) 
 
Based on Equation A.10 the approximate distribution of A can be derived as 
 
 ( ) ( )∑
=
==
⋅=
Kk
xXAxXAkA kk
Nmag
,1
,σµ  (A.17) 
 
Equation A.17 defines the approximate analytical distribution of the product of two 
normal random variables as a mixture model of a set of normal distributions. Three 
examples are made by using the software package MATLAB to demonstrate the 
performance of this mixture model. The simulation samples of X and Y are generated 
directly by using MATLAB function mvnrnd() 
 
A.3.3.2 Example 1: Uncorrelated Standard Normal X and Y  
Suppose that X and Y are standard normal random variable denoted as ( )1,0~ NX  
and ( )1,0~ NY . Suppose also ( ) 0, =YXr . The analytical solution of ( )af A  has been 
derived based on Bessel function in [Weisstein; Springer 1979; Glen, Leemis et al. 
2004] as 
 
 ( ) ( )
pi
aK
af A 0= , 0≠a  (A.18) 
 
where ( )0K  is a modified Bessel function of the second kind. 
 
We are going to derive the approximated distribution ( )ag A  as defined in Equation 
A.17. We then compare the approximate distribution with the analytical solution. 
 
Because X and Y are independent, we have 
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 0==
= YxXY µµ  
 
 1==
= YxXY σσ  
 
As defined in Equations A.15 and A.16, the component mean and standard deviation 
are calculated as 
 
 0=⋅=
== xXYxXA x µµ  
 
 xx
xXYxXA =⋅= == σσ  
 
We start with setting the TPB as 1e-8 and discretise X by keeping the same value of 
( ) ( )1,, −− kBXkBX xfxf . The representative point is set as ( ) 21,, −−= kBkBk xxx . Based 
on Equation A.17, two mixture models are built with 16 and 200 components for 
comparison. The weight, the mean and the standard deviation of the 16 components 
are defined in Table A.1. For this example, we can see that the components are 
symmetrically defined corresponding to the symmetric samples of X. Therefore the 
approximate distribution can actually be defined by 8 components and 100 
components respectively. 
 
 
Table A.1 Normal-components of the approximate distribution of the product of two 
independent standard normal random variables 
No. Mixing Weight Component Mean Component Std 
1. 5.00E-11 0 12.934 
2. 0.024261 0 3.2891 
3. 0.032463 0 1.7462 
4. 0.039774 0 1.4284 
5. 0.048544 0 1.1712 
6. 0.060971 0 0.93255 
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7. 0.083349 0 0.68178 
8. 0.21064 0 0.26696 
9. 0.21064 0 0.26696 
10. 0.083349 0 0.68178 
11. 0.060971 0 0.93255 
12. 0.048544 0 1.1712 
13. 0.039774 0 1.4284 
14. 0.032463 0 1.7462 
15. 0.024261 0 3.2891 
16. 5.00E-11 0 12.934 
 
 
For comparison, the 8-component approximate distribution and the 100-component 
approximate distribution are plotted together with the analytical distribution in Fig. 
A.2 (a) and (b) respectively. To demonstrate the difference further, we plot the ratio 
of the analytical distribution to the approximate distribution, i.e. ( ) ( )agaf AA , in Fig. 
A.3 (a) and (b) for the two approximate distributions respectively. The plots 
demonstrate that the approximate distributions coincides with the analytical 
distribution very well except in a small area around 0=A . The reason is that the 
approximate distribution has a finite density value for 0=A  while the analytical 
distribution has an infinite definition for 0=A . We can however gain higher 
accuracy by including more components in the approximate distribution. 
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(a) for the approximate distribution of 8 components 
 
 
(b) for the approximate distribution of 100 components 
 
Fig. A.2 The analytical distribution and the approximated distribution of the product 
of two independent standard normal random variables 
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(a) for the approximate distribution of 8 components 
 
 
(b) for the approximate distribution of 100 components 
 
Fig. A.3 The ratio between the analytical distribution and the approximate 
distribution of the product of two independent standard normal random variables  
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A.3.3.3 Example 2: Uncorrelated non-standard Normal X and Y 
We design this example to demonstrate the performance of the approximate 
distribution of the product of two independent normal variables that have non-zero 
means. We consider X~N(12, 0.4), Y~N(3, 0.2) and ( ) 0, =YXr . For such a case, the 
analytical distribution ( )af XYA=  has not been found in the literature. The analytical 
mean and the standard deviation however can be calculated by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 36=== YEXEXYEAE  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )YXXEYYEXXYA varvarvarvarvarvar 22 ⋅+⋅+⋅==  
 
( ) ( ) 7692.68447387var == AAσ  
 
We define the relative errors as  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )AEAEAE ag A −=Eerr  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )AAA ag A σσσσ −=err  
 
where ( ) ( )ag AAE  and ( ) ( )ag AAσ  stand for the mean and standard deviation that are 
calculated from the approximate distribution ( )ag A . 
 
The relative errors are used to measure the performance of the approximate 
distribution model with different implementation settings. As summarised in Table 
A.2, three implementation cases are defined with the combinations of the ways to 
delimit the borders kBx ,  and the ways to treat the truncated probability. For all the 
three cases, the representative kx  is set by equally dividing km , i.e. by satisfying 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 21,, kkBXkXkXkBX mxFxFxFxF =−=− −  
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For all the three cases, the random variable X is discretised into 300, 500, 800, 1000, 
1600 and 2000 points respectively; and TPB is set as 1e-5, 1e-6, 1e-8, and 1e-10 
respectively. 
 
 
Table A.2. The cases of Example 1 for building the distribution of A=XY 
 Treatment of the truncated 
probabilities 
Delimiting borders 
kBx , , for 11 −= Kk ⋯   
Case 1 
Fig. A.2  
(a), (b) 
Attributed to a representative 
20,Bx  for [ ]0,, Bx∞−  and KBx ,2  
for [ ]+∞,
,KBx  respectively. 
Set kBx ,  by equally dividing the 
density curve, i.e. keep constant 
( ) ( )1,, −− kBXkBX xfxf  
Case 2 
Fig. A.2  
(c), (d) 
Attributed to a representative 
20,Bx  for [ ]0,, Bx∞−  and KBx ,2  
for [ ]+∞,
,KBx  respectively. 
Set kBx ,  by equally dividing the 
inverse curve, i.e. keep constant 
kBkB xx ,1,
11
−
−
 
Case 3 
Fig. A.2 
(e), (f) 
Attributed to 1x  for [ ]1,0, , BB xx  
and Kx  for [ ]KBKB xx ,1, ,−  
respectively 
Set kBx ,  by equally dividing the 
inverse curve, i.e. keep constant 
kBkB xx ,1,
11
−
−
 
 
 
In Fig. A.4 (a)-(f), we plot the relative errors against TPB and the discretisation 
number for the three cases respectively. For all the three cases, it shows that TPB and 
the discretisation number can change the accuracy subject to the pattern defined by 
the other two factors. The minimum relative errors given under the diagrams 
demonstrate that the approximate distribution can achieve very high accuracy with 
affordable computation load. 
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We now compare the performance of the three cases based on the relative errors that 
are illustrated in Fig. A.4. By comparing Fig. A.4 (a) and Fig. A.4 (c), we can find 
that Case 1 shows higher accuracy on the mean of A. By comparing Fig. A.4 (b) and 
Fig. A.4 (d), however, we can find that Case 1 shows poorer accuracy on the 
standard deviation of A than Case 2. As summarized in Table A.2, Case 1 and Case 2 
have the same way to attribute the truncated probabilities. The borders kBx ,  are set 
by uniformly dividing the density curve in Case 1; while the borders kBx ,  are set by 
uniformly dividing the inverse curve in Case 2. Therefore we cannot see either way 
for setting the borders kBx ,  in Case 1 and Case 2 is better. 
 
By comparing Fig. A.4 (c) with Fig. A.4 (e) and comparing Fig. A.4 (d) with Fig. 
A.4 (f), we can see that Case 2 has higher accuracy on both the mean and the 
standard deviation of A than Case 3 does. Case 2 and Case 3 have the same way to 
set the borders kBx , . In Case 2 the truncated probabilities are attributed to two extra 
samples 20,Bx  and KBx ,2  on the both sides respectively. In Case 3, however, the 
truncated probabilities are attributed to the two terminal samples 1x  and Kx  
respectively. It shows that the treatment of the truncated probabilities can make a 
significant difference and Case 2 represent a set of implementation settings of better 
performance. 
 
Fig. A.5 illustrates the approximate distribution ( )ag A  that is built by Case 2 with 
2000 discretisation points of X and TPB set as 1e-10. The Q-Q plot of ( )ag A  against 
60000 simulations of A is also drawn on Fig. A.5. We can see that the Q-Q plot 
coincides with the Q=Q line very well. It shows that ( )ag A  is a good approximation 
to the real distribution ( )af A . The relative errors of the mean and standard deviation 
are about 8.0e-9 and 7.4e-7 respectively. 
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Fig. A.4. The illustration of the relative errors of Example 1. The cases are defined in 
Table A.2. 
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Fig. A.5. This diagram illustrates the approximate probability distribution of A=XY 
where X~N(12, 0.4), Y~N(3, 0.2) and ( ) 0, =YXr . The green solid curve represents 
the approximate probability distribution ( )ag A  that is built from Case 2 in Table A.2. 
The blue dash-dot curve represents the Q-Q plot against the 60000 simulations of A. 
The magenta dash line stands for Q=Q line. 
 
 
A.3.3.4 Example 3: Strongly Correlated X and Y 
In this example, we test the performance of the approximate probability distribution 
( )ag A  for correlated normal variables X and Y. As in Example 2, we set X~N(12, 0.4) 
and Y~N(3, 0.2). We set the correlation as ( ) 99999.0, =YXr . The borders kBx , , the 
representative kx  and the truncated probabilities are set in the same as in Case 2 of 
Example 2. The TPB is set as 1e-10. We build the approximate probability 
distribution ( )ag A  with 600 and 3000 discretisation points of X respectively. The 
probability distributions are plotted in Figs A.6 (a) and (b) respectively. The Q-Q 
plots against 60000 simulations of A are added in Fig. A.6 as well. 
 
As illustrated in Fig. A.6 (a), the approximate probability distribution corresponding 
to 600 discretisation points of X shows lots of spikes; and correspondingly the Q-Q 
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plot demonstrates lots of very small waves apart from the Q=Q. Comparatively, as 
illustrated in Fig. A.6 (b), the approximate probability distribution corresponding to 
3000 discretisation points of X is very smooth and the Q-Q plot shows little diversion 
from the Q=Q line. It implies huge error of the approximate probability distribution 
corresponding to 600 discretisation points of X. We will show that the reason is due 
to the strong correlation between X and Y, which causes large change in ( )yf
xXY =  for 
[ ]kBkB xxx ,1, ,−∈ . 
 
The bivariate joint distribution of X and Y is defined as 
 
 ( ) ( ) 













−+
−
−
−
=
yx
xy
yxxyxyyx
YX
xyyxyxf
σσ
ρ
σσρρσpiσ
2
12
1
exp
12
1
, 2
2
2
2
22,
 (A.19) 
 
where yx,ρ  is the correlation coefficient between X and Y. 
 
The partial derivative of the joint distribution is derived as 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )yxf
yxf
yxfyxf
xy
YX
YX
YX
yx
yx
yx
YX
,1025.6
,
99999.01
99999.0
4.02.0
1
,
1
1
,
,
5
,2
,2
,
,
,
⋅×=
⋅
−
⋅
×
=
⋅
−
⋅=
∂
∂
∂
∂
ρ
ρ
σσ
 (A.20) 
 
Equations A.20 shows that the derivative is more than 51025.6 ×  times the density 
when ( ) 99999.0, =YXr . It means huge variability of ( )yf
xXY =  and requires high 
discretisation number of X as discussed previously. This fact can be demonstrated by 
Equations A.12 and A.13 as well, from which we have 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )( )XY
X
X
Y
YxXA
xx
xYXrx
µµ
µ
σ
σµµ
−+⋅=






−+⋅=
=
5.0
,
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 ( ) xYXrx YxXA ⋅×=−⋅= −= 41032.6,1σσ  
 
When X changes from x  to xx ∆+ , 0>∆x , we have the offset 
 
( )( ) ( ) xxxx
xXAxxXA ∆−+∆∆=− =∆+= 35.0µµ  
 
When we set TPB as 1e-10, we have 4.90, =Bx , 6.14, =KBx . Because KBB xxx ,0, << , 
we have 
 
3103.9 −
=
×<
xXAσ  
 
x
xXAxxXA ∆⋅>− =∆+= 4.6µµ  
 
When we use 600 discretisation points of X, the average width x∆  is 
( ) 30,, 107.8600 −×=− BKB xx . Therefore we have 2105.5 −=∆+= ×>− xXAxxXA µµ , 
which is 5.9 time the 
xXA =σ . As defined in Equation A.14, ( )af xXA =  is the 
probability distribution of a normal variable of the mean 
xXA =µ  and the standard 
deviation 
xXA =σ . Therefore a huge error is encountered when we use ( )af kxXA =  as a 
representative of ( )af
xXA = , for [ ]kBkB xxx ,1, ,−∈ . It explains why the approximate 
probability distribution built with 600 discretisation points of X shows many spikes 
in Fig A.6 (a). When we increase the discretisation points of X to 3000, we have 
2101.1 −
=∆+= ×>− xXAxxXA µµ , which is 1.17 time the xXA =σ . The error in 
representing ( )af
xXA = , for [ ]kBkB xxx ,1, ,−∈  by ( )af kxXA =  is therefore much less than 
that with 600 discretisation points of X. A smooth approximate probability 
distribution is then obtained as shown in Fig A.6 (b). 
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As a summary, this example demonstrates that the approximate probability 
distribution as defined in Equation A.17 is able to deal with the strongly correlated 
normal random variables. It shows also that we need to much more discretisation 
points of X for strongly correlated X and Y to achieve acceptable accuracy. More 
generally it exemplifies the principle for discretising X regarding a large derivative of 
the joint distribution, i.e. ( )yxf
xy YX
,
,∂
∂
∂
∂
. 
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(a) for 600 discretisation points of X 
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(b) for 3000 discretisation points of X 
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Fig. A.6. These diagrams illustrate the approximate probability distributions of 
A=XY, where X~N(12, 0.4), Y~N(3, 0.2) and ( ) 99999.0, =YXr . The green solid 
curve represents the approximate probability distribution. The blue dash-dot curve 
represents the Q-Q plot against 6000 simulation of A. The magenta dash line stands 
for Q=Q line. 
 
 
A.4 Approximate Probability Distribution of the Product of 
Multiple Random Variables 
A.4.1 A Sequential Process 
A product of multiple random variables is defined as 
 
 ni
ni
XXX ⋯1
,1
=∏
=
 (A.21) 
 
where 2>n ; nXX ,,1 ⋯  are random variables. 
 
We suppose that the joint distribution of nXX ,,1 ⋯  is defined as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nXXXXXXnXX xfxfxfxxf nnn 111211 ,211, ,, ⋯⋯ ⋯⋯ −⋅=  (A.22) 
 
For reference convenience, the right sides of Equations A.21 and A.22 are called 
random variable chain (RVC) and the associated conditional distribution chain (CDC) 
respectively. As illustrated in Fig. A.7, the RVC and the associated CDC are put side 
by side to define the product. We start from the first row. The idea is to replace 1X  
and 2X  with 212 XXA =  that is called surrogate. For this purpose, we need to build 
the approximate marginal distribution ( )22 ag A  and, correspondingly, to update the 
CDC with ( ) ( ) ( )nAXXXAXA xgxgag nn 231232 ,32 ⋯⋯ −⋅⋅⋅ . After finishing these two tasks, 
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the original product i
ni
X
,1=
∏  can be approximated by i
ni
XA
,3
2
=
∏⋅  as defined on the 
second row. We then continue going down by defining iii XAA 1−=  for ni ,,3⋯=  
and repeating the above process. The last surrogate nA  approximates the original 
product i
ni
X
,1=
∏ . To implement the algorithm, the approximate marginal distribution 
( )iA ag i  needs to be built firstly, which can be implemented with the mixture model 
for two random variables as defined in Equation A.10. Secondly the associated CDC 
needs to be updated with iA  replacing 1−iA  and iX  at each stage, for which a new 
algorithm is to be developed based on Bayes' theorem. 
 
 
n
nn
nn
nn
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XA
XXA
XXXX
1
12
121
−
−
−
⋮⋮⋱
⋯
⋯
  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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( )nA
nAXnA
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nXXXXXX
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xfxfxf
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−
−
⋮
⋯
⋯
⋯
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Fig. A.7. The illustration of the process for building the approximate probability 
distribution of the product of multiple random variables nXX ,,1 ⋯ . 
 
 
A.4.2 Method for Updating the Conditional Distribution Chain 
Following the definitions given by Equations A.21 and A.22, the first surrogate A is 
defined as 
 
 21XXA =  (A.23) 
 
By substituting Equation A.23 with Equation A.21 we get a new RVC nXXA ⋯31 . 
We will build the CDC for nXXA ⋯31  based on the CDC defined in Equation A.22. 
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The random variable 1X  is discretised as defined in Equation A.9 as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) kkBXkBXk mxFxFxX ,11,1,1,11 11Pr =−== −  
 
where kx ,1  and km ,1  stand for a discrete point and the associated mess probability of 
1X  respectively. 
 
The approximate distribution ( )ag A  can then be built as a mixture model by 
Equation A.10. By Bayesian theorem [Bishop 1995], the probability of kxX ,11 =  
given aA =  can be derived as 
 
 ( ) ( )( )ag
afm
aAxX
A
xXAk
k
k,11,1
,11Pr
=
⋅
===  (A.24) 
 
As discussed previously, three successive borders are set at δ− , 0 and δ , 
where 0>δ , to avoid the singular point 0
,1 =kx  of Equation A.10. As a result, it is 
guaranteed that 0
,1 ≠kx , Kk ,,1⋯=∀ . Subsequently based on Equation A.24 we 
have 
 
 1,Pr
,11
,1
2 =







=== k
k
xXaA
x
aX  (A.25) 
 
Based on Equation A.24-A.25, we have 
 
 
( )
( )ag
afm
aA
x
aXxX
A
xXAk
k
k
k,11,1
,1
2,11 ,Pr
=
⋅
=







===  (A.26) 
 
The conditional distribution ( )33 xf aAX =  can be approximated as a mixture model as 
defined in Equation A.2 as 
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 ( ) ( )( ) ( )3,,,1
,1
3
,11
,1
23
,11
3
xf
ag
afm
xg
k
k
k
xX
x
aXXKk A
xXAk
aAX
===
=
=
⋅= ∑  (A.27) 
 
By the same way, we have the approximate conditional distribution defined as 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )nxX
x
aXxXXKk A
xXAk
naAxXxXX xf
ag
afm
xg
k
k
nnn
k
nnn
,11
,1
211
,11
3311
,,,,1
,1
,,,
====
=
===
−−
−−
⋅= ∑
⋯
⋯
  
  (A.28) 
 
Equations A.27 and A.28 define the CDC associated with RVC nXXA ⋯31 . 
 
A.4.3 Numerical Examples 
Following the examples in Section A.3.3, we consider three normal random variables 
X~N(12, 0.4), Y~N(3, 0.2) and Z~N(2, 0.4). The distribution of XYZB =  is to be 
built through one surrogate XYA = . At first stage, X is discretised and the 
approximate probability distribution ( )ag A  is built by Equation A.17. The TPB is set 
as 1e-5, 1e-6, 1e-8, and 1e-10 respectively. As in Case 2 in Example 2, the borders 
kBx ,  are delimited by equally dividing the inverse curve and the representative kx  for 
the interval [ ]kBkB xx ,1, ,−  is set by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2
,,1, kXkXkBXkBXkX mxFxFxFxF =−=− −  
 
where kXm ,  stands for the mess probability assigned for kx  as defined in Equation 
A.9. 
 
The truncated probability of X is attributed to the two extra points 20,Bx  and XKBx ,2 , 
where XK  standard for the discretisation number of X. 
 
 281 
By the above settings, the approximate probability distribution ( )ag A  is built at first. 
Based on ( )ag A , A is discretised in the same way as for X. The approximate 
probability distribution of B i.e. ( )bgB  is then built. 
 
The examples are implemented by using the software package MATLAB. The 
simulation samples of X, Y and Z are generated directly by using MATLAB function 
mvnrnd(). 
 
A.4.3.1 Example 4: Uncorrelated X, Y and Z 
In this example, we assume that X, Y and Z are uncorrelated. This example aims to 
demonstrate the computation errors of the approximate probability distribution ( )bgB . 
For such a case, the analytical distribution ( )bf XYZB=  has not been found in the 
literature. The analytical mean and the standard deviation of B however can be 
calculated by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 36=== YEXEXYEAE  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 72=== ZEAEAZEBE  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )YXXEYYEXXYA varvarvarvarvarvar 22 ⋅+⋅+⋅==  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ZAAEZZEAAZB varvarvarvarvarvar 22 ⋅+⋅+⋅==  
 
( ) ( ) 1844057983889.15var == BBσ  
 
Based on the analytical solution of ( )BE  and ( )Bσ , we define the relative errors as  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )BEBEBE bgB −=EB,err  
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )BBB bgB B σσσσ −=,err  
 
where ( ) ( )bgBBE  and ( ) ( )bgBBσ  stand for the mean and standard deviation of B that 
are calculated from the approximate distribution ( )bgB . 
 
The relative errors are used to measure the performance of the approximate 
distribution of B corresponding to the different settings of TPB and the different 
discretisation numbers of X and A as summarized in Table A.3. The relative errors 
are linearly represented with the size of the marks in Fig. A.8. The minimum relative 
errors are 2.5e-8 and 1.2e-7 for the mean and standard deviation respectively 
showing a very high accuracy of the approximate probability distribution ( )bgB . 
 
Fig. A.9 illustrates the approximate probability distribution ( )bgB  that is built with 
2000 and 3000 discretisation points of X and A respectively. The TPB is set as 1e-10. 
The Q-Q plot of ( )bgB  against 60000 simulation of B is also drawn on Fig. A.9. We 
can see that the Q-Q plot coincides with the Q=Q line very well. It shows that ( )bgB  
is a good approximation to the real distribution ( )bfB . 
 
 
Table A.3 The discretisation numbers of X and A 
No. Discretisation Number of X Discretisation Number of A 
1 300 300 
2 500 800 
3 800 1000 
4 1000 1600 
5 1600 2400 
6 2000 3000 
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(b) Relative error of the standard deviation 
Fig. A.8. These diagrams illustrate the relative errors of ( )bgB  corresponding to the 
different settings of TPB and the discretisation numbers. The mark size linearly 
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represents the relative errors. The minimum relative errors of the mean and standard 
deviation are 2.5e-8 and 1.2e-7 respectively. 
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Fig. A.9. This diagram illustrates the approximate probability distribution of B=XYZ, 
where X, Y and Z are uncorrelated normal random variable. The green solid curve 
represents the density of B. The blue dash-dot curve represents the Q-Q plot against 
the 60000 simulations. The magenta dash line stands for Q=Q line. 
 
 
A.4.3.2 Example 5: Correlated X, Y and Z 
This example aims to test the performance of the approximate probability 
distribution of B when X, Y and Z are correlated. Correlations are set as 
( ) 75.0, =YXr , ( ) 8.0, =ZXr  and ( ) 7.0, =ZYr . The same settings are used as for 
that illustrated in Fig. A.9 in Example 4. 
 
Fig. A.10 illustrates the outcome ( )bgB  and the Q-Q plot of ( )bgB  against 60000 
simulation of B. We can see that the Q-Q plot coincides with the Q=Q line very well. 
It shows that ( )bgB  is a good approximation to the real distribution ( )bfB . Due to the 
correlations, the distribution curve in Fig. A.10 skews to the right further than that in 
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Fig. A.9 does. The mode of the distribution curve moves leftwards from around 71.2 
in Fig. A.9 to around 68.2 in Fig. A.10. 
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Fig. A.10. This diagram illustrates the approximate probability distribution of 
B=XYZ, when X, Y and Z are correlated normal variables. The green solid curve 
represents the approximate probability distribution of B. The blue dash-dot curve 
represents the Q-Q plot against the 60000 simulations. The magenta dash line stands 
for Q=Q line. 
 
 
A.5 Approximate Probability Distribution of Sum of Products 
of Random Variables 
A.5.1 Approximate Probability Distribution of Sum of Two 
Random Variables 
Suppose 
 
 YXS +=  (A.29) 
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where X and Y are random variable. 
 
We suppose that X and Y have a general joint distribution defined as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )yfxfyxf
xXYXYX =⋅=,,  (A.30) 
 
Given xX =  the conditional distribution of S can be derived by shifting ( )yf
xXY =  as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )xsfsfsf
xXYxXSxXS −== ===  (A.31) 
 
Based on the mixture model as defined in Equation A.3, we have 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dxxfxsfdxxfsfsf XX xXYXX xXSS ∫∫ −== ==  (A.32) 
 
By discretising X as in Equation A.9, we can approximate the ( )sfS  defined in 
Equation A.32 by 
 
 ( ) ( )∑
=
=
−=
Kk
kxXYkS xsfmsg k
,1
 (A.33) 
 
where km  is the mess probability associated with the discrete point kx . 
 
Equation A.33 can be implemented in the same way as Equation A.10 for the product 
of two random variables. 
 
A.5.2 Approximate Probability Distribution of the Sum of Multiple 
Random Variables 
Suppose 
 
 nXXXS +++= ⋯21  (A.34) 
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where nXX ,,1 ⋯  are random variables of the CDC defined in Equation A.23. 
 
As for the product of multiple random variables, the sum of multiple random 
variables can be dealt with sequentially by replacing the first two random variables 
with their sum. Define the first surrogate random variable A as 
 
 21 XXA +=  (A.35) 
 
The ( )ag A  can be built by Equation A.33. Based on Bayesian theorem [Bishop 
1995], the conditional probability of kxX ,11 =  given aA =  is derived as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )kxXXkAk xafmagaAxX k ,1,1,11 ,112
1Pr −===
=
 (A.36) 
 
From Equation A.35, we have 
 
 ( ) 1,Pr
,11,12 ===−= aAxXxaX kk  (A.37) 
 
Based on Equations A.36 and A.37, we have 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )kxXXkAkk xafmagaAxaXxX k ,1,1,12,11 ,112
1
,Pr −==−==
=
 (A.38) 
 
From Equation A.38, the mixture model of the distribution of 3X  given aA =  can 
be approximated by Equation A.2 as 
 
 
( )
( ) ( )3,,
,1
,1,1
,11,123
,112
3
xf
af
xafm
g
kk
k
xXxaXX
Kk A
kxXXk
aAX =−=
=
=
=
⋅
−
= ∑  (A.39) 
 
 288 
The approximate conditional distribution 
aAX i
g
=
, ni ,,4 ⋯=  can be built as a 
mixture model in the same way as in Equation A.39. 
 
By repeating the above process, the sum of multiple random variables can be dealt 
with sequentially in the same way as for the product of multiple random variables. 
 
A.5.3 Process for Building Approximate Probability Distribution of 
Sum of Products of Random Variables 
The sum of products of random variables is defined as 
 
 ∏∏∏
===
+++=
kn
j
j
m
i
i wYXS
111 ℓ
ℓ⋯  (A.40) 
 
where iX , mi ,,1⋯= , jY , nj ,,1⋯=  and ℓW , k,,1⋯ℓ =  are different random 
variable. 
 
According to Equation A.40, S can be defined by the RVC and the associated CDC 
as 
 
 RVC: knm WWYYXX ⋯⋯⋯⋯ 111  (A.41.a) 
 
 CDC: ( ) ( )21 121 xfxf XXX … ( )1,, 11 yf XXY m ⋯ … ( )kXWW wf kk 11 ,,⋯−  (A.41.b) 
 
Define 
 
∏
=
=
m
i
iXA
1
, ∏
=
=
n
j
jYB
1
, ∏
=
=
k
wD
1ℓ
ℓ  
 
 289 
The approximate probability distribution of S can be built by alternatively applying 
the process for the product and the process for the sum of random variables as 
developed in the previous section. The process is defined as follows. 
 
Step 1: substitute the first product A and obtain 
  
 RVC: kn WWYAY ⋯⋯⋯ 11  (A.42.a) 
 
 CDC: ( )ag A ( )11 yg AY … ( )kAYWW wg kk ,, 11 ⋯−  (A.42.b) 
 
Step 2: substitute the second product B and obtain 
 
 RVC: kWWAB ⋯⋯ 1  (A.43.a) 
 
 CDC: ( )ag A ( )bg AB … ( )kABWW wg kk ,,,1 ⋯−  (A.43.b) 
 
Step 3: substitute BAS +=1  and obtain 
 
 RVC: kWWS ⋯⋯ 11  (A.44.a) 
 
 CDC: ( ) ( ) ( )kSWWSWS wgwgsg kk 11111 ,,1, ⋯⋯ ⋯⋯ −  (A.44.b) 
 
Step 4: repeat Step 1 to Step 3 until reaching the last sum representing S.  
 
The Step 1 and Step 2 can be implemented with the algorithm for the product of 
random variables; while Step 3 can be implemented with the algorithm for the sum 
of random variables. 
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A.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we propose an approximate analytical solution of the probability 
distribution of the product of two random variables of a general joint distribution. 
The approximate solution is defined by the mixture probability model; the 
discretisation method is investigated regarding the marginal distribution, the 
conditional distribution and the inverse curve x1 . Because normal random variables 
are used in the case studies planned for this research, we implement the approximate 
probability distribution of the product of two normal random variables for 
demonstration. For the product of two independent standard normal variables, we 
compare the approximate distribution with the analytical distribution. The 
comparison shows that the approximate analytical solution can approach the 
analytical distribution with high accuracy when we increase the number of the 
components in the approximate distribution. 
 
By Bayesian theorem, the approximate analytical solution is further expanded for the 
product of multiple random variables and for the sum of the products of random 
variables. The random variables are deal with sequentially and only one random 
variable is discretised at each step. The method is therefore suitable for large models 
while it is very difficult if possible to cope with the all random variables 
simultaneously. We test the expanded approximate distribution model with the 
product of three correlated normal random variables. The outcome approximate 
distribution is compared with the simulations of the product. 
 
As a conclusion, the approximate analytical solutions offer a potential generic way 
for building the distribution of the sum of products of random variables of a general 
joint distribution. They are also easy to implement on computers. The approximate 
analytical solutions are still not applicable. More efforts, for example, need to be 
exerted to measure and control the computation error. 
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Appendix B  
 
Tables Relating to the Case Studies 
 
 
B.1 Elicited Data for the Precursor Families Related to HET10 
B.1.1 Precursor Family RVSTRENV 
B.1.1.1 Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 3 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the variant factors for 
the precursor family RVSTRENV. 
 
The precursor family RVSTRENV is defined for “RV incorrectly on various types of 
LCs and struck by train due to environmental factors”. As summarized in Table B.1, 
one variant factor class is elicited as “RV drivers' ability to respond to the prevailing 
weather conditions”. The level crossings are put into two categories: user worked 
crossings (UWC) and non-UWC [RSSB 2004]. The two categories of LCs have their 
own users. Accordingly the two groups of users are defined as UWC users and non-
UWC users. 
 
Table B.1 Elicited factor class for the family RVSTRENV 
Family RVSTRENV – RV incorrectly on various types of LCs and struck by train due to 
environmental factors 
No. Variant Class 
2.  RV drivers' ability to respond to the prevailing weather conditions. 
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B.1.1.2  Correlations between the Precursors and the Associated 
Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 4a in Fig. 6.2 because one variant factor class has 
been elicited for the family RVSTRENV. We will elicit the correlations between the 
precursors and the associated variant factors. 
 
A medium correlation is elicited between the precursors on UWC LCs and the UWC 
users; a medium correlation is also elicited between the precursors on non-UWC LCs 
and the non-UWC users. The elicited results are summarized in Table B.2. Because 
the elicited correlations are positive in this case study we do not mark the correlation 
sign explicitly. 
 
Table B.2 Elicited correlations between the variant factors and the associated 
precursors of the family RVSTRENV 
Precursor Family RVSTRENV – RV incorrectly on LC and struck by train due 
to environmental factors 
Variant Class RV drivers' ability to respond to the prevailing weather 
conditions. 
NO. Variant Factors Associated precursor Correlation 
3. Concerning UWC LCs RVSTRENV on UWC LCs M 
4. Concerning Non-UWC LCs RVSTRENV on Non-UWC LCs M 
 
B.1.1.3  Correlations within the Variant Factor Class 
This subsection is related to Block 5 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the correlations within 
the factor class of "RV drivers' ability to respond to the prevailing weather 
conditions". 
 
A medium correlation between UWC users and non-UWC users is elicited as 
summarized in Table B.3. 
 
Table B.3 The correlations within the factor class for the family RVSTRENV 
Family name RVSTRENV – RV incorrectly on LCs and struck by train due to 
environmental factors 
 293 
Variant class RV drivers' ability to respond to the prevailing weather conditions 
Variant factor 1 On UWC LCs 
Variant factor 2 On Non-UWC LCs 
The correlation between the 
above two variant factors 
M 
 
B.1.2 Precursor Family TOVRSPD 
B.1.2.1  Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 3 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the variant factors for 
the precursor family TOVRSPD. 
 
The precursor family TOVRSPD is defined as “Train over-speeding causes RV 
struck by train on various types of LCs”. For this family, no significant variant factor 
is identified by the experts. 
 
B.1.2.2  Proportion of the Variance of Each Precursor due to the 
Family Commonality 
This subsection is related to Block 4b in Fig. 6.2 because no variant factor is 
identified for the family TOVRSPD. 
 
As proposed previously, the proportion of the variance due to the family 
commonality is elicited for each family member as summarized in Table B.4. 
 
Table B.4 Proportion of the variance due to the family commonality elicited for each 
precursor in the family TOVRSPD 
Family TOVRSPD – Train over-speeding causes RV struck by train on various types of LCs 
No. Precursor 
Proportion of the variance due to the family commonality 
(100% for a very strong family; 90%   for a less strong family) 
1.  TOVRSPD on ABCL 0.9 
2.  TOVRSPD on AHB 0.9 
3.  TOVRSPD on AOCL 0.9 
4.  TOVRSPD on MG/B 0.9 
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B.1.3 Precursor Family RVSTRAN 
B.1.3.1  Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 3 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the variant factors for 
the precursor family RVSTRAN. 
 
The precursor family RVSTRAN is defined as “RV stranded on LC causes RV struck 
by train on various types of LCs”. For this family, two variant factor classes are 
identified as summarized in Table B.5 as: 
• FC1: Propensity for there to be blocking back on a crossing, i.e. where you get 
traffic jams extending back over level crossings 
• FC2: Profile of the RV drivers using the crossing, i.e. the propensity of certain 
drivers to violate rules 
 
Table B.5 Factor classes of the precursor family RVSTRAN 
Family RVSTRAN – RV stranded on LC causes RV struck by train on various types of LCs 
No. Variant Classes 
1.  Propensity for there to be blocking back on a level crossing 
2.  Propensity of the drivers violating the rules when using the level crossing 
 
B.1.3.2  Correlations between the Precursors and the Associated 
Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 4a in Fig. 6.2 because one variant factor class has 
been elicited for the family. We will elicit the correlations between the precursors 
and the associated variant factors. 
 
For the variant factors regarding the propensity for there to be blocking back on a 
crossing, the correlations between the precursors and the associated variant factors 
are elicited and summarized in Table B.6. 
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For the variant factors regarding the propensity of the drivers violating the rules 
when using the level crossing, the UWC user group and non-UWC user group are 
defined as for the family RVSTRENV. The correlations between the precursors and 
the associated variant factors are elicited and summarized in Table B.7. 
 
Table B.6 Elicited correlations between the precursors in the family RVSTRAN and 
the associated variant factors regarding the propensity for there to be blocking back 
on a crossing 
Precursor Family RVSTRAN – RV stranded on various LC 
Variant Factor Class Propensity for there to be blocking back on a crossing 
NO. Variant Factor Associated precursor Correlation 
1.  Propensity for there to be 
blocking back on ABCL 
RVSTRAN on ABCL W (ABCL tend to quite rural 
and hence light use by traffic) 
2.  Propensity for there to be 
blocking back on AHB 
RVSTRAN on AHB S (blocking back seems to 
happen predominantly on AHB 
crossings) 
3.  Propensity for there to be 
blocking back on AOCL 
RVSTRAN on AOCL W (AOCL tend to be quite rural 
and hence light use by traffic) 
4.  Propensity for there to be 
blocking back on MG/B 
RVSTRAN on MG/B VW (manual barriers would 
have to be closed round vehicle) 
5.  Propensity for there to be 
blocking back on UWC 
RVSTRAN on UWC VW (likely to be single use) 
6.  Propensity for there to be 
blocking back on UWC-
MWL 
RVSTRAN on UWC-
MWL 
VW (likely to be single use) 
7.  Propensity for there to be 
blocking back on UWC+T 
RVSTRAN on UWC+T VW (likely to be single use) 
 
Table B.7 Elicited correlations between the precursors in Family RVSTRAN and the 
associated variant factors regarding the propensity of the drivers violating the rules 
when using the level crossing 
Precursor Family RVSTRAN – RV stranded on various LCs 
Variant Factor Class Propensity of the drivers violating the rules when 
using the level crossing 
NO. Variant Factor 
Propensity of the drivers violating 
the rules when using the LC on 
Associated precursor Correlation 
1.  ABCL RVSTRAN on ABCL M 
2.  AHB RVSTRAN on AHB M 
3.  AOCL RVSTRAN on AOCL VW 
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4.  MG/B RVSTRAN on MG/B VW 
5.  UWC RVSTRAN on UWC S 
6.  UWC-MWL RVSTRAN on UWC-MWL S 
7.  UWC+T RVSTRAN on UWC+T S 
 
B.1.3.3  Correlations within the Variant Factor Classes 
This subsection is related to Block 5 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the correlations within 
the variant factor classes. 
 
For the variant factor class regarding the propensity for there to be blocking back on 
a crossing, the correlations within the factor class are elicited and summarized in 
Table B.8. 
 
For the variant factor class regarding the propensity of the drivers violating the rules 
when using the level crossing, the correlations within the class are elicited and 
summarized in Table B.9. 
 
Table B.8 Correlations within the variant factor class regarding the propensity for 
there to be blocking back on a crossing 
Family RVSTRAN – RV stranded on various LC 
Variant class Propensity for there to be blocking back on a crossing 
Variant 
factors 
On 
AHB On AOCL 
On 
MG/B 
On 
UWC On UWC-MWL On UWC+T 
On ABCL W M (due to similar 
location of LCs) 
VW W W W 
On AHB  VW VW W W W 
On AOCL   VW VW VW VW 
On MG/B    VW VW VW 
On UWC     VS (due to similar 
UWC usage) 
VS (due to similar 
UWC usage) 
On UWC-
MWL 
     VS (due to similar 
UWC usage) 
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Table B.9 Correlations within the variant factor class regarding the propensity of the 
drivers violating the rules when using the level crossing 
Family RVSTRAN – RV stranded on various LC 
Variant class Propensity of the drivers violating the rules when using the level crossing 
Variant factors On Non-UWCs 
On UWCs M 
 
B.1.4 Precursor Family SPADPROT 
B.1.4.1  Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 3 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the variant factors for 
the precursor family SPADPROT. 
 
The precursor family SPADPROT is defined as “SPAD at signal protecting the LC 
causes RV struck by train on various types of LCs”. As summarized in Table B.10, 
one factor class is identified by the experts as “the effectiveness of the signal 
protecting the LCs”. 
 
Table B.10 Elicited factor class of the family SPADPROT 
Family SPADPROT – SPAD at signal protecting the LC 
No. Variant Factor Class 
1.  Effectiveness of signals protecting the LC 
 
The Correlations between the Precursors and the Associated Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 4a in Fig. 6.2 because one variant factor class has 
been elicited for the family. We will elicit the correlations between the precursors 
and the associated variant factors. 
 
The correlations between the precursors and the associated variant factors are elicited 
and summarized in Table B.11. 
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Table B.11 Elicited correlations between the precursors in Family SPADPROT and 
the associated variant factors 
Precursor Family SPADPROT – SPAD at signal protecting the LC 
Variant Class Effectiveness of signals protecting the LC 
NO. Variant Factor Associated precursor Correlation 
1.  Effectiveness of the signals 
protecting ABCL 
SPADPROT on ABCL VW 
2.  Effectiveness of the signals 
protecting AOCL 
SPADPROT on AOCL VW 
3.  Effectiveness of the signals 
protecting MG/B 
SPADPROT on MG/B VW 
 
B.1.4.2  Correlations within the Variant Factor Class 
This subsection is related to Block 5 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the correlations within 
the factor class of the effectiveness of the signals protecting LCs. 
 
The correlations within the factor class are elicited and summarized in Table B.12. 
 
 
Table B.12 Elicited correlations within the variant factor class regarding the 
effectiveness of the signals protecting LCs 
Family name SPADPROT – SPAD at signal protecting the LC 
Variant class Quality of the drivers using the LC (propensity of certain drivers to violate rules) 
Variant 
factors On AOCL On MG/B 
On ABCL VW VW 
On AOCL  VW 
Note: 
The physical similarity of the signals 
protecting the different types of level 
crossings is a good clue on the correlation. 
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B.1.5 Precursor Family SIGERR 
B.1.5.1  Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 3 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the variant factors for 
the precursor family SIGERR. 
 
The precursor family SIGERR is defined as “Signalman or Crossing keeper error 
causes RV struck by train on various types of LCs”. As summarized in Table B.13, 
one factor class is identified as “Complexity of operating the crossing”. 
 
Table B.13 Elicited factor class of the family SIGERR 
Family SIGERR – Signalman or Crossing keeper error causes RV struck by train on 
various types of LCs 
No. Variant Factor Class 
1.  complexity of operating the crossing 
 
The Correlations between the Precursors and the Associated Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 4a in Fig. 6.2 because one variant factor class has 
been elicited for the family. We will elicit the correlations between the precursors 
and the associated variant factors. 
 
The correlations between the precursors and the associated variant factors are elicited 
and summarized in Table B.14. 
 
 
Table B.14 Elicited correlations between the precursors in Family SIGERR and the 
associated variant factors 
Precursor Family SIGERR – Signalman or Crossing keeper error causes 
RV struck by train on various types of crossing 
Variant Factor Calss complexity of operating the crossings 
NO. Variant Factor Associated precursor Correlation 
1.  complexity of operating the 
crossing on AHB 
SPADPROT on AHB M 
2.  complexity of operating the 
crossing on MGB 
SPADPROT on MG/B M 
 300 
3.  complexity of operating the 
crossing on UWC+T 
SPADPROT on UWC+T M 
 
B.1.5.2  Correlations within the Variant Factor Class 
This subsection is related to Block 5 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the correlations within 
the factor class of the complexity of operating the crossings. 
 
The correlations within the factor class are elicited and summarized in Table B.15. 
 
 
Table B.15 Elicited correlations within the factor class regarding the complexity of 
operating the crossings 
Family name SIGERR – Signalman or Crossing keeper error causes RV struck by train on 
various types of crossing 
Variant class complexity of operating the crossings 
Variant 
factors On MG/B On UWC+T 
On AHB VW (different operation) S (both remotely 
operated) 
On MG/B  VW (different operation) 
Note: the similarity of 
operating level crossing 
may be a good clue on 
the correlation. 
 
B.1.6 Precursor Family RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL 
The experts believe that the precursors “RV Driver error causing RV struck by train 
on LCs” and the precursors “RV driver deliberate action on various types of 
crossing” are identical on the same level crossing in terms of the uncertainty 
modelling. Correspondingly these two groups of precursors are defined within in one 
family RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL. 
 
B.1.6.1  Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 3 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the variant factors for 
the precursor family RVDRVERR and RVDRVDEL. 
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As summarized in Table B.16, one factor class is identified by the experts as “the 
quality of the users”. The UWC user group and non-UWC user group are defined as 
for the families RVSTRENV and RVSTRAN. 
 
Table B.16 Elicited factor class of the family RVDRVERR & RVDRVDEL 
Family DRERRSTR & RVDRVDEL: RV Driver error causing RV struck by train on LCs and 
RV driver deliberate action on various types of crossing 
No. Variant Factor Class 
1.  Quality of the drivers using the crossing (propensity of certain drivers to violate rules) 
 
The Correlations between the Precursors and the Associated Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 4a in Fig. 6.2 because one variant factor class has 
been elicited for the family. We will elicit the correlations between the precursors 
and the associated variant factors. 
 
The correlations between the precursors and the associated variant factors are elicited 
and summarized in Table B.17.  
 
Table B.17 Elicited correlations between the precursors in Family RVDRVERR and 
RVDRVDEL and the associated variant factors 
Precursor Family DRERRSTR & RVDRVDEL 
Variant Factor Class Quality of the drivers using the crossing (propensity of 
certain drivers to violate rules) 
NO. Variant Factor Associated precursor Correlation 
1. Quality of the RV drivers using 
UWC level crossings 
DRERRSTR & RVDRVDEL on 
UWC level crossings 
Very Strong 
2. Quality of the RV drivers using 
Non-UWC level crossings 
DRERRSTR & RVDRVDEL on 
Non-UWC level crossings 
Very Strong  
 
B.1.6.2  Correlations within the Variant Factor Class 
This subsection is related to Block 5 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the correlations within 
the factor class of 
 
The correlations within the factor class are elicited and summarized in Table B.18. 
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Table B.18 Elicited correlations within the factor class regarding the quality of the 
users of the LCs 
Family name DRERRSTR & RVDRVDEL 
Variant factor class Quality of the drivers using the crossing (propensity of certain 
drivers to violate rules) 
Variant factors 1 On UWC level crossings 
Variant factors 2 On Non-UWC level crossings 
The correlation between the 
above two variant factors 
(Tip: think of the similarity 
between the two groups of 
drivers) 
M – the reason for this is that the users using the UWC 
crossings will also form part of the driver population who use 
non-UWC crossings.  Therefore information regarding the 
uncertainty of the UWC error rate is likely to inform us of the 
uncertainty in the Non-UWC error rate.  
 
B.1.7 Precursor Family RVDRVSUI 
B.1.7.1  Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 3 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the variant factors for 
the precursor family RVDRVSUI. 
 
The precursor family RVDRVSUI is defined as “RV driver suicide causes RV struck 
by train on various types of LCs”. For this family, no significant variant class is 
identified by the experts. 
 
The Proportion of the Variance of Each Precursor due to the Family Commonality 
This subsection is related to Block 4b in Fig. 6.2 because no variant factor is 
identified for the family. 
 
As proposed previously, the proportion of the variance due to the family 
commonality is elicited for each precursor as summarized in Table B.19. 
 
Table B.19 Elicited proportion of the variance due to the family commonality for the 
family RVDRVSUI 
Family Name RVDRVSUI - RV driver suicide on various types of LC 
No. Precursor Proportion of covariance due to the family 
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commonality(Number between 0 and 1) 
1.  RVDRVSUI on ABCL 0.95 
2.  RVDRVSUI on AHB 0.95 
3.  RVDRVSUI on AOCL 0.95 
4.  RVDRVSUI on O 0.95 
5.  RVDRVSUI on UWC 0.95 
6.  RVDRVSUI on UWC-MWL 0.95 
7.  RVDRVSUI on UWC-T 0.95 
 
B.1.8  Precursor Family LTBRFAI 
B.1.8.1  Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 3 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the variant factors for 
the precursor family LTBRRAI. 
 
The precursor family LTBRFAI is defined as “That Light/barriers fail to operate 
causes RV struck by train on various types of LCs”. As summarized in Table B.20, 
one factor class is identified by the experts as “the technical workings of the lights 
and barriers and their failure rates”.  
 
Table B.20 Elicited factor class of the family LTBRFAI 
Family LTBRFAI – Light/barriers fail to operate on various types of LC 
No. Variant Class 
1.  Technical workings of the various lights and barriers and their likely failure rates 
 
 
The Correlations between the Precursors and the Associated Variant Factors 
This subsection is related to Block 4a in Fig. 6.2 because one variant factor class has 
been elicited for the family. We will elicit the correlations between the precursors 
and the associated variant factors. 
 
The correlations between the precursors and the associated variant factors are elicited 
as summarized in Table B.21. 
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Table B.21 Elicited correlations between the precursors in Family LTBRFAI and the 
associated variant factors 
Precursor Family LTBRFAI – Light/barriers fail to operate on various types 
of LCs 
Variant Factor Class Technical workings of the various lights and barriers and 
their likely failure rates 
NO. Variant Factor Associated precursor Correlation 
3.  Technical workings and 
likely failure rates on ABCL 
LTBRFAI on ABCL M 
4.  Technical workings and 
likely failure rates on AHB 
LTBRFAI on AHB M 
5.  Technical workings and 
likely failure rates on AOCL 
LTBRFAI on AOCL M 
6.  Technical workings and 
likely failure rates on MG/B 
LTBRFAI on MG/B W (as the crossing is 
under manual control 
 
B.1.8.2  Correlations within the Variant Factor Class 
This subsection is related to Block 5 in Fig. 6.2. We will elicit the correlations within 
the factor class of the technical workings and likely failure rates between the LCs. 
 
The correlations within the factor class are elicited as summarized in Table B.22. 
 
Table B.22 Elicited correlations within the factor class regarding the technical 
workings and likely failure rates between the LCs 
Family LTBRFAI – Light/barriers fail to operate on various types of LC 
Variant class Technical workings of the various lights and barriers and their likely failure rates 
Variant 
factors On AHB On AOCL On MG/B 
On ABCL VS (similar 
lights & barrier) 
W (similar lights – 
barriers are different) 
M (similar lights) 
On AHB  W (similar lights – 
barriers are different) 
M (similar lights) 
On AOCL   M (similar lights) 
The technical 
similarity of the 
equipment of light 
and barrier between 
the level crossing 
types is a good clue 
to assess the 
correlation. 
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B.2 Rule Sets Related to HET10 
 
Table B.23 Rule sets related to HET10 
Rule Set Code Description 
T10-LCPAU-2 Train strikes normal road vehicle (car/HGV) on AOCL or ABCL crossing, 
with fire 
T10-LCPAU-3 Train strikes large road vehicle above buffer height (low loader, JCB, 
etc. ) on an AOCL or ABCL crossing, no fire 
T10-LCPAU-4 Train strikes large road vehicle above buffer height (low loader, JCB, 
etc. ) on an AOCL or ABCL crossing, with fire 
T10-LCPAU-5 Train strikes HGV carrying toxic hazardous goods on AOCL or ABCL 
crossing, no fire 
T10-LCPAU-6 Train strikes HGV carrying toxic hazardous goods on AOCL or ABCL 
crossing, with fire 
T10-LCPAU-7 Train strikes HGV carrying flammable hazardous goods on AOCL or 
ABCL crossing, with fire 
T10-LCPRO-2 Train strikes normal road vehicle (car/HGV) on AHB, FP, MB/MCB/CCTV 
& all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), with fire 
T10-LCPRO-3 Train strikes large road vehicle above buffer height (low loader, JCB, 
etc. ) on AHB, FP, MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), no 
fire 
T10-LCPRO-4 Train strikes large road vehicle above buffer height (low loader, JCB, 
etc. ) on AHB, FP, MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), 
with fire 
T10-LCPRO-5 Train strikes HGV carrying toxic hazardous goods on AHB, FP, 
MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), no fire 
T10-LCPRO-6 Train strikes HGV carrying toxic hazardous goods on AHB, FP, 
MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), with fire 
T10-LCPRO-7 Train strikes HGV carrying flammable hazardous goods on AHB, FP, 
MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC) crossing, with fire 
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Table B.24 Rule sets related to HET12 
Code Description 
T12-BG-1 Passenger train derailment on rail bridge 
T12-OF-01 PT Fast derailment on open track inside train clearances 
T12-OF-02 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side 
T12-OF-03 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, no fire 
T12-OF-04 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, with fire 
T12-OF-05 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, no fire 
T12-OF-06 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, with fire 
T12-OF-07 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, no fire 
T12-OF-08 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, with fire 
T12-OF-09 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, no fire 
T12-OF-10 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, with fire 
T12-OF-11 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, no fire 
T12-OF-12 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, with fire 
T12-OF-13 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with PT, no fire 
T12-OF-14 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with PT, with fire 
T12-OF-15 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
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line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-
hazardous goods, no fire 
T12-OF-16 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-
hazardous goods, with fire 
T12-OF-17 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying toxic haz 
goods, no fire 
T12-OF-18 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying toxic haz 
goods, with fire 
T12-OF-19 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on side, secondary collision with FT carrying flammable haz 
goods, no fire 
T12-OF-20 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying flammable 
haz goods, with fire 
T12-OF-21 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with PT, no fire 
T12-OF-22 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with PT, with fire 
T12-OF-23 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-hazardous 
goods, no fire 
T12-OF-24 PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-hazardous 
goods, with fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-01 
PT Fast derailment on open track inside train clearances 
T12-
OFAUTO-02 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side 
T12-
OFAUTO-03 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-04 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, with fire 
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T12-
OFAUTO-05 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-06 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, with fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-07 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-08 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, with fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-09 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-10 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, with fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-11 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-12 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, with fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-13 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with PT, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-14 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with PT, with fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-15 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-
hazardous goods, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-16 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-
hazardous goods, with fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-17 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying toxic haz 
goods, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-18 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying toxic haz 
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goods, with fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-19 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on side, secondary collision with FT carrying flammable haz 
goods, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-20 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying flammable 
hazardous goods, with fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-21 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with PT, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-22 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with PT, with fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-23 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-hazardous 
goods, no fire 
T12-
OFAUTO-24 
PT Fast derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-hazardous 
goods, with fire 
T12-OS-03 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, no fire 
T12-OS-04 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, with fire 
T12-OS-05 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, no fire 
T12-OS-06 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, with fire 
T12-OS-07 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, no fire 
T12-OS-08 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, with fire 
T12-OS-09 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, no fire 
T12-OS-10 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
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side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, with fire 
T12-OS-11 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, no fire 
T12-OS-12 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards cess 
side, carriage on its side, hits line side structure, structure collapses onto 
train, with fire 
T12-OS-13 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with PT, no fire 
T12-OS-14 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with PT, with fire 
T12-OS-15 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-
hazardous goods, no fire 
T12-OS-16 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-
hazardous goods, with fire 
T12-OS-17 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying toxic haz 
goods, no fire 
T12-OS-18 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying toxic haz 
goods, with fire 
T12-OS-19 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying flammable haz 
goods, no fire 
T12-OS-20 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying flammable 
haz goods, with fire 
T12-OS-21 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with PT, no fire 
T12-OS-22 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with PT, with fire 
T12-OS-23 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-hazardous 
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goods, no fire 
T12-OS-24 PT Slow derailment on open track outside train clearances, towards adjacent 
line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-hazardous 
goods, with fire 
T12-ST-1 PT Fast derailment in single track tunnel inside train clearances 
T12-ST-2 PT Fast derailment in single track tunnel outside train clearances, carriage in 
contact with tunnel wall, no fire 
T12-ST-3 PT Fast derailment in single track tunnel outside train clearances, carriage in 
contact with tunnel wall, with fire 
T12-TT-1 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel inside train clearances 
T12-TT-2 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
cess side, carriage in contact with tunnel wall, no fire 
T12-TT-3 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
cess side, carriage in contact with tunnel wall, with fire 
T12-TT-7 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
cess side, carriage on its side, no fire 
T12-TT-8 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
cess side, carriage on its side, with fire 
T12-TT-13 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with PT, no fire 
T12-TT-14 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with PT, with fire 
T12-TT-15 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying 
non-hazardous goods, no fire 
T12-TT-16 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying 
non-hazardous goods, with fire 
T12-TT-17 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying 
toxic hazardous goods, no fire 
T12-TT-18 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying 
toxic hazardous goods, with fire 
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T12-TT-19 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying 
flammable hazardous goods, no fire 
T12-TT-20 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying 
flammable hazardous goods, with fire 
T12-TT-21 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with PT, no fire 
T12-TT-22 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with PT, with fire 
T12-TT-23 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-
hazardous goods, no fire 
T12-TT-24 PT Fast derailment in twin track tunnel outside train clearances, towards 
adjacent line, carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-
hazardous goods, with fire 
T14-SF-1 PT Fast derailment at station inside train clearances 
T14-SF-2 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards cess side, 
carriage not on its side 
T14-SF-3 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards cess side, 
carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, no fire 
T14-SF-4 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards cess side, 
carriage not on its side, hits line side structure, with fire 
T14-SF-7 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards cess side, 
carriage on its side, no fire 
T14-SF-8 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards cess side, 
carriage on its side, with fire 
T14-SF-9 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards cess side, 
carriage on its side, hits line side structure, no fire 
T14-SF-10 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards cess side, 
carriage on its side, hits line side structure, with fire 
T14-SF-13 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage not on its side, secondary collision with PT, no fire 
T14-SF-14 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
 313 
Code Description 
carriage not on its side, secondary collision with PT, with fire 
T14-SF-15 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-hazardous 
goods, no fire 
T14-SF-16 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-hazardous 
goods, with fire 
T14-SF-17 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying toxic hazardous 
goods, no fire 
T14-SF-18 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying toxic hazardous 
goods, with fire 
T14-SF-19 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying flammable 
hazardous goods, no fire 
T14-SF-20 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage not on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying flammable 
hazardous goods, with fire 
T14-SF-21 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage on its side, secondary collision with PT, no fire 
T14-SF-22 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage on its side, secondary collision with PT, with fire 
T14-SF-23 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-hazardous 
goods, no fire 
T14-SF-24 PT Fast derailment at station outside train clearances, towards adjacent line, 
carriage on its side, secondary collision with FT carrying non-hazardous 
goods, with fire 
T10-LCPAU-2 Train strikes normal road vehicle (car/HGV) on AOCL or ABCL crossing, with 
fire 
T10-LCPAU-3 Train strikes large road vehicle above buffer height (low loader, JCB, etc. ) 
on an AOCL or ABCL crossing, no fire 
T10-LCPAU-4 Train strikes large road vehicle above buffer height (low loader, JCB, etc. ) 
on an AOCL or ABCL crossing, with fire 
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T10-LCPAU-5 Train strikes HGV carrying toxic hazardous goods on AOCL or ABCL 
crossing, no fire 
T10-LCPAU-6 Train strikes HGV carrying toxic hazardous goods on AOCL or ABCL 
crossing, with fire 
T10-LCPAU-7 Train strikes HGV carrying flammable hazardous goods on AOCL or ABCL 
crossing, with fire 
T10-LCPRO-2 Train strikes normal road vehicle (car/HGV) on AHB, FP, MB/MCB/CCTV & 
all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), with fire 
T10-LCPRO-3 Train strikes large road vehicle above buffer height (low loader, JCB, etc. ) 
on AHB, FP, MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), no fire 
T10-LCPRO-4 Train strikes large road vehicle above buffer height (low loader, JCB, etc. ) 
on AHB, FP, MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), with fire 
T10-LCPRO-5 Train strikes HGV carrying toxic hazardous goods on AHB, FP, 
MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), no fire 
T10-LCPRO-6 Train strikes HGV carrying toxic hazardous goods on AHB, FP, 
MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC), with fire 
T10-LCPRO-7 Train strikes HGV carrying flammable hazardous goods on AHB, FP, 
MB/MCB/CCTV & all UWC (incl. MWL + T & UWC) crossing, with fire 
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Appendix C  
 
Definition and Theorems on Positive Definite and 
Positive Semi-Definite Matrices 
 
 
Definition C.1 Any nn×  symmetric real matrix A is positive definite when 0>AxxT  
for all nonzero vector 1×∈ nRx . A symmetric real matrix A is positive semi-definite 
when 0≥AxxT  for all 1×∈ nRx ; and A is positive definite when 0>AxxT  for all 
1×∈ nRx . 
 
This definition can be found in the books on linear algebra such as [Strang 1986; 
Herstein and Winter 1988; Zhang 1999]. From this definition, we can develop more 
properties about the positive definite matrix and the positive semi-definite matrix. 
 
Theorem C.1 Suppose that A is a nn×  symmetric real matrix of the eigenvalues iλ , 
ni ,,1⋯= . The matrix A is positive definite when 0>iλ  for ni ,,1⋯= ; the matrix A 
is positive semi-definite 0≥iλ  for ni ,,1⋯= . 
 
Proofs: 
Suppose that 1×∈ ni Rh  is the eigenvector associated with iλ , i.e iii hAh λ= . Base on 
the linear algebra theory [Strang 1986], ih  ni ,,1⋯=  are orthogonal and normalized, 
i.e., 
 



=
≠
= ji
ji
hh j
T
i
,1
,0
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Therefore ih  ni ,,1⋯=  define a complete base of the 1×nR  space. Therefore any 
vector 1×∈ nRx  can be defined by the linear combination of ih  ni ,,1⋯=  as 
 
∑
=
=
ni
iihcx
,1
 
 
Base on matrix operation rules [Lay 2003], we have 
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By the orthogonality and the normalization of ih , we have  
 
∑
=
=
ni
ii
T cAxx
,1
2λ  
 
By the above formula, 0≥AxxT  when 0≥iλ  for ni ,,1⋯= . By Definition C.1, the 
matrix A is positive semi-definite and Theorem C.1 is proven. 
 
Theorem C.2 Suppose that A is a nn×  symmetric real matrix. A is then positive 
semi-definite when A can be factored as UUA T= , where nnRU ×∈ . 
 
Proofs: 
By the matrix operation rules [Lay 2003], for any vector 1×∈ nRx  we have 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0≥== UxUxxUUxAxx TTTT  
 
By the linear algebra theory [Strang 1986], we have 1×∈= nRyUx  and 
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( ) ( ) 02 ≥== ∑
i
i
TT yyyUxUx  
 
Therefore the matrix A is positive semi-definite and Theorem C.2 is proven. 
 
Theorem C.3 Suppose that nnRBA ×∈, . The matrix ABBT  is positive semi-definite 
when A is positive semi-definite. 
 
Proofs: 
By the matrix operation rules [Lay 2003], for any vector 1×∈ nRx  we have 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BxABxBxABxxABBx TTTTT ==  
 
By the linear algebra theory [Strang 1986], we have 1×∈= nRyBx . Because A is 
positive semi-definite, we have 
 
( ) 0≥= AyyxABBx TTT  
 
By Definition C.1, Theorem C.3 is proven. 
 
Theorem C.4 Suppose that there are m positive semi-definite matrices nni RA ×∈ , 
mi ,,1⋯= . The sum matrix ∑
=
=
mi
iAA
,1
 is positive semi-definite; the sum matrix A is 
positive definite when any iA  is positive definite. 
 
Proofs: 
For any vector 1×∈ nRx , suppose that ii
T xAx α= . By Definition C.1 we have 0≥iα  
for mi ,,1⋯= . By the matrix operation rules [Lay 2003], we can have 
 
0
,1,1
≥== ∑∑
== mi
i
mi
i
TT xAxAxx α  
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By Definition C.1, the sum matrix A is positive semi-definite. When there exists any 
positive definite iA , i.e. 0>iα  for any 
1×∈ nRx , we have  
 
0
,1
>= ∑
= mi
i
T Axx α  
 
By Definition C.1, the sum matrix A is positive definite. Theorem C.4 is proven. 
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